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It is time to end the ‘war on drugs’ and massively redirect resources towards 
effective evidence-based policies underpinned by rigorous economic analysis.
The pursuit of a militarised and enforcement-led global ‘war on drugs’ strategy has produced enormous negative 
outcomes and collateral damage. These include mass incarceration in the US, highly repressive policies in Asia, vast 
corruption and political destabilisation in Afghanistan and West Africa, immense violence in Latin America, an HIV 
epidemic in Russia, an acute global shortage of pain medication and the propagation of systematic human rights 
abuses around the world.
The strategy has failed based on its own terms. Evidence shows that drug prices have been declining while purity has 
been increasing. This has been despite drastic increases in global enforcement spending. Continuing to spend vast 
resources on punitive enforcement-led policies, generally at the expense of proven public health policies, can no longer 
be justified.
The United Nations has for too long tried to enforce a repressive, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. It must now take the lead 
in advocating a new cooperative international framework based on the fundamental acceptance that different policies 
will work for different countries and regions. 
This new global drug strategy should be based on principles of public health, harm reduction, illicit market impact 
reduction, expanded access to essential medicines, minimisation of problematic consumption, rigorously monitored 
regulatory experimentation and an unwavering commitment to principles of human rights.
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Executive Summary
 John Collins, Editor
 
 
 
A major rethink of international drug policies is under way. The failure of the UN to achieve its goal of ‘a drug free world’ and the continuation of enormous collateral damage from excessively militarised and enforcement-led drug policies, has led to growing calls for an end to the ‘war on 
drugs’. For decades the UN-centred drug control system has sought to enforce a uniform set of prohibitionist 
oriented policies often at the expense of other, arguably more effective policies that incorporate broad 
frameworks of public health and illicit market management. Now the consensus that underpinned this 
system is breaking apart and there is a new trajectory towards accepting global policy pluralism and that 
different policies will work for different countries and regions. The question, however, remains, how 
do states work together to improve global drug policies? This report highlights two approaches. First, 
drastically reallocating resources away from counterproductive and damaging policies towards proven 
public health policies. Second, pursuing rigorously monitored policy and regulatory experimentation.
States appear set to push forward with a new variety of 
responses to this issue designed to meet their various national 
and regional needs. If multilateralism is to remain relevant 
it must evolve its role from that of global enforcer to global 
facilitator. The UN, in particular, must recognise that its role 
is to assist states as they pursue best practice policies based 
on science and evidence, not work to counteract them. If this 
occurs, a new and effective international regime based on 
the acceptance of policy pluralism can emerge. If not, states 
are likely to move ahead unilaterally and the international 
coordinating opportunities that the UN affords will be lost. 
This report begins with John Collins examining the strategic 
logic underpinning drug policy over the last century. He argues 
that the ‘drug free world’ ideology that pervaded the recent 
international strategy was misguided and counterproductive 
and argues that a fundamental restructuring of national and 
international policies and strategies is required. Next Jonathan 
Caulkins suggests that current policy debates underestimate 
prohibition’s success in drastically inflating drug prices and 
diminishing access to illicit drugs in consumer countries. 
He argues that the goal of prohibition should not be to 
eradicate mature drug markets completely, something which 
is not realistic. Instead the goal should be to drive the activity 
underground while controlling collateral damage created by 
the markets. His analysis does not, however, apply to producer 
and transit countries where many of the collateral costs of 
prohibition are displaced.
Taking up this discussion, Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo 
examine the negative impacts of prohibitionist policies on 
producer and transit countries. They argue that Latin American 
governments are increasingly rejecting prohibitionist policies 
due to their poor ‘operationalisation’. They conclude with a 
call for drug policies to be evaluated on the basis of their 
results, not their intentions. Peter Reuter examines the 
evidence on the ‘balloon effect hypothesis’ which posits that 
supply interdiction or eradication in one area merely displaces 
it to another, ‘with no more than temporary inconvenience to 
the participants’. He argues that this hypothesis contains at 
least some element of truth and that effective international 
cooperation and management is required to mitigate 
its damages.
Vanda Felbab-Brown examines the evidence surrounding 
the supply-side policies aggressively pursued by the US 
and its partners in producer and transit countries over the 
past few decades, finding that blanket eradication and 
interdiction policies have not only failed, but have often 
proved highly destabilising for these countries. She argues 
for a shift towards focused-deterrence strategies, selective 
targeting and sequential interdiction efforts. These should 
be coupled with effective economic development and 
population security strategies. Laura Atuesta examines 
the plight of Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) 
created by the drug wars in Latin America. She argues 
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that governments need to implement legislation to recognise the existence 
of IDPs and work to ensure their ability to return to their home regions, as 
well as economic restitution for their losses. She argues that legalisation alone 
will not solve this problem and that it would need to be accompanied by 
major reinvestments of current security expenditures in health, education and 
transport infrastructure. 
Alejandro Madrazo examines the constitutional costs of the ‘war on drugs,’ 
finding that many of the legal changes aimed at better enforcing prohibition 
consist of major alterations to national constitutional systems. These include 
the creation of ‘exceptional’ legal regimes. He argues that once these regimes 
are created they tend to broaden and serve purposes different from those 
originally sought and are hard to reverse. Following on from this, Ernest Drucker 
examines the explosive growth of mass incarceration in the US following the 
declaration of the ‘war on drugs’. He argues that its large-scale systems of 
punishment now represent an important determinant of broader population 
health. He warns that, although drug-related mass incarceration is largely a 
United States phenomenon, it is rising in many developing countries facing 
burgeoning drug markets. 
Continuing this discussion of public health outcomes and turning to a basis for the 
post-‘war on drugs’ strategy, Joanne Csete examines the clear benefits of 
adopting public health policies to manage drugs. She highlights that public 
health services for people who use drugs provide substantial cost savings and 
positive outcomes, yet are grossly under-resourced. She argues for governments 
to scale up these services and ensure that law enforcement does not impede 
access to them. Finally, turning to the role of regulatory experimentation in a 
post-‘war on drugs’ strategy, Mark Kleiman and Jeremy Ziskind examine the case 
of cannabis, ‘the drug for which serious legalisation efforts are now in motion’. 
They argue that, although key questions remain uncertain, it is important to allow 
jurisdictions to pursue their current initiatives with regulatory experimentation 
to determine what policies work and what policies need to be avoided. They also 
outline regulatory principles that can form the basis for states beginning to look at 
cannabis regulation.
The time has now come to develop an international strategy for the twenty-
first century. This will take time to emerge. However the most immediate task 
is ensuring a sound economic basis for policies and reallocating international 
resources accordingly. This report sets out a roadmap for finally ending the 
drug wars. ■ 
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The Economics of  
a New Global Strategy
John Collins
This contribution provides an overview of the evolution of the current international drug control system. It also highlights some of the contradictory forces built into the system since early in its genesis. It examines the microeconomic contradictions inherent in the supply-centric model of control. 
These contradictions have created a central policy paradox within the system and thereby help explain the 
latter’s continued failure to achieve its goals as well as its active propagation of widespread policy harms. 
The contribution then looks at the systemic macroeconomic problems of the globally planned licit drug 
market and how this relates to the provision of essential medicines. The contribution concludes by outlining 
the core tenets for a new strategy for international efforts.
A SHoRT HISToRy oF INTERNATIoNAL  
DRUG CoNTRoL
International drug control efforts, currently governed through 
the United Nations, can be traced to 1909.1  The world’s powers 
met in Shanghai to devise an international response to the vast 
quantities of opiates washing around the global market. Following 
a moralistic and supply-centric vision of this issue, states attending 
resolved to eradicate ‘drug abuse’. This aspiration became codified 
in the 1912 Hague Opium Convention which set the trajectory 
for the next hundred years of control efforts. Although no 
specific tools were initially created to implement this strategy, the 
institutional mechanisms that evolved over the following decades 
became almost entirely focused on supply minimisation and police 
enforcement as the means to achieve it. 
The approach to and conception of the problem resulted in a 
system that was almost entirely supply-centric. All the early political 
and bureaucratic battles centred on controlling supply. Bureaucrats 
were hired to focus on supply; delegates arrived at international 
meetings to discuss supply; home governments then implemented 
supply-focused treaties and recommendations. An international 
machinery emerged, initially under the banner of the League of 
Nations and then transferred to the United Nations, to implement 
this treaty framework.2 As such, the system was built largely upon 
the assumption that by controlling supply it could control and 
eventually eradicate ‘non-medical and non-scientific’ use of drugs.
 
      Summary
 ■ The current United Nations-governed global 
strategy of achieving a ‘drug-free world’ has 
failed. Pursuit of this unachievable goal has 
proved damaging to human security and 
socioeconomic development.
 ■ Decades of evidence conclusively show that 
the supply and demand for illicit drugs are 
not something that can be eradicated.  
They can be managed, either well or badly. 
They are currently being managed badly.
 ■ Multilateralism should not be geared  
towards bullying states into pursuing a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ response to drugs. It should focus 
on facilitating and coordinating multifaceted 
responses based on a principle of  
policy pluralism.
 ■ States should examine whether the failure 
of the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) to guarantee access to essential pain 
medicines internationally is the result of a 
systemic regulatory design flaw or  
other factors.
 ■ The interpretation and implementation of 
the conventions is often a fluid construction 
and a function of the politically dominant 
approach to policies within the UN 
framework at any given time. Over the period 
1970-2008 the ideologically prohibitionist 
approach developed an unchallenged 
suzerainty over the drug issue at the UN. 
This leadership has now been broken as new 
approaches are openly supported. 
 ■ States should drastically re-prioritise resources 
away from law enforcement and interdiction, 
towards public health-based policies of 
harm reduction and treatment. The priority 
should be to ensure that treatment and harm 
reduction services are fully resourced to  
meet requirements.
1 For an historical overview, see ‘The International Drug Control 
System,’ in Governing the Global Drug Wars, ed. John Collins 
(London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012).
2 William B. McAllister, ‘Reflections on a Century of International 
Drug Control,’ in Governing the Global Drug Wars, ed. John Collins 
(London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012), 13.
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Devising policies for dealing with issues of demand and 
consumption was more problematic and generally sidestepped. 
This was particularly important regarding the delicate question 
of opium smoking and the existence of opium monopolies in 
Europe’s Asian colonies. The question of what to do with Asian 
populations living with addiction and the monopolies that 
supplied them, which didn’t conform to the strict ‘medical and 
scientific’ interpretation of ‘legitimate’ drug use, plagued the 
system for the first four decades of its existence. Delegates tried 
to sidestep it by finding common ground between states willing 
to accept international regulation of narcotics, such as Britain, 
and those advocating an absolutist prohibitionist approach, 
such as the United States. Where these two strands intersected 
– around limiting the production and manufacture of opiates 
and cocaine via the creation of a global ‘system of estimates’– 
political progress was possible. Where the two diverged – such 
as on the question of ending the opium monopolies – acrimony 
initially ensued. 
A distinction between global licit and illicit markets was 
eventually formalised into treaty law in 1931, but a growing 
illicit market quickly accompanied this provision. Efforts to 
generate an enforcement response to this illicit market were 
mixed and political momentum stalled as the US adopted 
an absolutist prohibitionist approach to the colonial opium 
monopolies. By the end of the 1930s the system had become 
entwined in negotiations to control the production of opium 
at its source. By the outbreak of World War II it had largely 
lost forward political momentum. The US then used its wartime 
leverage, particularly over its allies, to push through major policy 
changes around the world and by 1945 the drug issue had been 
transformed. Previous impediments to accord, particularly the 
opium monopolies, faded from view and there emerged a more 
coherent supply-centric paradigm. This aspired towards a unified 
commodity control arrangement that would regulate drugs from 
production all the way to consumption. The questions of what 
to do with existing addiction and the illicit market, however, 
remained unanswered.3
The international political battles in the decades following 
World War II centred on the distribution of the regulatory 
burden between states that grew drug crops and states that 
manufactured narcotics. Eventually a compromise oligopolistic 
structure was created, which delineated a group of recognised 
producers to grow opium poppy for the global licit market.4 
These were traded through a set of international conduits 
administered by UN-affiliated technocrats, which eventually 
became the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The 
Single Convention of 1961 codified this approach – although it 
alienated the more hard-line US delegates who became partially 
estranged from the system until the early 1970s. 
In the meantime, countries with previously low rates of illicit 
drug consumption began witnessing a rapid expansion in use. 
As they cast around for a method to deal with this the US-led 
prohibitionist bloc appeared to offer the only coherent model 
ready for adoption. Following the American lead, and supported 
by the UN treaty framework and agencies, states uniformly 
moved towards the criminalisation of use and doubled down on 
supply enforcement measures.
Thus began the trend of modern drug control characterised by 
a series of drug wars. In the 1970s the US took a reinvigorated 
lead on the issue, particularly at the UN and through INCB. This 
was reinforced by a domestic declaration of a ‘war on drugs’ 
under Richard Nixon and an aggressive batch of bilateral drug 
diplomacy. The 1971 Convention and the 1972 amendment to the 
Single Convention represented a strengthening of international 
drug control measures while states gradually ramped up their 
domestic control efforts. The 1988 Convention, aimed primarily 
at illicit trafficking, followed logically from these efforts. Ten years 
later, in 1998, states sought to reinvigorate international efforts 
by embarking on ambitious targets for demand and supply-
reduction under the slogan ‘a drug-free world, we can do it!’5
As the 2000s progressed it became clear that states would miss 
these targets and the international consensus around the current 
supply-centric and prohibitionist-oriented approach began to 
break apart.6 There is now a new willingness among certain 
states, particularly in Latin America, to be vocal about the inherent 
problems within the system and to try to extricate themselves 
from the global drug war quagmires.7 This contribution hopes 
to aid these debates by providing explanations for some of 
the fundamental policy paradoxes built into the system that 
render the supply-centric strategy not only unachievable, 
but in many cases actively damaging to human security and 
socio-economic development.
3 John Collins, ‘Breaking the Monopoly System: American Influence on the British Decision to Prohibit Opium Smoking and End Its Asian 
Monopolies, 1939-1943,’ Paper Presented at Drugs and Drink in Asia : New Perspectives from History Conference, Shanghai University, China, 
June 22, 2012.
4 For the debates around a closed list of producers see John Collins, ‘Anglo-American Relations and International Drug Policy:  The Diplomacy 
of Disunity from the 1953 Opium Conference to the 1961 Single Convention,’ Paper Presented at the Transatlantic Studies Association Annual 
Conference, University College Cork, Ireland, July 12, 2012.
5 David R. Bewley-Taylor, ‘The Contemporary International Drug Control System: A History of the UNGASS Decade,’ in Governing the Global 
Drug Wars, ed. John Collins (London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012), 49.
6 David R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
7 Juan Manuel Santos, ‘Re-examining the Drug Problem Through a Fresh Lens,’ in Governing the Global Drug Wars, ed. John Collins (London: 
LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012): 2–3; Alfonso Serrano, ‘Guatemala president to UN: Reform global drug policy,’ Al Jazeera America, 
September 26, 2013, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/26/guatemalan-presidentcallsfordrugpolicyreformatungeneralassembly.html
A global system which 
predominantly encourages 
policies that transfer the costs of 
prohibition onto poorer producer 
and transit countries, as the current 
system does, is an ineffective and 
unsustainable way to control  
drugs in the long term. 
‘ ,
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THE MICRo-ECoNoMICS oF  
GLoBAL FAILURE
The pursuit of a ‘drug-free world’ is underpinned by the goal of 
eventually reducing illicit supplies to zero. One can argue whether 
policymakers pursue this as a genuine or merely an aspirational 
goal. Regardless, articulating such broad strategic goals has clear 
and substantial impacts on international bureaucracies when 
deciding priorities and allocating resources. This has resulted 
in a drastic overemphasis on policies aimed at suppressing 
the supply of illicit substances and encouraging the pursuit of 
highly repressive demand reduction policies. These extend a full 
spectrum of policy measures, from military intervention, through 
aerial spraying, alternative livelihoods, border enforcement and 
criminalisation of consumption (as a means to deprive supply 
of its demand). Underpinning this strategy, however, is a 
fundamental policy paradox. In a world where demand remains 
relatively constant,8 suppressing supply can have short-run 
price effects.9 However, in a footloose industry like illicit drugs, 
these price increases incentivise a new rise in supply, via shifting 
commodity supply chains. This then feeds back into lower prices 
and an eventual return to a market equilibrium similar to that 
which existed prior to the supply-reduction intervention.10 
This effect is exacerbated for addictive substances. For example, a 
person addicted to heroin is far more likely to decrease outlays on 
other living expenses to meet marginally increased costs for heroin, 
as explained by the economic concept of elasticity.11 Price elasticity 
of demand measures how much demand for a good changes in 
response to price changes. For a good with many substitutes 
(rice can be replaced by wheat) a rise in price brings a 
proportional decline in demand. For a good with few 
substitutes (e.g. a drug required to prevent the onset of 
withdrawal symptoms) and that is inelastic, increases in price 
lead to a proportionally smaller fall in demand (see Figure 1). 
It is also likely that the new equilibrium, although at a similar 
level of supply than before interdiction, may be punctuated by 
a higher level of violence as the least efficient and (potentially) 
less violent actors are cleared from the market.12 This pattern 
can help explain the escalation of drug war violence over the 
past five decades. Market interventions by states disturb the 
political economy of the trade, cultivating more violent actors, 
in turn driving more aggressive state interventions which in turn 
drive more violent outcomes. This is a point highlighted by Paul 
Gootenberg with regard to the evolution of the cocaine trade in 
the Americas from an informal underground economy into the 
present state of acute violence.13
8 UNODC, World Drug Report 2006 (Vienna: United Nations, 2006), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf.
9 These price effects are contingent on many factors, such as how far up the commodity chain interdiction occurs and where outcomes are 
measured. The general trend is for drug prices to grow exponentially as they move up the value chain towards final market consumer countries. 
As a result, interdiction and eradication close to production source have a minimal impact on consumer country prices. For example, eradication 
under the Taliban in the 2000s resulted in a ten fold increase in farm gate prices in Afghanistan. These price increases were largely absorbed 
by the profit margins of traffickers without significant impact on consumer country prices or demand. See Barnett R. Rubin and Jake Sherman, 
Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2008), 
19.
10 Vanda Felbab-Brown, in her contribution to this report, cites data that suggests a maximum of a two-year lag between successful interdiction 
and eradication policies and a return to previous levels of supply.
11 Peter Reuter has pointed out that elasticity varies across different drugs and is influenced by a variety of factors. See Peter Reuter, ed., 
Understanding the Demand for Illegal Drugs (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2010), 20. As a generic example of supply 
interventions in this case we will assume a relatively inelastic demand for addictive drugs in a market where drug consumption is not saturating 
all consumers’ income. 
12 The escalation of violence as a result of ‘undifferentiated targeting of organised crime groups’ is highlighted in Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Focused 
deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities,’ Modernising Drug Law Enforcement 
Report II (International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/03/drug%20law%20
enforcement%20felbabbrown/drug%20law%20enforcement%20felbabbrown.pdf
13 Paul Gootenberg, ‘Cocaine’s ‘Blowback’ North: A Commodity Chain Pre-History of the Mexican Drug Crisis,’ in Governing the Global Drug 
Wars, ed. John Collins (London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012).
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Figure 1. Impact of a Supply-Side Enforcement with a Steep Demand Curve
P  - Price
E  - Equilibrium
S  - Supply
D - Demand
Q - Quantity
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...the system was built largely  
upon the assumption that by  
controlling supply it could control and 
eventually eradicate ‘non-medical  
and non-scientific’ use of drugs.
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This is not to say that a realistic and rational implementation 
of prohibitionist policies is without merit. Vastly inflating the 
price of goods which are deemed detrimental to macro-level 
public health outcomes can be viewed as highly beneficial 
for consumer countries through diminished accessibility.14 
However, these benefits often derive from the transfer 
of prohibition’s externality costs to producer and transit 
countries.15 A global system which predominantly encourages 
policies that transfer the costs of prohibition onto poorer 
producer and transit countries, as the current system does, is 
an ineffective and unsustainable way to control drugs in the 
long term. 
Further, implementing prohibitionist-oriented policies requires 
an appreciation of what they can reasonably be expected to 
do, particularly at the margins. They cannot be expected to 
eradicate drugs. They can be expected to raise prices to a very 
high level and thereby dissuade consumption in final market 
countries.16 However, in consumer countries with mature drug 
markets this policy reaches diminishing returns at a certain 
level.17 Additional spending has little additional effect other 
than creating market interventions which are unpredictable and 
potentially violence-inducing, or increasing societal costs in the 
form of incarceration and negative public health outcomes.18 
Marginal spending in pursuit of these policies is therefore an 
ineffective and often counterproductive use of resources.
A more thorough cost-benefit analysis of the merits of 
prohibition relative to the costs of enforcement, which takes 
into account the cross-border spillovers, is required for a global 
cooperative framework. From this analysis a better appreciation 
of regulatory options and potential for experimentation and 
readjustment of resources can then be decided. This is not 
merely a case of numbers. There are intangible human rights 
and legal institutional costs which must also be weighed.19 
 
14 See Jonathan P. Caulkins’ contribution to this report.
15 See Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo’s contribution to this report. For discussions of specific externalities see Laura Atuesta’s and Alejandro 
Madrazo’s contributions.
16 See Jonathan P. Caulkins’ contribution to this report.
17 Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter, ’Reorienting U.S. Drug Policy,’ Issues in Science and Technology, XXIII/1 (2006), pp.79-85.
18 Joanne Csete’s contribution to this report highlights some of the opportunity costs in terms of money not spent on proven and highly effective 
public health interventions. Ernest Drucker’s contribution highlights the costs of over-incarceration on macro population health determinants.
19 See Alejandro Madrazo’s contribution to this report and Damon Barrett, ‘Reflections on Human Rights and International Drug Control,’ in 
Governing the Global Drug Wars, ed. John Collins (London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012).
20 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Art. 9.4.
21 See Hamid Ghodse, ‘Preface,’ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Availability of Internationally Controlled Drugs:  
Ensuring Adequate Access for Medical and Scientific Purposes (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/
AnnualReports/AR2010/Supplement-AR10_availability_English.pdf.
22 Katherine Pettus, Untreated Pain in the Lower and Middle-Income Countries (Swansea: Global Drug Policy Observatory Situation Analysis, 
2013), http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20Situation%20Analysis%20Essential%20Med.pdf.
23 Ghodse, ‘Preface’.
24 Bertil A. Renborg, ‘The Grand Old Men of the League of Nations: What They Achieved. Who They Were,’ UN Bulletin on Narcotics (1964), 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1964-01-01_4_page002.html.
THE MACRoECoNoMICS oF  
REGULAToRy FAILURE
The international drug control system, through the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB), is tasked with ensuring adequate 
supplies for licit scientific and medical uses.20 This, however, by 
INCB’s own admission, is something which it has failed to do.21 As 
a 2013 GDPO Situation Analysis highlights, ‘[m]ore than 5.5 billion 
people (83 percent of the world’s population) in over 150 countries 
have low to non-existent access to morphine and other controlled 
medicines for pain relief, palliative care or opioid dependency’.22 
While INCB has sought to lay the blame with countries for overly 
restricting national access, the international community must 
examine whether this failure is not instead the result of a systemic 
regulatory design flaw.23
The ‘system of estimates’ upon which the international licit 
market is based was created at a time when policymakers held far 
greater faith in centrally-planned commodity markets to ensure 
that supply met demand. As was remarked in 1964 of the 
international system:
‘[it] pioneers new territory – that of a planned 
economy on a world-wide scale. It regulates a whole 
industry throughout the world’.24 
There is now a greater understanding of the regulatory 
problems associated with centrally-planned markets. 
In particular, the absence of a price mechanism creates major 
information asymmetries and obscures the actual levels of supply 
required to meet demand. Often estimates are extrapolated from 
previous years’ statistics, resulting in a cumulative trend towards 
shortages where supply remains constant while demand is 
growing. This problem accurately predicts the severe shortages and 
large market distortions witnessed in the global pain medication 
market. At the international level this is rendered far more complex 
by the fact that a global market needs to engage in significant 
price differentiation practices to counteract the vast global income 
inequalities between nations and their populations. Further, the 
level of institutional capacity to physically supply ‘medical and 
scientific’ narcotics through legitimate channels varies drastically 
from country to country. 
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These design flaws have all been rendered more problematic by 
the intense politicisation of INCB’s work. Soon after its creation 
in 1968, INCB succumbed to regulatory capture25 by ideologically 
prohibitionist forces within the system.26 It has since evolved into 
a proxy for states advocating an absolutist, prohibitionist-oriented 
approach to narcotics control, while appearing to command 
the legitimacy of a technocratic agency. Examples of the highly 
politicised work of the INCB have been highlighted elsewhere.27 
The ‘system of estimates’ should arguably have been designed 
to provide regulated and accessible forms of opiates globally. 
Poorer populations, in Asia in particular, had previously relied 
on traditional ‘quasi-medical’ uses of opiates, either by smoking 
or eating prepared opium. However, for ideological reasons the 
international goal instead became to suppress all opiate use. The 
indigenous traditional use of opiates was suppressed while the 
system of estimates had no way to provide fully legalised and 
‘medical’ alternatives.  This design flaw could initially be ignored 
out of a belief that medical innovations would soon render plant-
based opioid medicines obsolete. As one of the chief architects 
of the international drug control system and lead US Delegate to 
the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) Harry J. Anslinger 
stated at a UN meeting in 1965:
When it has been demonstrated, as is expected 
within the next few years, that opium is not essential 
for medical purposes, the United States would give 
very favorable consideration to discussions leading to 
an international agreement which would abolish legal 
opium production entirely.28 
The goal was therefore to stabilise and shrink supply until such 
innovations occurred. However, no such ‘silver bullet’ version 
of pain medication has been discovered while the goal of 
suppressing supplies of opioid-based medicines has remained.29
It is unlikely that these information and market asymmetries, 
not to mention the political weaknesses of the INCB structure, 
can be overcome. Nevertheless, the international community 
can take action to reform the current system. Rather than 
examining micro-oriented and state-level ways to counteract 
the vast inequality of access to medicines internationally (see 
Figure 2), it is time to examine seriously whether the model 
begun a century ago, and consolidated under the 1961 
Single Convention, remains suitable to meet the needs of the 
current era. 
Figure 2. Global Inequality: Distribution of Morphine Consumption 200930
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25 Regulatory capture describes an outcome where a regulatory agency becomes unduly influenced by a particular interest group. The interest 
group then uses the agency to advance their goals.
26 The INCB was established in 1968 in accordance with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It represented an amalgamation of its 
technocratic predecessors the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. Debates around the evolving conception of 
INCB are highlighted in David R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control Consensus Fractured (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 266-7.
27 Joanne Csete, ‘Overhauling Oversight: Human Rights at the INCB,’ in Governing the Global Drug Wars, ed. John Collins (London: LSE IDEAS 
Special Reports 2012).
28 Statement by Harry Anslinger to the 20th Session of the UN CND, on the Review of the Commission’s Work During its First Twenty Years, 
December 16, 1965, Federal Bureau of Narcotics Files, US National Archives, ACC 170-74-5, Box 124, File 1230-1 United Nations 20th  
Session (1965).
29 The idea of discovering a synthetic ‘silver bullet’ for pain medicine was a constant theme of drug policy discussions around the 1961 Single 
Convention. See William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History (Routledge, 2000).
30 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Availability of Internationally Controlled Drugs: Ensuring Adequate Access for 
Medical and Scientific Purposes (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2010/
Supplement-AR10_availability_English.pdf.
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The UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) 
in 2016 can and should be used as an opportunity to examine 
other global regulatory models. 
States should also work to ensure that INCB:
1. Remains within its mandate and does not interfere 
with or prejudice states in their pursuit of public 
health interventions and domestic cannabis 
regulation. Excessive interference, outside 
facilitating CND discussion, is a symptom of 
politicisation of INCB, rather than a manifestation 
of the intent of the treaties governing the 
international drug control system. INCB was 
created, first and foremost, as a cooperative, 
technocratic and number-crunching body, not 
a policy advocacy or enforcement body. It has 
pursued these latter interests at the expense of its 
core technocratic function, to the detriment of the 
developing world.
2. Incorporates the basic principles of human rights, 
outlined by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) in its 2012 Guidelines.31 For 
any drug control strategy to be effective it must 
be firmly grounded in adherence to and respect 
for principles of human rights. INCB should not 
be permitted to use UN Secretariat services, while 
claiming to be unbound by the UN’s conventions 
in the field of human rights.32
3. Aggressively acts to expand access to essential 
pain medicines. Further it should work to expand 
the use of opioid substitution therapy (OST) 
through its mandate to provide adequate access 
to ‘gold standard’ treatment medicines such as 
methadone and buprenorphine.33 
The issue of access to essential pain medicines is central to 
economic development, global public health and basic human 
rights. The ‘planned’ global market has not worked as intended. 
It is time to examine a new macroeconomic regulatory approach 
to meet international demand. Ideally this is an issue to be 
addressed at the UN level. If, however, the international drug 
control system fails to respond, national and regional institutions 
should unilaterally move towards addressing this issue. 34  
31 UNODC, UNODC and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-
prison-reform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf
32 In 2014, after years of condemnation by human rights groups, INCB finally adhered to international human rights norms by publicly dissuading 
states from pursuing the death penalty for drug-related offenses. Press Release: ‘INCB encourages States to consider the abolition of the death 
 penalty for drug-related offences,’ United Nations Information Service, March 5, 2014, http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/
PressRelease/PR2014/press_release_050314.pdf
33 See Csete, ‘Overhauling Oversight’.
34  Guatemala is an example of a country currently examining the potential of bringing illicit opium cultivation under regulatory control in order to 
supply medicinal requirements. Phillip Smith, ‘Guatemala Considers Legalizing Opium Growing for Medicinal Market,’ in Drug War Chronicle, 
December 19, 2013, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2013/dec/19/guatemala_considers_legalizing_o.
35 Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes and Alex Stevens, ‘What Can We Learn From The Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?,’ in British Journal of 
Criminology (50)6 (2010): 999-1022ma17 
ToWARDS A REGIME oF  
PoLICy PLURALISM
 
These policy paradoxes and design flaws have resulted in the 
failure to realise the core goals of international drug control. A 
deep strategic re-evaluation is therefore required. This should 
be accompanied by clear alterations in funding allocation and 
policy priorities. Further there must be a far greater emphasis on 
measuring the relative cost and benefits of specific policies. 
The immediate task is for international policymakers to accept that 
a more rational and humble approach to supply-centric policies 
is required. If prohibition is to be pursued as a means to suppress 
the supply of certain drugs deemed incompatible with societal 
well-being, care must be taken to ensure that enforcement is 
resourced only up to the point of drastically raising marginal 
prices to the point where consumption is measurably reduced. 
After this, additional spending is wasteful and likely damaging. 
Further, there is a clearly emerging academic consensus that 
moving towards the decriminalisation of personal consumption, 
along with the effective provision of health and social services, is 
a far more effective way to manage drugs and prevent the highly 
negative consequences associated with criminalisation of people 
who use drugs.35
...there is a clearly emerging  
academic consensus that moving 
towards the decriminalisation of 
personal consumption, along with  
the effective provision of health and 
social services, is a far more  
effective way to manage drugs 
and prevent the highly negative 
consequences associated with 
criminalisation of people 
 who use drugs.
‘
,
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The failures of the war on drugs and the ‘drug-free world’ 
strategy shine a light on a more fortuitous response to 
the question of drugs and drug policy. An effective and 
rational drug policy should aim to manage drug harms via a 
multifaceted and evidence-based approach, not a one-size-
fits-all, one-dimensional war strategy based on impossible 
targets. Managing this problem involves incorporating a 
broad spectrum of policies and indicators and making them 
work in tandem rather than in opposition to one another. 
An example of policies working in opposition to each other 
occurs where the criminalisation of users undermines their 
access to healthcare, justice and other social welfare services.36 
States can begin to embark on a new strategy by: 
 ■ Drastically re-prioritising resources away from 
law enforcement and interdiction, towards 
public health-based policies of harm reduction 
and treatment. The priority should be to ensure 
that treatment and harm reduction services are 
fully resourced to meet requirements.37
 ■ Accurately measuring and reporting total drug 
policy spending in national budgets and where 
this spending is directed.
 ■ Scaling up harm reduction funding to a 
minimum of 10 percent of total drug policy 
spending in national budgets by 2020.
 ■ Designing more effective ways to mitigate the 
harms of drug markets.38
 ■ Engaging in widespread and vigorously 
monitored regulatory experimentation to 
develop the empirical evidence base around 
this topic and discern which policies work and 
which don’t. The moves towards cannabis 
regulation in the US (at a subnational level) and 
Uruguay (at the national level) are a positive 
step in this regard. Regulatory experimentation 
around new psychoactive substances (NPS) will 
also prove useful. 
Multilateral forums should aim to: 
 ■ Disseminate and discuss best practice evidence 
around public health policies of harm reduction, 
prevention of new use and problematic use   
and treatment.
 ■ Disseminate and coordinate illicit market  
impact reduction policies for transit and  
producer countries.
 ■ Ensure access to essential medicines.
 ■ Protect and advocate for human rights.
 ■ Coordinate international cooperation to 
minimise the cross-border externalities of 
increasingly varying national and regional 
policies under a new regime based on  
policy pluralism.
 
 
 
36 Switzerland and the Czech Republic provide two good examples of well-integrated and rigorously evaluated drug control strategies 
for states to consider emulating. See Joanne Csete, From the Mountaintops: What the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in 
Switzerland (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2010), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/from-the-mountaintops-
english-20110524_0.pdf; Joanne Csete, A Balancing Act: Policymaking on Illicit Drugs in the Czech Republic (New York: Open Society 
Foundations, 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/A_Balancing_Act-03-14-2012.pdf.
37 See Joanne Csete’s contribution to this report.
38 See Vanda Felbab-Brown’s contribution to this report.
 
The downsides of prohibition can be minimised if  
combined with: 
 ■ Properly resourced and strongly prioritised 
public health interventions.
 ■ Policies aimed towards minimising the impact 
of illicit markets, rather than focusing on the 
supplies of illicit commodities, in producer and 
transit countries.
 ■ The protection of human rights and access to 
justice of those caught up in the drug  
supply chain.
 ■ Ensuring that people who use drugs are 
adequately protected from law enforcement 
activities and have access to justice, public 
health and social services.
 ■ Limiting policing and enforcement tactics to 
more adequately reflect the strategic goals 
of prohibition: not eradicating but managing 
global drug markets. The goal of managing 
drug markets is to heavily raise prices and 
decrease consumption as far as possible, while 
minimising the accompanying violence and 
impact on user populations.
 ■ Recognition that the goal of a ‘drug-free 
world’ is an impossible target, underpinned by 
flawed assumptions and a basic incoherence 
between tactical means and strategic goals. 
Further it results in policies which fail on a basic 
Hippocratic standard of ‘first do no harm’. 
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39 See Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo’s contribution to this report.
40 Joanne Csete, ‘Overhauling Oversight’.
States should recognise that: 
 ■ Too much debate centres around the legal 
technicalities of the international drug  
control conventions.
 ■ These conventions represent an often 
(purposely) deeply ambiguous and vague 
articulation of a set of goals and aspirations.
 ■ The interpretation and implementation of  
the conventions are often a fluid construction 
and a function of the politically dominant 
viewpoint of policies within the UN framework 
at any given time. Over the period 1970-
2008 the ideologically prohibitionist approach 
developed an unchallenged suzerainty over the 
drug issue at the UN. This leadership has  
now been broken as new approaches are 
openly supported.
 ■ The emergence of policy pluralism within the 
UN is a recent and positive phenomenon.
 ■ Although certain aspects of the conventions 
should be seen as representing binding 
commitments – namely to minimise the 
impact of drug commodities flowing between 
states – in others they should not. The idea 
of an overarching, ‘one-size-fits-all,’ binding 
approach for regulation within states was 
never envisaged by those who drafted the 
conventions. It is a construction of the recent 
prohibitionist era.
 ■ This ‘one-size-fits-all’ prohibitionist approach 
will not work in an era of policy plurality and 
should not be viewed as mandated by  
the Conventions.
 ■ Individual states, subject to best practice 
human rights and global public health 
standards, remain the final arbiters and 
executioners of treaty provisions and are best 
placed to determine what policies can protect 
and improve the ‘health and welfare’ of 
populations within their territories.
 ■ Regulatory experimentation, particularly 
in the case of cannabis and so-called new 
psychoactive substances (NPS), with close 
scientific scrutiny feeding back into policy, 
should be viewed as a positive thing. It should 
be pursued. 
 ■ States should view the drug conventions 
as one part of, and subservient to, a web 
of commitments that encompasses various 
human well-being and security issues.
 ■ Existing international human rights norms 
can be clearly seen as militating against the 
pursuit of deeply repressive and unscientific 
policies based on, for example, compulsory 
detention of addicted populations, blanket 
criminalisation of individual consumption and 
the use of the death penalty. 
 
A time will come when a new convention will encapsulate a 
reformed strategic orientation towards this issue and correct the 
inadequacies of the current convention structure. Now does not 
yet appear the time. A new consensus has not clearly emerged 
which dissatisfied states can rally around to ensure a successful 
convention process. Amendments to the existing conventions, 
however, can and should be countenanced in areas where 
international cooperation is required. This is perhaps most pressing 
in addressing the broken regulatory framework for ensuring access 
to essential medicines.
CoNCLUSIoN:  
CoNTEMPLATING A NEW TRAJECToRy?
From 1909-1961 a highly imperfect regulatory system was 
created based on supply-centric tenets. This system was then 
used by prohibitionist forces after 1961 when they gained political 
ascendancy at the UN. The result was a regulatory overreach that 
assumed the illicit market could be tamed through enforcement and 
the diffusion of police measures internationally. This assumption 
proved to be incorrect, but the policy path determined by this 
view ensured the continuation of a failed approach for decades. 
Meanwhile, the system has enforced obligations for producer and 
transit countries to assume the costs of prohibitionist policies, 
while providing no clear obligation for consumer countries to 
share these costs.39
Now, it is clear that political forces within the system, particularly 
Latin American states, are pushing for a re-evaluation for perhaps 
the first time in the system’s history. Furthermore, many human 
rights organisations are highlighting problematic aspects within 
the system as bodies such as INCB act without institutional 
checks and balances in pursuit of a failed supply-focused and 
prohibitionist paradigm.40 This contribution has highlighted some 
of the policy paradoxes built into the current system which argue 
for an end to the current strategy. The UN General Assembly 
Special Session on Drugs in 2016 provides an excellent opportunity 
for states to break with the failed strategy of the past and pursue 
a more effective international approach to drug policy for the 
twenty-first century. ■
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Effects of Prohibition, 
Enforcement and  
Interdiction on Drug Use
Jonathan P. Caulkins1 
The alleged ‘failure’ of the ‘war on drugs’ is a standard point of departure for discussions of drug law reform,2 but reports of prohibition’s failure – like those of Mark Twain’s death – may be exaggerated. Having a realistic understanding of what prohibition does and does not accomplish in final market 
countries is prerequisite to informed discussion of the relative merits of alternatives. Prohibition and its 
attendant enforcement drive drug prices up far beyond what they would be in a legalised market, and that 
(as well as reduced availability) constrain use and dependence. Applying cost-utility analysis from health 
economics provides a framework for roughly quantifying prohibition’s benefits from reduced dependence. 
This contribution argues that plausible parameter values for the United States suggest those benefits may 
exceed prohibition’s direct costs. Inasmuch as prohibition as implemented in the United States is something 
of a worst case, with toughness pursued far beyond the point of diminishing returns, this likewise 
suggests prohibition may bring net benefits to other final market countries. For those who nonetheless 
want to overturn prohibition, e.g. because prohibition harms source and transshipment countries and/or 
is unsustainable in the long-run given globalisation’s erasing of international borders, the possibility that 
prohibition may not simply be a mistake implies a need to adjust rhetoric accordingly. 
    Summary
 ■ The alleged failures of prohibition in 
consumer/final market countries may be 
overstated in current drug policy discourses.
 ■ Having realistic goals for prohibition in final 
market countries is a prerequisite to informed 
discussion of the relative merits  
of alternatives.  
 ■ The goal of prohibition should not be to 
eradicate mature drug markets completely; 
that is not realistic. The goal should be 
to drive the activity underground while 
controlling collateral damage created by  
the markets.
 ■ Higher prices and greater inconvenience can 
reduce use and use-related consequences, 
even if it remains physically possible for a 
determined customer to procure.  
 ■ Even granting that prohibition’s costs are 
enormous, it does not automatically follow 
that those costs outweigh potential benefits 
from reduced dependence, because the 
benefits may also be very large.  
 ■ This analysis does not apply to source or 
transshipment countries. 
1 The author would like to thank GiveWell and Good Ventures for supporting his work on cannabis policy. The views expressed are the author’s 
and should not be attributed to Carnegie Mellon, GiveWell or Good Ventures, whose officials did not review this article in advance.
2 See, for example, Global Commission on Drug Policy, ‘War on Drugs,’ 2011, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report.
3 See, for example, Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo’s contribution to this report.
None of this gainsays prohibition’s costs or limitations. Prohibition 
clearly fails if it is saddled with the impossible aspiration of 
eliminating all drug use, but it clearly succeeds at constraining 
supply and use to an extent. The common drugs (cocaine, heroin, 
cannabis) are merely semi-refined agricultural products, yet they 
are extraordinarily expensive in final market countries. The only 
illegal drug that is used nearly as widely as are the legal drugs 
(alcohol, nicotine, caffeine) is the one (cannabis) whose prohibition 
is arguably not taken too seriously.
Prohibition is extraordinarily expensive on multiple dimensions, 
including budgetary costs, enrichment of criminal gangs and 
deprivation of liberty. So that prohibition reduces use and 
abuse does not imply it is good or that it could not benefit from 
fundamental reform. However, an honest discussion must look 
fairly at prohibition’s benefits as well as its costs.
Other contributions in this report deal ably with prohibition’s effects 
on source and transshipment countries,3 so the perspective here is 
that of final market countries. The focus is on the United States, 
both for convenience (data availability) and logic; prohibition is 
implemented in a particularly pigheaded way in the United States, 
so its performance in the US is something of a worst case.
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Drugs differ, and so policies should differ across drugs 
accordingly. At a minimum, intelligent discussions ought to 
distinguish between (1) the expensive majors (cocaine/crack, 
heroin and methamphetamine), (2) cannabis, (3) diverted 
pharmaceuticals and (4) the minor drugs (LSD, PCP, GHB, etc.). 
In the interests of space, I address only the first two, paying 
particular attention to cocaine (which has historically dominated 
drug problems in the US) and cannabis (which offers the only 
historical examples of legalisation in the contemporary era).
I discuss evidence concerning prohibition’s effects on those 
drugs’ supply and price, after first discussing metrics upon 
which prohibition should be evaluated. I then connect price to 
consumption, and provide a rough quantification of possible 
benefits of prohibition in terms of reduced dependence. 
4 Mark Kleiman (personal communications) argues that lost consumer liberty or option-value is a fourth category, over and above the foregone 
consumer surplus.  
5 For a discussion of these costs see Ernest Drucker’s and Joanne Csete’s contributions to this report.
6 For example, 98 percent of those reporting current cannabis use in the US national household survey report initiating that use by age 25.   
The corresponding proportions for other drugs are cigarettes 97 percent, alcohol 98 percent, cocaine 87 percent.
Having a realistic understanding 
of what prohibition does and 
does not accomplish in final 
market countries is prerequisite 
to informed discussion of the 
relative merits of alternatives.  
‘ ,
WHAT WoULD CoUNT AS A  
’SUCCESSFUL’ PRoHIBITIoN?
Most countries allow most goods to be produced and 
distributed by private enterprise through markets. The markets 
are almost never completely free. Firms have to comply with 
regulations but, in general, everyone who wants to start a 
business can. There are exceptions, however, and selling a range 
of goods is prohibited, including products from endangered 
species, certain weapons and human organs. Likewise certain 
services may be prohibited, including the sale of votes and 
sexual favours.
The goal of prohibition is not and should not be to eradicate 
the corresponding markets completely; that is not realistic. 
Rather, the goal should be to drive the activity underground, 
making it less efficient or, equivalently, driving up the cost 
of providing the good or service. The combination of higher 
prices and greater inconvenience can reduce use and use-
related consequences, even if it remains physically possible 
for a determined customer to procure the good or service 
in question. 
Prohibitions generate three categories of cost: (1) costs of 
enforcement; (2) greater harms per unit of consumption that 
does occur; and (3) foregone benefits of consumption that does 
not occur.4 The first two are obvious; enforcement is intrusive 
and imprisonment is expensive to both taxpayers and those 
imprisoned, and consumption of street heroin is riskier than 
is consumption of medical-grade heroin delivered through 
heroin maintenance programmes.5 The third pertains to the 
idea of a ’consumer surplus’. Standard economics presumes 
that customers buy whatever brings them the greatest joy. 
If that product is not available, they will buy something else. The 
difference between the joy they could have felt if the banned good 
were available and what they actually feel consuming their second-
favourite object counts as a cost of prohibition.
So if a group of friends would like to get stoned and listen to jazz, 
but prohibition induces them to go to the movies instead, the 
difference between how much they would have enjoyed getting 
stoned and how much they actually enjoyed going to the movies is 
a loss whose value should be charged to prohibition.
The benefits of prohibition are reduced ’externalities’ and reduced 
’internalities’. Externalities are costs one person’s consumption 
imposes on another. For example, to the extent that alcohol 
prohibition reduces drunkenness, it might count fewer assaults, 
greater road safety and less domestic violence among its benefits.
‘Internalities’ are costs that one person’s consumption imposes 
on oneself. Extreme ’Chicago School’ economists generally 
deny the possibility of internalities, assuming perfect consumer 
foresight. An alternative model of human behaviour holds that 
people are heuristic decision-makers who muddle through life 
following rules of thumb that work most of the time for most 
products, but which can be defeated by certain products whose 
effects bundle immediate gratification with some non-negligible 
but modest probability of deep pain in the future. Cocaine 
may fit that description. So might Krispy Kreme doughnuts, 
as in the adage ’a moment on the lips, a lifetime on the hips’. 
Opinions differ sharply and perhaps intractably about whether 
a paternalistic intervention to limit someone’s freedom can ever 
make that person better off. Parents routinely limit their teenagers’ 
freedom, ostensibly out of love and concern for their welfare, 
and modern neuroscience amply demonstrates that the brain’s 
prefrontal cortex and associated executive control does not reach 
maturity until around age 25. (And few who are not already 
polydrug abusers initiate use of a new intoxicant after age 25, so 
almost all drug-using careers are launched by immature brains.6) 
 
 
18  |  End ing  the  Drug  Wars
Liberal democratic societies assume that people generally do 
a fine job of looking out for themselves, or at least a much 
better job than the government would do. Hence, government 
paternalism is usually limited to suasion (e.g. the FDA’s advice on 
healthy eating), ’nudges’ and quality standards (e.g. it is illegal to 
sell lawnmowers that lack a kill switch).7 Outright bans are less 
common, but do exist. For example, some countries and some 
US states prohibit production and purchase of larger firecrackers, 
mostly to prevent internalities (people harming themselves), 
not externalities. 
Dependence-inducing substances pose a special challenge 
to the presumption that consumers consistently act in their 
own self-interest. Repeated administration of artificial neuro-
transmitters creates lasting changes in the brain. Dependence is 
therefore a central consideration. Even though most consumers 
do not become dependent, dependent users account for a 
disproportionate share of consumption. Likewise, intoxicants 
pose special challenges because many decisions to consume 
intoxicants are made while intoxicated, particularly when 
’bingeing’ is common, as with crack.
That holds even for cannabis. According to the 2011 US household 
survey, about 42 percent of all days of cannabis use are by people 
who self-report enough problems to meet DSM-IV criteria for 
substance abuse or dependence (not always dependence on 
cannabis; the 42 percent figure includes cannabis consumed 
by alcoholics). For heroin the proportion is likely much higher;8 
about 83 percent of heroin in the US is consumed by people who 
use heroin daily or near-daily, and most of them are dependent.9 
I will not attempt to resolve here what value, positive or negative, 
to attach to drug use in social welfare calculations; that is more 
of a philosophical debate. Rather, I will look only at prohibition’s 
effect on consumption, and will remember that for all drugs – 
legal and illegal – the majority of consumption is attributable to 
the minority of users who consume on a daily or near-daily basis, 
many of whom have a clinically diagnosable problem of abuse 
or dependence. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CoNCERNING PRICE 
INCREASES ALoNG THE SUPPLy CHAIN  
FoR CoCAINE
The prices of illegal drugs increase enormously as they move down 
the supply chain; those price increases are almost entirely due 
to prohibition.10 I illustrate this by comparing two agricultural-
based psychoactive substances, one legal (caffeine in the form of 
coffee) and one prohibited (cocaine), and contemplate what the 
price of cocaine might be if its distribution costs were comparable 
to those of coffee.
There is sometimes debate about whether distribution costs 
should be thought of in terms of percentage or cost per unit 
weight, so I provide comparable data for silver, a legal product 
whose value per unit weight approaches that of cocaine in South 
America. The silver data show that when a good’s value to weight 
ratio is high, the mark-ups in percentage terms are much lower. 
Their geography of production is broadly similar. Cocaine bound 
for the United States is produced primarily in Colombia, with 
Peru and Bolivia being other major producers. Colombia is the 
world’s second-largest producer of Arabica coffee – albeit a 
distant second to Brazil, with Peru also in the top five. Peru has 
the world’s largest silver reserves and, with Mexico, is either the 
largest or second largest producer depending on the year (Bolivia 
is seventh).
I focus on cocaine ’salt’ (meaning powder), so the product at 
export is already in final form; there is very little processing 
between export and retail sale (just some repackaging and 
perhaps dilution, but diluents’ value is trivial compared with that 
of the cocaine). I likewise consider the prices of silver bullion and 
rounds, not jewellery or flatware. 
The bottom line is clear. The increase in price as cocaine moves 
down its distribution chain utterly dwarfs that of coffee or silver. 
Cocaine prices increase by more than $100 per gram. Silver and 
coffee bean prices increase by less than $0.10 per gram – a 
difference of three orders of magnitude.  
Even if legalisation meant cocaine prices increased along the 
distribution chain by ten times that much, or $1.00 per gram, the 
resulting retail prices would still be less than five percent of their 
current levels. 
 7 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008);  
see Code of Federal Regulations, Title 16, Part 1205, http://cfr.regstoday.com/16cfr1205.aspx.
 8 The household survey-based calculation is not informative for heroin, as most heroin is consumed by people who do not complete the 
household survey.
 9 The author’s side calculation is based on B. Kilmer, S. Everingham, J. Caulkins, G. Midgette, R. Pacula, P. Reuter, R. Burns, B. Han and R. 
Lundberg, What America’s users spend on illicit drugs: 2000-2010 (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2014).  For cannabis in 
the US, daily and near-daily users account for about two-thirds of days-of-use and 80 percent of the quantity consumed. 
10 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013 (Vienna: United Nations, 2013), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/
World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf.
Prohibition clearly fails  
if it is saddled with the impossible 
aspiration of eliminating all drug 
use, but it clearly succeeds  
at constraining supply  
and use to an extent.
‘ ,
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Table 1.  Mark-ups Along the Distribution Chain for Legal and Illegal Commodities
Sources: Cocaine prices within the US are from Fries et al.11  Other prices for illegal drugs are from the World Drug Report, with UK heroin prices 
multiplied by 1.33 to adjust for dilution along the distribution chain (e.g. average purity in the UK is 56 percent vs. 42 percent in Turkey).12  
Likewise, cocaine percent increases over export factor in that US cocaine prices are given per pure gram. 
11 Arthur Fries, Robert W. Anthony, Andrew Cseko Jr., Carl C. Gaither and Eric Schulman, The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981-2007 (Institute 
for Defense Analysis, 2008).
12 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013 (Vienna: United Nations, 2013), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/
World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf.
PRICES ALoNG  
DISTRIBUTIoN 
CHAIN 
CoFFEE SILVER CoCAINE CANNABIS RESIN HERoIN
Units Pound Troy Ounce Gram Gram Gram
Source Country $3-$6,Colombia $21.80, spot price $2.44, Colombia 
(87-95% pure)
$0.75, Morocco $2.23, Afghanistan
In Transit (multi kg) N/A N/A $7.00, Bahamas $2.04, Spain Various
Final Market Country US US US prices per pure g Netherlands UK
Wholesale price $6.75-$8.55 $1 over spot + delivery 
(cash price)
$37
 EPH for 50 + g, 
2007
$2.60
 multi-kg loads
$54
Adjusted to 56% 
purity
Retail price, bulk $3.99-$10.19
Grocery store, 3/4 
pound bag
$1.50-$2 over spot
Coin Store, 20+ 
rounds
$71
Street Dealer, 5g
Retail, single serving $1.25, medium cup 
brewed
Convenience store
$2 over spot
Coin store, single 
round
$175
Street Dealer, 0.25g
$8.60 $86
Adjusted to  
56% purity
 
DRIVERS oF 
DISTRIBUTIoN 
CoSTS 
Price/g.export $0.01 $0.77 $2.68 $0.75 $2.23
Legal Yes Yes No No No
MARK-UPS
Serving size (grams) 17 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2
Piece per serving
Export $0.17 $0.38 $0.54 $0.30 $0.45
Wholesale $0.29 $0.40 $7.40 $1.04 $10.71
Retail, bulk $0.35 $0.42 $14.20
Retail, as sold $1.25 $0.42 $35.00 $3.44 $17.15
% Increase over 
export
Wholesale 69% 5% 1280% 247% 2302%
Retail, bulk 108% 8% 2548%
Retail, single serving 635% 9% 6427% 1047% 3745%
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13  Jeffrey Miron, ‘The Effect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices: Evidence from the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin,’ The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 85/3 (2003): 522-530.  
14 For a detailed analysis of cannabis price increases along the distribution chain from Morocco to final market countries in Europe, see Beau 
Kilmer and J. Burgdorf, ‘Insights about cannabis production and distribution costs in the EU,’ in Further Insights Into Aspects of the Illicit EU 
Drugs Market, ed. F. Trautman, B. Kilmer and P. Turnbull (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union: 2013), 389-404.  
15 Jonathan P. Caulkins and Eric Sevigny, ‘How Many People Does the US Incarcerate for Drug Use, and Who Are They?’ Contemporary Drug   
Problems, 32/3 (2005): 405-428.
16 Robert J. MacCoun, ‘What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis Coffee Shop System?,’  Addiction. 106 (2011): 1899–1910.  
17 See Rosalie Pacula, David Powell, Paul Heaton and Eric Sevigny, ‘Assessing the Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana and Alcohol 
Use: The Devil Is in the Details,’ National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 19302 (2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19302. 
The paper finds that dispensaries are a particularly important component of medical cannabis’s effect on use.
18 O’Connell and Bou-Mater and Nunberg et al. provide data showing that most of those obtaining cannabis recommendations in California do 
not have serious diseases such as cancer, HIV, MS or glaucoma. T. O’Connell and C. Bou-Mater, ‘Long term marijuana users seeking medical 
cannabis in California,’  Harm Reduction Journal, 4/16 (2007); Helen Nunberg , Beau Kilmer, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, James R. Burgdorf, ‘An 
analysis of applicants presenting to a medical marijuana specialty practice in California,’ Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 4/1 (2011).
Some who argue that prices wouldn’t fall so much look at the 
percentage increases, e.g. between wheat and the price of 
breakfast cereal containing wheat.13 I would argue that is an 
incorrect comparison. Converting wheat into breakfast cereal 
involves significant processing, and distribution costs loom much 
larger, in percentage terms, for products with a low value-to-
weight ratio. But even if cocaine increased by as much in absolute 
terms as silver ($0.07 per gram) and also by as much as coffee 
in percentage terms (635 percent), then its retail price would still 
only be $20 per pure gram, not $175 per pure gram as it is today. 
 
Table 1 also gives mark-ups for cannabis resin (moving from 
Morocco to the Netherlands) and heroin (from Afghanistan to 
the UK) to show that the broad outlines of these observations are 
not specific to cocaine or to the Western Hemisphere. 
An amount equivalent to one ’serving’ of cannabis resin, heroin 
and cocaine all cost about the same in the source country, 
roughly $0.30 - $0.50, so we define a ‘serving’ of silver as 0.5 
grams so its price also falls in that range. But despite similar 
prices in the source countries, the retail prices are radically 
different. Distribution of legal commodities is cheap, so their 
prices increase by far less than do the three commodities 
whose distribution is prohibited. Traffickers demand $10,000 
or more per kilogram to move cocaine from South America 
to the US; FedEx will ship a kilogram of anything else 
for $60. While prohibition cannot seal the borders, it 
succeeds in making drugs extraordinarily expensive. 
Legalisation might drive source country prices down sharply, 
and that would lead to a larger percentage increase along 
the distribution chain, but also to even lower final prices than 
are described here. Production of all three illegal drugs with 
current methods is highly labour-intensive. If legalisation 
allowed producers to own and employ labour-saving 
capital equipment, production costs might fall appreciably. 
The differences in price increases across the three illegal 
commodities are instructive. Cannabis, for which the prohibition 
is enforced least intensively, shows by far the smallest increase.14 
The price increases from export country to final market wholesale 
price for cocaine and heroin are similar, but the increase from 
wholesale to retail is much greater for cocaine in the US than for 
heroin in the UK, which makes sense inasmuch as the US pursues 
drug enforcement much more aggressively than does almost any 
other developed country, so the risks and other distribution costs 
are higher. 
CANNABIS
Cannabis accounts for a modest share of the enforcement 
effort and other costs of prohibition. Even though it is 
the most widely used of the illegal drugs, fewer than 10 
percent of drug law violators imprisoned in the United 
States were involved only with cannabis, and incarceration 
for cannabis offences is even less common elsewhere.15 
Nevertheless, cannabis is of interest because there is much better 
empirical evidence concerning how prohibition affects production 
costs and wholesale prices, for two reasons. First, there are well-
established regimes of partial legalisation. The Netherlands has 
de facto legalised retail sales of up to five grams.16 Alaska has 
legalised personal possession and home growing of up to 25 
plants. And a number of western US states, including California, 
Colorado, Oregon and Washington, have legalised medical 
cannabis production and sale, including via bricks-and-mortar 
’dispensaries,’17 with rules about medical eligibility so broad that 
effectively anyone can buy a medical recommendation from a 
‘Doctor 420’.18 
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Second, two US states (Colorado and Washington) recently 
legalised large-scale commercial production and distribution of 
cannabis for recreational, not just medical, purposes. Licensed 
commercial operation has only just commenced as of this writing 
in early 2014, so market conditions are still years from reaching a 
new equilibrium, but considerable effort has gone into estimating 
what production costs and prices will be in the long-run, 
because the regulatory agencies need to estimate tax revenues 
and reach various administrative decisions. These sources 
provide a range of estimates of production costs and wholesale 
prices.19 The relevant analyses are summarised in Figure 1. 
All figures pertain to the wholesale price per pound for high-
potency sinsemilla or its equivalent. The red bar on the left was 
the former price under prohibition ($3,500) in the western states 
where prices have subsequently fallen. 
The  grey bars show how wholesale prices fell as the medical 
industry achieved formal regulatory status under state law.20 
It should be noted that federal prohibition remained in 
place, and both producers and dispensaries were subject 
to occasional federal enforcement action. These grey 
bars therefore represent the effect of only a partial lifting 
of prohibition. 
The second bar ($2,000 per pound) is a typical farmgate price 
quoted by media sources. The third and fourth bars are production 
cost estimates for existing small and large firms, based on data 
collected for BOTEC’s work advising Washington State’s Liquor 
Control Board on its implementation of cannabis legalisation. 
Small and large in this context means production on 100 vs. 1,000 
square metres, respectively. Washington State allows production 
on up to 2,800 square metres, so some further economies of 
scale may be realised in the future. 
The black bars pertain to legalisation. The first ($490 per 
pound) is for the supplier of Dutch medical cannabis. 
It reflects (1) low-volume production, therefore not realising 
economies of scale (2) of medicine, and so is subject to greater 
quality control and inspection costs than one would expect for 
recreational cannabis.21
The next three bars are refinements on the estimates that 
pertain to a situation in which a state has legalised cannabis, 
but growers need to remain discreet in order to avoid 
attracting attention from federal enforcement.22 The last bar, 
for outdoor farming, assumes full legalisation and production 
costs comparable to other crops that are transplanted, rather 
19 Retail prices are harder to project because retailer mark-ups can vary enormously by industry, from lows of 14 percent for gasoline and new 
cars to 139 percent for optical goods, and it is not clear which existing industries provide the best comparators for the future cannabis retailing 
industry. See Jonathan Caulkins, Susan Andrzejweski and Linden Dahlkemper, ‘How Much Will the 25/25/25 Tax Scheme Actually Impact the 
Price of Cannabis?’ Supplement: Retailer and Processor Markup BOTEC Analysis Corp., I-502 Project Report 430-81, 28 June 2013, http://lcb.
wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/BOTEC%20reports/8a_Impact_of_tax_schemes_Appendix_A_on_Markups-Final.pdf.  
20 The price decline was apparent in both official reports and user-contributed websites tracking prices. For a colourful description of how the 
supply expansion affected producers see Walter Hickey, ‘The True Story of the Great Marijuana Crash of 2011,’ Business Insider, 25 September 
2013 , http://www.businessinsider.com/the-great-marijuana-crash-of-2011-2013-9.   
21 Beau Kilmer and J. Burgdorf, ‘Insights about cannabis production and distribution costs in the EU’ in Further Insights Into Aspects of the Illicit 
EU Drugs Market, ed. F. Trautman, B. Kilmer, and P. Turnbull (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union: 2013), 389-404.
22 Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Altered State? Assessing how marijuana 
legalization in California could influence marijuana consumption and public budgets (RAND, 2010).
Figure 1. Production Costs and Wholesale Prices for Cannabis Under Various Scenarios
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than grown from seed (i.e. it allows for production costs 
10-20 times greater than those currently observed for 
industrial hemp). 
We would expect national legalisation in the US to bring 
production costs below those currently achieved by Dutch 
medical growers, but how low depends on the dominant form 
of THC consumption. More expensive indoor growing may be 
necessary for standard usable cannabis that is sold loose and 
rolled by the user. Outdoor production may be limited to butane 
hash oil and other extracts (for vaporisation, direct consumption 
via ‘dabbing’ or infused in edibles and beverages) and pre-rolled 
cigarettes, for which appearance matters less, and ‘fortifying’ 
THC content by adding oils should be possible. 
Any of these scenarios, though, involves a decline of over 
90 percent in pre-tax wholesale prices relative to prohibition, 
and taxes large enough to make up the difference would be 
unprecedented in terms of value-per-unit weight, and would 
thus be expected to invite large-scale evasion unless the 
entire regime were designed around the goal of facilitating 
tax collection.23 
ELASTICITy oF DEMAND
The two previous sections argued that prohibition drives 
prices up substantially, but driving up prices is just a means to 
an end; the ultimate goal is to reduce use and abuse. 
Economists characterise the effect of price on consumption 
via the ‘elasticity of demand,’ which measures the percent 
change in consumption associated with a one percent 
increase in price. (Elasticities are almost always negative, since 
price increases suppress consumption, so a ‘bigger negative’ 
number indicates a greater responsiveness of consumption 
to price.)
Two recent reviews are relevant: Rosalie Pacula reviews the 
literature specific to cannabis and Craig Gallet offers a meta-
analytic survey of the literatures also concerning cocaine 
and heroin.24 Both note complexities. Different studies do 
not always agree, and there are important distinctions. For 
example, youths tend to be more price-responsive than 
older users, and the long-run price response is greater than 
the short-run response. Also, the overall or total elasticity is 
greater (in absolute value) than are participation elasticities; 
the latter encompass only prices’ effects on prevalence. 
However, Pacula concludes that the total elasticity of demand 
for cannabis is likely to be between -0.4 and -1.25, based on 
which Kilmer et al. use -0.54 as the single best point estimate;25 
Gallett finds somewhat larger values for cocaine and heroin. 
There are, however, unavoidable challenges when trying to 
translate an elasticity of demand and a legalisation-induced 
price change into a projected effect on consumption. First, 
all historical evidence underpinning elasticity estimates comes 
from relatively modest price changes within a prohibition 
regime, and the relationship between price and consumption 
may be different after legalisation.26 Second, legalisation can 
affect consumption through a half-dozen or so mechanisms 
besides price.27 Robert MacCoun estimates these might 
have bumped up consumption by an additional five to 
50 percent if California had legalised cannabis in 2010.28 
Third, legalisation-induced price declines would be large 
enough that assumptions about the shape of the demand 
curve well away from current prices can radically affect the 
projected effects on consumption. If one sticks to the linear 
demand curves drawn on chalkboards in an ‘Introduction to 
Economics’ class, then the projected effects on consumption 
will be much smaller than if one believes the demand 
curve actually curves, as with a constant-elasticity curve.29 
 
Hence, even if one somehow knew that legalisation would 
reduce retail prices by 75 percent for cannabis and 90 percent 
for cocaine, and even if one knew those drugs’ elasticities 
over modest prices changes in the past were -0.5 and -0.75, 
respectively, it would almost certainly be wrong to project 
a price-induced increase in consumption of only 0.75*0.5 
= 37.5 percent and 0.9*0.75 = 67.5 percent, respectively. 
Indeed, Caulkins and Kilmer et al. show that one cannot 
rule out the possibility that the actual increases could be very 
much larger.30
The next section works through estimates of prohibition’s 
benefits using arbitrary assumptions that legalisation 
would double the amount of cannabis use and abuse, and 
triple those for cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine. 
Those are plausible and conveniently round numbers, but 
they should be thought of as place-holders for quite broad 
uncertainty ranges.
23  Jonathan P. Caulkins and Michael A.C. Lee, ‘The Drug-Policy Roulette,’ National Affairs, 12 (2012): 35-51.
24  Rosalie L  Pacula, Examining the Impact of Marijuana Legalization on Marijuana Consumption: Insights from the Economics Literature (RAND,   
 2010) WR-770-RC; Craig A. Gallet, ‘Can price get the monkey off our back? A meta-analysis of illicit drug demand,’ Health Economics  
(2013).
25  Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Altered State? Assessing how marijuana  
 legalization in California could influence marijuana consumption and public budgets (RAND, 2010).
26  Caulkins and Lee, ‘The Drug-Policy Roulette,’ 35-51.
27  Robert J. MacCoun, ‘Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition,’  Psychological Bulletin, 113(3) (1993): 497-512.
28  Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating the Non-Price Effects of Legalization on Consumption (RAND, 2010).
29  Jonathan P. Caulkins, ‘Do Drug Prohibition and Enforcement Work?’  White paper published in the ‘What Works?’ series (Lexington Institute,  
 2000); Caulkins and Lee, ‘The Drug-Policy Roulette,’ 35-51; Kilmer, Caulkins, Pacula, MacCoun and Reuter, Altered State?.
30  Caulkins, ‘Do Drug Prohibition and Enforcement Work?’; Kilmer, Caulkins, Pacula, MacCoun and Reuter, Altered State?.
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THE BENEFIT oF PRoHIBITIoN-INDUCED 
REDUCTIoNS IN DEPENDENCE
 
Dependence 
Based on responses to the 2011 household survey, about 
2.6 million Americans meet DSM-IV criteria for cannabis 
dependence (4.1 million for abuse or dependence), with 
about 400,000 also dependent on some other illicit drug.31 
The true rates may be larger, since household surveys miss some 
users, and denial is a hallmark of addiction. Nevertheless, if 
legalisation would double cannabis abuse and dependence, then 
prohibition should get credit for preventing something like 2.2 
million instances of cannabis dependence above and beyond 
those who are also dependent on other illicit drugs.
The number meeting DSM-IV critieria for abuse or dependence on 
cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine is harder to know, since 
so many of them are missed by a household survey. There are, 
however, new estimates of the number using these substances 
on a daily or near-daily basis, which we will use as an imperfect 
proxy for dependence. Kilmer et al. estimate that there were 
0.6 million, 1.0 million and 0.3 – 0.6 million daily or near-daily 
users of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine, respectively.32 
There is some overlap, particularly between cocaine and heroin, 
so the total number of individuals who are daily or near-daily 
users of one of these ‘hard drugs’ is about 90 percent of the 
individual sums.33 Not all daily or near-daily users are dependent, 
but conversely some of the nearly 1 million additional people 
who use hard drugs roughly every other day (but not daily or 
near-daily) are dependent, so there are probably something 
on the order of 2-2.5 million frequent users of hard drugs in 
the US who are dependent. If legalisation would triple rates of 
hard drug use and dependence, then prohibition gets credit for 
averting something like 4-4.5 million instances of dependence on 
hard drugs. 
 
Valuation of Dependence
In the international health literature, the most common method 
for quantifying the loss in well-being associated with disease 
and other health conditions is quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) 
lost. QALYs measure both survival probability and the degree 
of impairment when living with the illness relative to a scale on 
which 1.0 represents perfect health. 
Several studies have estimated the QALY loss caused by 
dependence itself, as opposed to the various other physical 
ailments that are often associated with dependence. For example, 
Mather et al. suggest losses of 0.113 and 0.184 per year of 
dependence and harmful use of cannabis and benzodiazepines.34 
For heroin or polydrug dependence they suggest 0.27 as a ‘[l]
ocally derived weight, [that is] slightly larger than GBD weight 
[of] 0.252,’ referring to Murray and Lopez’s (1996) global 
burden of disease (GBD) study. Zaric et al. assumed a loss of 0.2 
QALY per year spent by injection drug users not in methadone 
maintenance treatment and 0.1 QALY loss per year in treatment.35 
Pyne et al. tried to assess the QALY state of drug dependent 
individuals directly.36 The 390 subjects with a lifetime history 
of drug dependence and who had current problems had 
31  SAMHDA, ‘National Survey on Drug Use and Health,’ 2011, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/.
32  Kilmer et al., What America’s users spend on illicit drugs.
33  Jonathan P. Caulkins, Susan Everingham, Beau Kilmer and Greg Midgette, ‘The whole is just the sum of its parts: Limited polydrug use among  
 the “big three” expensive drugs in the United States,’ Current Drug Abuse Reviews (forthcoming).
34  Colin Mathers, Theo Vos and Chris Stevenson, The Burden of Disease and Injury in Australia (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare,  
 1999), AIHW Cat. No. PHE 17: 195.
35  G.S. Zaric, P.G. Barnett and M.L. Brandeau, ‘HIV transmission and the cost-effectiveness of methadone maintenance,’ American Journal of  
 Public Health, 90 (2000): 1100–11.
36  J. M. Pyne, T.L. Patterson , R.M. Kaplan, J.C. Gillin, W.L. Koch and I. Grant, ‘Assessment of the quality of life of patients with major   
 depression,’ Psychiatric Services, 48 (1997): 224–30.
 
Number dependent 
now (millions)
Possible increase 
due to legalisation
QALY loss per case
Possible additional QALYs lost 
(millions)
Cannabis 2.2 100 percent 0.1 0.22
Hard drugs 2.25 200 percent 0.2 0.9
Total       1.12
Value per QALY $100,000 
Value of dependence 
averted ($B) $112
Table 1. Very Rough Quantification of the Benefits of Prohibition in the United States from Reduction in Dependence      
              on the Drugs that are now Prohibited
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average QALY scores of only 0.58 and 0.681 out of 1.0, but 
in a multivariate regression controlling for socio-demographic 
variables, the effect of lifetime dependence with current 
problems relative to a ’control group’ of those in the study who 
did not have a history of dependence was 0.125. Arguably 
that is a conservative estimate because the control group met 
the diagnosis for drug abuse and need for treatment (but not 
dependence). On the other hand, the list of socio-demographic 
controls was limited, so the 0.125 figure is not a lower bound. 
We will use values of 0.1 for cannabis dependence and 0.2 for 
dependence on cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine. 
A common threshold test when assessing health interventions is 
that programmes which save a QALY for $50,000 or less are cost-
effective, although this figure may be out of date. One would 
expect the threshold to increase with inflation and growth in real 
GDP per capita, but the $50,000 figure dates to the mid-1980s 
when valuations were $1 million dollars per life.37 If $50,000 was 
the right figure in 1985, today the right figure might be more like 
$100,000. Furthermore, the economics literature now favours 
the so-called ’revealed-preference approach’ which can yield 
substantially higher valuations on human life. Viscusi and Aldy 
review revealed-preference studies and conclude that estimates 
fall within the range of $4 million to $9 million per statistical 
life in 2000 dollars, which would suggest $400,000 per QALY in 
today’s dollars.38 I will use $100,000, but understand that figures 
half as large or two or even four times as great can be defended. 
Table 1 translates these parameter values into a point estimate 
that prohibition may prevent enough drug dependence to 
warrant spending as much as $112 billion per year, well in excess 
of the roughly $50 billion per year now spent on drug control. 
This quantification is extremely rough, but it has the virtue of 
being parsimonious, involving only seven parameters. Any reader 
with a calculator can quickly compute how the $112 billion 
figure would change if one or more of the parameters were 
varied. Clearly one can produce benefit valuations below $50 
billion. Notably, those who reject the idea that legalisation will 
have any effect on dependence and/or that dependence involves 
any loss in quality of life would compute that prohibition offers 
zero benefit. 
Likewise, the $50 billion cost figure pertains to monetary 
spending. Some might argue that imprisonment causes a 
loss in quality of life. If the almost 500,000 drug law violators 
behind bars suffer a QALY loss of 0.5, that is 250,000 QALY lost per 
year, whose monetised value of $25 billion ought to be added to 
the $50 billion in financial outlays. Likewise prohibition increases 
drug-related crime and violence, since the economic-compulsive 
and systemic crime it creates exceeds the psychopharmacological 
crime it averts.39 Prohibition also reduces labour productivity (e.g. 
when a criminal record blocks someone from getting a particular 
job), although drug abuse does as well, so it is not immediately 
clear which effect is greater. Similarly, prohibition exacerbates 
some medical conditions (e.g. from HIV) but averts others. (The 
QALY calculation above considered only dependence per se, not 
the physical sequelae of substance abuse, such as heart problems 
or stroke caused by stimulant abuse.) 
An optimist might also argue that legalisation would provide 
competition for alcohol and tobacco, siphoning users away 
from those substances, and thereby creating additional benefits. 
Of course a pessimist might worry that the hard drugs are 
complements not substitutes for alcohol, at least in the long 
run, and that increases in cannabis smoking might increase, not 
reduce, tobacco smoking. 
So the purpose of this calculation is certainly not to argue that 
prohibition offers a net benefit of $112 billion - $50 billion = 
$62 billion. For many reasons it is not possible to make such a 
calculation. However, this arithmetic exercise does challenge the 
presumption that prohibition has failed to serve the interests of 
the United States and, by extension, other final market countries. 
Even granting that prohibition’s costs are enormous, it does not 
automatically follow that those costs outweigh potential benefits 
from reduced dependence, because the benefits may also be 
very large. 
Furthermore, there is a broad consensus among researchers and 
increasingly among policymakers that enforcement intensity in 
the United States has gone beyond the point of diminishing 
returns. Peter Reuter and I have argued that the United States 
could cut sanctioning by 50 percent across the board and suffer 
only a very modest increase in use and dependence, even though 
eliminating prohibition altogether would lead to a doubling or 
tripling of dependence.40 If that is correct, then such a kinder, 
gentler prohibition would look even better relative to legalisation 
than the table above suggests, and that may be a caricature of 
the spirit of prohibition as implemented in many final market 
countries in Europe and Australasia. 
37 For a discussion, see W.G. Manning, E.B. Keeler and J.P. Newhouse, ‘The Taxes of Sin:  Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way?,’ Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 261 (1989): 1604-1609.
38 W.K. Viscusi and J.E. Aldy, ‘The value of a statistical life: A critical review of market estimates throughout the world,’ Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 27 (2003): 5–76.
39 Jonathan P. Caulkins and Mark A.R. Kleiman, ‘Drugs and Crime,’  in Oxford Handbook of Crime and Criminal Justice, ed. Michael Tonry. 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), 275-320.
40 Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter, ’Reorienting U.S. Drug Policy,’ Issues in Science and Technology, XXIII/1 (2006), 79-85.
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CoNCLUSIoN
The central point of the analysis above is that the benefits of drug 
prohibition in the US – in terms of reduced dependence – may 
well exceed prohibition’s combined costs in terms of financial 
outlays and loss of freedom from incarceration. There is enormous 
uncertainty surrounding every component of the calculations, 
and intelligent people can disagree about what value to place 
on averting a year of dependence vs. a year of incarceration, 
but it is at least plausible that prohibition is actually succeeding 
from a US perspective. And if the rather extreme and inefficient 
version of prohibition implemented in the US has merits, the 
same may be true for prohibition as implemented in other final 
market countries. Furthermore, one cannot readily ’experiment’ 
with legalisation; more likely than not, it is an irreversible step.41 
What does this imply for the debate over drug policy reform? 
Even if one were persuaded by the analysis here, it does not apply 
to source or transshipment countries. If there were a country 
whose people would have no interest in using a drug, and that 
country were beset by violence, corruption and other ills from 
hosting production or international trafficking, then that country 
might benefit from legalisation, even if final market countries 
would not. That, simply put, is what some other contributions in 
this report argue. 
There are at least three reactions to the possibility that 
prohibition benefits final market countries but hurts production 
and transshipment countries. The first is that the final market 
countries ought to subordinate their interests to those of source 
and transshipment countries; that seems far-fetched, as nations 
tend to put their own interests first. The second is that the 
final market countries ought to compensate production and 
transshipment countries for the harms caused, in proportion to 
their share of consumption. Arguably, that is part of what has 
motivated some US aid to Colombia, which in recent years has 
stressed institution-building, not just crop eradication. 
Another possibility is that the present international prohibition 
regime is unsustainable in the long run even if there were 
some such compensation; over time, footloose international 
trafficking may migrate to the nations least able to defend 
themselves, leading to failed states and de facto, if not de 
jure legalisation. Failed narco-states are in nobody’s interests, 
so an alternative would be for states that are net losers under 
prohibition to withdraw from the international control regime, 
in hopes of being able to control, regulate and even tax 
legal production. 
The country that moves first will bear unusual risks. It may quickly 
attract production activity from other countries. And its people 
would be exposed to low prices and high availability before the 
global society has learned how to nurture anti-use norms that 
can (partially) take the place of official prohibition. Nevertheless, 
it seems plausible that some state will become sufficiently 
desperate that they may take the plunge. If so, then the self-
interested policy for other states, particularly distant states, may 
be to encourage that other country to jump first, and then learn 
from its tribulations. In legalisation as in software development, 
it may be prudent to distinguish between aspiring to be on the 
cutting edge vs. the bleeding edge of reform. ■ 
41    Caulkins and Lee, ‘The Drug-Policy Roulette,’ 35-51.
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Why Is Strict  
Prohibition Collapsing? 
A Perspective from Producer 
and Transit Countries
Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo
In this contribution we lay out a simple political economy theory that helps explain the current debate on prohibitionist drug policies in Latin America and their slow but sustained collapse as a strategy to confront illegal drug production and trafficking. Viewed from the perspective of producer and transit countries, 
prohibitionist drug policies are a transfer of the costs of the drug problem from consumer to producer 
and transit countries, where the latter are pushed to design and implement supply-reduction policies. The 
contribution shows how the low effectiveness and high costs of these policies have led the region to ask for 
an urgent and evidence-based debate about alternatives to strictly prohibitionist drug policies. 
Only a couple of years ago not even the most radical advocates for a 
change in drug policy felt that the international drug debate would 
evolve as quickly as it has. In an important way, the debate began 
to intensify four years ago, with the publication of the report of 
the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, headed 
by former Latin American presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Cesar Gaviria and Ernesto Zedillo.1 
Then, about two years ago, other world leaders and international 
figures, such as Kofi Annan, George Schultz, Paul Volcker 
and Richard Branson, joined the three former Latin American 
presidents and published the report of The Global Commission 
on Drug Policy. Both reports made an urgent call for a revision 
of prohibitionist drug policies and advocated treating drug 
consumption as a public health issue, not as a criminal offence. The 
reports advocated including ‘not just alternatives to incarceration 
and greater emphasis on public health approaches to drug use, but 
also decriminalisation and experiments in legal regulation’.2 
Only a few months after the publication of the report of the 
Global Commission, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos 
(quite courageously) encouraged the international community, 
other presidents in the region and especially the United States 
government to engage in an informed and honest discussion, 
based on the best available empirical and academic evidence, 
about the effectiveness and costs of the current global regime on 
drugs.3 President Santos was followed by other Latin American 
presidents, like Otto Pérez Molina, who introduced the issue of 
drug legalisation into the debate. 
1 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, ‘Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift,’ 2009,  
http://www. drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf.
2 See Global Commission on Drug Policy, ‘War on Drugs,’ 2011, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report.
3 See also Juan Manuel Santos, ‘Re-examining the Drug Problem Through a Fresh Lens,’ in Governing the Global Drug   
Wars, ed. John Collins, (London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, 2012), 2–3.
 
Summary
 ■ Latin American governments have 
recently pushed back against continuing 
prohibitionist drug policies.
 ■ This is due to a poor ‘operationalisation’ of 
prohibitionist drug policies that has ended 
up transferring a large proportion of the 
costs of the drug problem to producer and 
transit countries.
 ■ There are three main reasons why:
(1)  Poor effectiveness of supply-reduction  
efforts in reducing the flow of drugs to 
consumer countries.
(2)  A high cost of implementing supply-
reduction efforts (violence, corruption 
and institutional instability).
(3)  A decreased willingness of producer 
and transit countries to mortgage 
their national security interests in 
exchange for receiving partial funding to 
implement supply-reduction efforts.
 ■ Drug policy, like any policy, must be judged 
by results not intentions.
 ■ Evidence is clear highlighting very high costs 
and ineffectiveness of many prohibitionist 
policies implemented under the ‘war  
on drugs’.
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In the Summit of the Americas held in Cartagena in 2012, 
the Organization of American States (OAS) received the 
mandate to produce a report about the Drug Problem in the 
Americas. This thorough report was released in May 2013, 
making a special emphasis in five areas: the relationship 
between drugs and public health; the relationship between 
drugs and economic and social development; security 
challenges as reflected in the nexus between drugs, violence 
and organised crime; the production and supply of drugs, 
pharmaceuticals and chemical precursors; and the legal and 
regulatory approaches to the drugs problem. All in all, the 
two Commissions, the statements by former and acting Latin 
American presidents and the OAS report reflect the frustration 
of many countries in the region with the ‘war on drugs’ as we 
know it and its high costs. 
But how did all this movement start? And why in Latin America? 
This contribution aims at answering these two questions by 
providing a simple political economy theory of the war on 
drugs in producer and transit countries and the main reasons 
why the region is making an urgent call for an evidence-based 
debate on the costs and benefits of this war. 
Before laying out the theory, it is useful to provide some 
definitions of prohibition and how it has been operationalised 
in practice. According to different sources, prohibition is ‘the 
action of forbidding something, especially by law’ or ‘a law 
or rule that stops people from doing something’. Policies to 
deal with the production, trafficking, sale and consumption 
of psychoactive substances such as cannabis, cocaine and 
heroin have been dominated for decades by a so-called 
‘prohibitionist’ approach. That is, by policies that restrict or 
ban the production, trafficking, sale and consumption of these 
substances. More importantly, however, these policies have 
been operationalised using criminal policy tools such as arrest, 
prosecution and imprisonment. But beyond a grammatical 
or even operational definition of prohibition, it is worth 
understanding prohibitionist drug policies from an international 
political economy perspective. 
4 The US certification process rates the anti-narcotics efforts of other countries, imposing sanctions on countries that do not meet certain 
standards of drug control. Sanctions range from the suspension of US foreign aid and preferential trade benefits to curtailment of air 
transportation. 
5 For this argument see Jonathan P. Caulkins’ contribution to this report.
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The rest of the contribution is organised as follows. First, it lays 
out a simple international political economy theory of prohibition. 
It then explains in detail the three main reasons why, in our view, 
the operationalisation of this theory is collapsing as a strategy to 
confront the drugs problem in Latin America. Finally, it presents 
some concluding remarks. 
A SIMPLE PoLITICAL ECoNoMy THEoRy  
oF PRoHIBITIoN 
From the perspective of producer and transit countries, 
prohibitionist drug policies can be understood as a transfer of 
the costs of the ‘drugs problem’ faced by consumer countries to 
producer and transit countries. On the one hand, under complete 
legalisation, consumer countries would end up bearing most of 
the costs associated with drug consumption. Among others, these 
are the costs that the health systems in consumer countries would 
have to pay for treating dependent users and problematic drug 
consumers, the productivity losses associated with problematic 
drug consumption and the costs of implementing policies to reduce 
drug consumption (prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, 
among others), among others. 
With full prohibition, on the other hand, consumer countries end 
up transferring a significant part of these costs to producer and 
transit countries by pushing them (through international norms 
such as the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 or the US 
annual certification process4) to implement supply-reduction efforts 
aimed at making the price of drugs reaching consumer countries 
higher and their availability lower. Examples of supply-reduction 
efforts that have been implemented in different countries in the 
region are the eradication campaigns of illicit crops; the interdiction 
of drug shipments; the detection and destruction of drug 
producing labs; and the arrest of leaders of Drug Trafficking 
Organisations (DTOs).  
With less drug supply and higher prices, the argument follows, the 
use of these substances in consumer countries should decrease, as 
should the costs that these countries have to pay to confront their 
drug problem.5 In summary, from an international political economy 
point of view, the current operationalisation of prohibition is little 
more than the transfer of a major part of the costs of the drug 
problem from consumers to producer and transit nations.
In theory, at least, this operationalisation of prohibition (e.g. the 
pressure on producer and transit countries to implement supply-
reduction policies) sounds like a reasonable option, and should 
not then be a surprise that major consuming countries partially 
fund these supply-reduction efforts through initiatives such as 
Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative (or, in a different region, 
crop eradication programmes in Afghanistan). Ultimately, it is 
about some consumer countries compensating others for having 
transferred an important part of the costs of their drug problem. 
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Under the current prohibitionist approach to drug policy, 
producer and transit countries have ended up paying a very 
high cost in terms of violence, corruption and the loss of 
legitimacy of state institutions, among many others. 
Consider the following thought experiment.6 Suppose for a 
moment that all cocaine consumption in the US disappears 
and goes to Canada. Would the US authorities be willing to 
confront drug trafficking networks at the cost of seeing the 
homicide rate in cities such as Seattle go up from its current 
level of about five homicides per 100,000 individuals to 
a level close to 150 in order to prevent cocaine shipments 
from reaching Vancouver? If your answer to this question is 
‘perhaps not,’ well… this is exactly what Colombia, Mexico 
and other Latin American countries have been doing over 
the last 20 years: implementing supply-reduction policies 
so that drugs don’t reach consumer countries at the cost of 
very pronounced cycles of violence and political corruption, 
with the consequent losses of legitimacy of state institutions. 
THE THREE MAIN REASoNS BEHIND THE SLoW 
BUT SUSTAINED CoLLAPSE oF PRoHIBITIoNIST 
DRUG PoLICIES 
What was it that failed with the operationalisation of prohibition 
in Latin America if it seemed like a reasonable policy (in theory, at 
least)? This section argues that three main assumptions on which 
the theory rested have failed to be true: first, a high effectiveness of 
supply-reduction efforts in reducing the flow of drugs to consumer 
countries; second, a low cost of implementing supply-reduction 
efforts; and third, a sustained willingness of producer and transit 
countries to mortgage their national security interests in exchange 
for receiving partial funding to implement supply-reduction efforts.
First, the theory assumed that if sufficiently large amounts of 
resources were invested in supply-reduction efforts in producer and 
transit countries, it was possible to restrict, or at least to control, 
the flow of drugs to consumer countries. However, the available 
evidence shows that there are very few success stories in the fight 
against drug production and trafficking in the region. And what is 
even more worrying is that of the few success stories, these have 
just ended up transferring or displacing production and trafficking 
activities somewhere else. 
The most emblematic case study of the ‘war on drugs’ in the region 
is Plan Colombia, a joint initiative implemented by Colombia and the 
US to fight against cocaine production and trafficking. Under Plan 
Colombia, the two countries have invested more than one percent 
of Colombia´s GDP each year (about $1.2 billion per year) to curtail 
cocaine production and trafficking and to fight against criminal 
organisations linked to these activities. The available evaluations of 
anti-drug strategies implemented under Plan Colombia show that 
these policies tend to be very ineffective – and costly – in reducing 
the cultivation of coca crops and cocaine production. 
First, aerial spraying campaigns of coca crops (the most used strategy 
to combat cocaine production in Colombia) have been shown to 
have very small (or no) effects in quantities produced and prices.7 
According to the most conservative estimates derived from a quasi-
experimental evaluation of this strategy, for each additional hectare 
sprayed with herbicides, coca cultivation is reduced by about 0.1 to 
0.15 hectares.8 Furthermore, spraying campaigns have been shown 
to generate health problems in rural populations exposed to the 
herbicides used in these campaigns,9 to damage the environment10 
and to cause loss of confidence in state institutions.11 
6 This thought experiment is based on a conversation between the authors and Benjamin Lessing.
7 Luis C. Reyes, ‘Estimating the Causal Effect of Forced Eradication on Coca Cultivation in Colombian Municipalities,’ unpublished manuscript, 
Department of Economics, Michigan State University, 2011; Sandra Rozo, ‘On the Effectiveness and Welfare Consequences of Anti-drug 
Eradication Programs,’ unpublished manuscript, UCLA, 2013; Daniel Mejía, Pascual Restrepo and Sandra Rozo, ‘On the Effectiveness of Supply 
Reduction Efforts in Drug Producing Countries: Evidence from Colombia,’ unpublished mansucript, Universidad de los Andes, 2013; Jorge 
Gallego and Daniel Rico, ‘Manual Eradication, Aerial Spray and Coca Prices in Colombia,’ unpublished manuscript, UNODC-Colombia, 2013.
8 Mejía et al., ‘On the Effectiveness of Supply Reduction Efforts’.
9 Adriana Camacho and Daniel Mejia, ‘Consecuencias de la aspersión aérea en la salud: evidencia desde el caso colombiano,’ in Costos 
económicos y sociales del conflicto en Colombia: ¿Cómo construir un postconflicto sostenible? ed. Ibañez et al., (Universidad de los Andes 
2014).
10 Rick A. Relyea, ‘The Impact of Insecticides and Herbicides on Biodiversity and Productivity of Aquatic Communities,’ Ecological Society of 
America (2005): 618-627; Carolina Navarrete-Frías and Connie Veillete ‘Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes’ 
Congressional Research Service (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61022.pdf.; L. Dávalos, A. Bejarano and H. Correa 
‘Disabusing Cocaine: Pervasive Myths and Enduring Realities of a Globalized Commodity,’ International Journal of Drug Policy, 20 (5) (2009): 
381-386; L. Dávalos, A. Bejarano, M. Hall,  H. Correa, A. Corthals and O. Espejo, ‘Forests and Drugs: Coca-Driven Deforestation in Tropical 
Biodiversity Hotspots’ Environ. Sci. Technol., 45 (4) (2011): 1219-1227.
11 M. García, ‘Cultivos ilícitos, participación política y confianza institucional,’ in Políticas antidroga en Colombia: éxitos, fracasos y extravíos ed. 
A. Gaviria and D. Mejía, 2011, 357-386.
Recent research has shown  
how the increase in the size  
of illegal drug markets observed 
between 1994 and 2008   
(about 200 percent) explains 
roughly 25 percent of the current 
homicide rate in Colombia.  
This translates into about 3,800 
more homicides per year on 
average that are associated with 
illegal drug markets and  
the war on drugs.
‘
,
LSE  Exper t  Group on  the  Economic s  of  Drug  Po l i cy  |  29
Second, interdiction efforts aimed at disrupting cocaine 
shipments en route to consumer markets have been shown to be 
more effective when compared to aerial spraying campaigns,12 
but have only ended up displacing the bases of operation of 
DTOs to other countries in the region instead of leading to 
regional decreases in the amount of drugs transacted. This was 
the case, for instance, after successful interdiction policies in 
Colombia were implemented in 2007 and cocaine production 
activities in this country were reduced significantly. With the shift 
to more interdiction and less eradication in Colombia, coca crops 
started to move back to Peru and Bolivia; cocaine processing 
facilities moved to Venezuela and Ecuador (where lower prices 
for some of the chemical precursors used in the production of 
cocaine such as gasoline and cement make this activity more 
lucrative); and the bases of operation of the main trafficking 
organisations were displaced to Mexico and Central America. 
All in all, the recent Latin American experience shows that 
when a country is (locally) successful in the fight against drug 
production and trafficking – which is the exception rather than 
the rule – DTOs are displaced to other countries where they 
find more favourable environments to run their operations. The 
displacement of drug trafficking activities to other countries 
after successful interdiction strategies are implemented in 
one country leads to cycles of violence and instability in the 
receiving countries. A recent example is Mexico, where drug 
trafficking activities and violence have sky-rocketed since 2006. 
Although many political analysts have put all the blame of the 
recent situation in Mexico on the strategies implemented by 
Felipe Calderon, recent research shows that part of the increase of 
violence and drug trafficking activities in Mexico can be explained 
by successful interdiction policies implemented in Colombia 
starting in 2007 (Figure 1). This research finds that high-frequency 
shocks in the supply of cocaine created by higher cocaine 
seizures in Colombia increased the levels of violence in Mexico. 
According to this study, ‘scarcity created by more efficient cocaine 
interdiction policies in Colombia may account for 21.2 percent 
and 46 percent of the increase in homicides and drug related 
homicides, respectively, experienced in the north of Mexico’.13 
In most cases, however, anti-drug policies implemented 
to reduce supply are unsuccessful, even at the local level. 
The second assumption of the theory that failed to hold relates 
to the costs that producer and transit countries had to pay 
for implementing supply-reduction efforts.  The theory clearly 
underestimated both the direct and the collateral costs that 
had to be paid by countries in Latin America for implementing 
anti-drug strategies aimed at reducing the supply of drugs and 
fighting against DTOs.14 The recent case of Mexico is the most 
salient one. When President Felipe Calderon declared an open 
war against DTOs and decided to send the army to confront these 
organisations at the beginning of his term (December 2006), what 
can only be described as an ‘epidemic’ of violence was unleashed. 
 
12 D. Mejía and P. Restrepo, ‘The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking,’ Documento CEDE no. 54, Universidad de los 
Andes, 2013.
13 J. Castillo, D. Mejía, and P. Restrepo, ‘Scarcity without Leviathan: The Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War,’ 
Center for Global Development WP # 356, February (2014).
14 For other examples of these collateral costs see Laura Atuesta’s contribution to this report examining the creation of ‘internally displaced 
populations’ (IDPs) in Colombia and Mexico or Alejandro Madrazo’s contribution on the ‘constitutional costs’ of the war on drugs.
Figure 1.  Net cocaine supply from Colombia and homicide rate in Mexico
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Figure 2.  Homicide rate in Mexico
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The total homicide rate in Mexico increased threefold within a 
period of just four years, from about eight homicides per 100,000 
individuals in 2006 to more than 23 in 2010 (see Figure 2). 
Several studies have tackled this issue, confirming that the 
crackdowns on drug cartels had a significant effect on the 
levels of violence experienced in Mexico.15
Another well-known case where both illegal drug markets and 
the war against them have led to pronounced cycles of violence 
is that of Colombia during the last 30 years. Figure 3 presents 
the evolution of the homicide rate in Colombia during the 
last three decades. The first wave of violence (during the late 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s) is clearly associated 
with the war against the Medellin cartel, which ended in 1993 
with the killing of Pablo Escobar in a populous neighbourhood 
15 Melissa Dell, ‘Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war,’ unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 2012; G. Calderón, A. Diaz-
Cayeros and B. Magaloni ‘The Temporal and Spatial Dynamics of Violence in Mexico,’ unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 2012.
16 D. Mejía and P. Restrepo, ‘Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in Colombia,’ Documento CEDE no. 53, Universidad de los 
Andes, November 2013.
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in Medellin. In that year, the homicide rate in Colombia reached a 
level of 72 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Although this level 
is very high, it pales when compared with the level of the homicide 
rate reached in that year in Medellin: 420. The second wave of 
violence in Colombia occurred during the late 1990s, and is mainly 
explained by FARC´s increasing involvement in the drug trade and the 
strengthening of their military capacity afterwards (Figure 3). Recent 
research has shown how the increase in the size of illegal drug markets 
observed between 1994 and 2008 (about 200 percent) explains 
roughly 25 percent of the current homicide rate in Colombia. This 
translates into about 3,800 more homicides per year on average 
that are associated with illegal drug markets and the war on drugs.16 
Although violence is the clearest, crudest and most visible 
example of the high costs that producer and transit countries 
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have had to pay for waging a war on illegal drugs, they 
are, unfortunately, not limited to it. A less visible but equally 
important obstacle to socioeconomic development caused 
by the high rents associated with drug trafficking are the 
levels of corruption observed in the region. Drug cartels have 
funded political campaigns, have penetrated (and intimidated) 
media outlets and have corrupted the most remote corners 
of society (including beauty contests and football teams, the 
two preferred hobbies of Latin American drug traffickers). The 
costs of violence, crime and corruption caused by the high 
rents associated with the illegal drug trade are very difficult 
to quantify, but for countries like Mexico, Colombia and many 
small countries in Central America, they undoubtedly account 
for a non-negligible fraction of GDP and for a few percentage 
points in terms of lower growth rates in these economies.
The third pillar of the theory of prohibition, which only began 
to fail more recently, is the assumption that producer and 
transit countries in the region would continue mortgaging 
their security interests and institutional stability in exchange 
for $400-500 million per year in aid to confront illegal drug 
trafficking. Increasingly, countries in the region are beginning 
to realise that the funding they receive from governments of 
consumer countries to help finance supply-reduction efforts 
Figure 3. Homicide rate in Colombia
Source: author´s calculations based on data from the 
Colombian National Police. 
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are not sufficient to compensate the high costs they have to 
pay for waging this war on drug trafficking and drug cartels. 
In order to have full control of the policies, some countries, like 
Colombia, have begun a process of nationalisation of the costs 
of the ‘war on drugs’. This will ensure these countries have full 
control over which policies are and are not implemented. This does 
not mean that all forms of aid to the countries in the region risk 
national and institutional security interests. However, there is no 
doubt that they reduce the space and independence to decide 
which policies are more effective and less costly for their own 
national interests rather than the interests of funding countries. 
Such is the case, for example, of aerial spraying campaigns of illicit 
crops with herbicides in Colombia, where a sizeable proportion 
of US aid under Plan Colombia has been tied to the use of small 
aircraft, contractors and herbicides to carry out these campaigns. 
Only recently, the government of Colombia has started to realise 
that this form of funding for the war on drugs brings about more 
costs than returns, and it is starting to question the benefits of 
continuing these fumigation campaigns. The same realisation has 
occurred in Mexico, where the government has preferred, in some 
cases, to give up substantial aid packages in order to keep full 
control of the policies that are implemented and the operations 
that are carried out against cartel leaders.
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These are three main reasons why, in our view, strictly prohibitionist 
policies are being subjected to increasing public scrutiny in Latin 
America. Several leaders (including several acting presidents) in 
the region have asked respectfully but urgently for an honest and 
informed debate about which policies work, which don’t and 
what their costs are. The urgent call of Latin American leaders for 
a debate on the drug problem is a desperate plea to consumer 
countries to start carrying their own burdens, treating their own 
ills and fighting their own wars.
CoNCLUSIoN
The recent history of countries affected by drug production 
and trafficking in the region has been repeated again and 
again: violence, corruption, overstretching the capacity of state 
institutions, etc. In its initial stages, drug trafficking organisations 
infiltrated traditional political parties. Then, the increase in drug-
related violence overwhelmed the capacity of the judicial system to 
confront these criminal organisations, thus making the countries 
in the region shift to a new equilibrium characterised by high levels 
of crime and violence and low state capacity. Organised criminal 
groups waged an open war against the state and the media, and 
later funded the expansion of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. 
 
The current debate on drug policy should not be based on 
simplistic solutions derived from preconceived ideological 
positions, but on analysis and research that takes into account 
all the available evidence about the effectiveness, efficiency and 
costs of alternative drug policies. Drug policy, like any other public 
policy, must be judged by its results, and not by its intentions, 
and although in theory prohibition sounds like a reasonable 
choice, the available evidence is clear in pointing out the very 
high costs and ineffectiveness of many of the policies that have 
been implemented so far under the so-called war on drugs. ■  
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The Mobility of  
Drug Trafficking
 Peter Reuter1
It is widely believed that pressing down on one trafficking route simply leads to a shift in drug traffic. This contribution reviews the evidence for this proposition, focusing on cocaine and heroin.  Theory suggests that smugglers choose the low-cost method for moving from the source country to the final 
market country.  However, interdiction risks are only one among many factors that determine that cost 
and substantial changes in interdiction intensity on one route may not induce change.  A small number of 
episodes do suggest that the balloon effect, if not universal, can apply.  In particular, the emergence of a 
West African route for cocaine to Europe may have been in response to a Dutch crackdown on an existing 
route from the Netherlands Antilles to Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport.  The poor quality of data on either 
interdiction intensity or on the distribution of drug traffic across routes makes it difficult to find counter-
examples, such as crackdowns that did not induce shifts. Though the balloon effect is not perhaps as universal 
as claimed, it is real enough that policymakers contemplating a major crackdown need to consider effects on 
other nations.
 
      Summary
 ■ The balloon effect hypothesis advances 
that if authorities get tougher on 
producing, trafficking or dealing in one 
location then the targeted activity will 
be displaced to another location with no 
more than temporary inconvenience to 
the participants.
 ■ The hypothesis further advances that 
the long-term consequences of supply 
interventions in terms of availability and 
price to users will be slight, particularly  
if the intervention is close to the 
production site.
 ■ Surely the balloon effect contains at 
least a grain of truth, even if it is not 
the whole story. But the question is how 
much increased interdiction can erode 
the competitive advantage of existing 
routes, and that remains in the domain 
of pure speculation.
 ■ Interdiction crackdowns by one country 
may well affect others. Co-ordinating 
decision-making internationally will be 
extremely difficult both institutionally 
and operationally but without such 
co-ordination, negative outcomes may 
continue to be displaced across borders.
1 The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Rafael Alencar and Daniel Rico in preparing this paper.   
Financial support for this research was provided by the Open Society Foundations.  
The balloon effect hypothesis has become part of the conventional 
wisdom about the illegal drug trade.  Simply put, this hypothesis 
advances that if authorities get tougher on producing, trafficking or 
dealing in one location then the targeted activity will be displaced to 
another location with no more than temporary inconvenience to the 
participants.2  The long-term consequences, in terms of availability and 
price to users, will be slight, particularly if the intervention is close to 
the production site.
This contribution reviews the evidence in support of that proposition 
with respect to international drug trafficking.  To what extent has such 
trafficking, as opposed to production, proven mobile in response to 
interdiction activities?  Interdiction is broadly defined as any activity 
aimed at apprehending drugs or couriers.  The contribution begins with 
a brief conceptual framework as to how smugglers choose routes.  It 
then reviews what is known about the major routes chosen for cocaine 
and heroin.  The third section examines a small number of instances 
of crackdowns on specific routes and what happened in response. 
The final section identifies the principal caveats and draws conclusions.
Cocaine and heroin are the principal focus of the review. They are 
the drugs thought to be the most valuable in terms of revenues and 
certainly have caused great harm.  Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) 
are also internationally trafficked and cause harm but very little is known 
about the trafficking itself.  The review’s emphasis is on effects in the 
trafficking countries rather than in final markets; in that sense it looks 
at interdiction from the point of view of the transshipment countries, 
not the final consumer countries that are so often the financiers and 
instigators of interdiction crackdowns.  
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THE THEoRy BEHIND THE BALLooN EFFECT
What explains the geographic configuration of international 
drug trafficking, in particular which countries serve as the 
principal transit countries?  The obvious model for understanding 
smuggler choices, used in the few attempts to formally model 
drug trafficking, assumes that the smuggler’s goal is to minimise 
the cost of smuggling the drug from the source country to the 
final market country. 3  The difficulty is to specify the components 
of the cost function.  The consequences of interception (weighted 
by the probability of occurrence) are presumably a large, perhaps 
dominant, component of that cost.  Interception imposes a 
variety of costs: loss of the drugs; loss of the transportation 
vehicle if the drug is being carried in a specialised vessel, such 
as a go-fast boat or small plane; and perhaps incarceration of 
those bringing the drugs.4  The latter shows up as a cost in 
terms of the compensation paid to couriers for incurring the 
risk of incarceration and perhaps also compensation to their 
families while the courier is in prison.5  The costs may also 
include paying government officials for allowing shipments and 
couriers through.6  
In this model, the effect of intensified interdiction in a specific 
transshipment country is straightforward.  Costs are now higher, 
making other countries relatively more attractive.  Depending 
on the difference between the costs associated with the current 
transshipment country and the next cheapest, the traffic will 
shift to the latter when the differential is eliminated.  Given 
that the smugglers have imperfect knowledge about costs and 
risks associated with a particular route, the shift may be partial 
and lagged.7
So what determines the smuggling risk cost associated with 
any country for a given set of smugglers?   First note that the 
risks are not unidimensional.  There is the risk of smuggling 
from source country A (Colombia) to transshipment country 
B but then also the risk associated with smuggling from B to 
(in this simplified example) final country C (the US).  Assume 
that Honduran colonels offer cheaper protection for cocaine 
importers than Costa Rican customs officials (given that the latter 
country lacks a military).  However, if the probability of search 
and apprehension is higher for Honduras-US shipments than for 
Costa Rica-US shipments, then Costa Rica may be a preferred 
transshipment country, because total smuggling costs are lower. 
It is this complexity that helps explain the surprising observation, 
documented below, that some drug shipments travel through 
multiple countries rather than going by the most direct route 
from source to consumer country.  
The costs are also state-dependent.  Learning which Honduran 
colonels can be trusted and which cannot is a valuable experience-
dependent asset.  Assume that the Honduran government 
increases the expected prison sentence for convicted traffickers 
or creates an elite unit that raises the risk of apprehension.8 
Even then the investment in relations with corrupt Honduran 
colonels may enable established traffickers to smuggle more 
cheaply there than in other Central American nations.  Knowing 
which Honduran transportistas are reliable is similarly a cost-
reducing asset that may reduce willingness to seek alternative 
routes.  Thus route choice responses to higher interdiction 
intensity may be lagged and incomplete.
Moreover, different types of smugglers may face different risks in 
a given country, dependent on such factors as extended family 
links and linguistic familiarity.  For example, a Mexican smuggler 
may have cross-border family ties to Honduran officials that 
are unavailable to Colombian smugglers and which can largely 
negate a Honduran crackdown on cocaine trafficking.
 
Geography and Route Choices
Being close reduces the exposure time of the shipment and the 
pure transportation cost, though the latter is surely a small part 
of the total cost.  Neighbouring major producer or consumer 
countries are plausibly important risk factors for a country 
becoming a transshipment country. A land border allows for use 
of routes which are usually harder to monitor than those by air 
or sea.
 
Consumer countries (e.g. US, Western European countries)
Mexico is perhaps the nation for which geographic destiny is 
strongest; it has been called a ‘natural smuggling platform’ for 
the United States, though it was less important than Canada 
for alcohol smuggling during Prohibition.9  Mexico serves as 
the principal entry country for cocaine, heroin, cannabis and 
methamphetamine imported by the United States. For cocaine 
its proximity to Colombia also helps. Caribbean nations serve 
2 Perhaps the most prominent early articulation of the proposition is Ethan Nadelmann (1989) ‘Drug Prohibition in America:  Costs, 
Consequences and Alternatives,’ Science 253,1989: 949-957
3 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gordon Crawford and Peter Reuter ‘Simulation of Adaptive Response: A Model of Interdictor-Smuggler Interactions,’ 
Mathematical and Computer Modelling 17 (2) 1993: 37-52; Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo ‘The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug 
Production and Trafficking,’ working paper (2013), http://crimelab.stanford.edu/clftp/uploads/183/5838.pdf 
4 Money laundering charges may arise as well if the interdiction is intelligence determined but there are not many such charges.
5 There are occasional reports of such payments.  See for an earlier period J. R. Fuentes, The Life of a Cell: Managerial Practice and Strategy 
in a Colombian Cocaine Distribution System in the United States (City University of New York, 1998).
6 One could imagine a race to the bottom.  Officials of different countries might compete to offer the lowest price for their services.  
There is, however, no evidence of anything approaching an international market for corruption services; the barriers to dissemination of 
information may be too substantial for a market to form.  
7 This indeed was the result in Caulkins, Crawford and Reuter, ‘Simulation of Adaptive Response’.
8 The D.E.A has developed special units in the enforcement agencies of Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Belize. The 
squads are part of a programme called Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST). Charlie Savage, ‘D.E.A. Squads Extend Reach of 
Drug War,’ New York Times, November 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/world/americas/united-states-drug-enforcement-
agency-squads-extend-reach-of-drug-war.html?pagewanted=all 
 9 This may have simply reflected the relatively low value of bootlegged alcohol per unit volume.  Transportation costs themselves were an 
important component of total costs.  The major US city markets for alcohol in the 1920s were much closer to the Canadian border than 
to Mexico.  
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as transit countries for cocaine, again reflecting geography. 
At various times Central American nations have also served as 
transshipment countries to Mexico; they are way stations to 
Mexico, with minimal direct entry to the United States.10
Western Europe, unlike the United States, has a complex set 
of borders.  The many nations of the Western Balkans, hewn 
out of the artificial monolith Yugoslavia, have become, along 
with Albania, an important set of transshipment countries for 
heroin.11  Proximity in this case is artificial – the major markets 
are far west of the Balkans but these countries border the 
European Union and once inside the EU, the risk of interception 
is significantly reduced.  Morocco almost neighbours Spain, 
with a sea separation of less than 10 miles.  While Morocco, 
a traditional producer of cannabis, is the major foreign source 
of cannabis to Western Europe, it does not appear to have an 
important role in the importation of cocaine or heroin.
 
Producer countries (e.g. Andean countries, Afghanistan)
Looking at proximity to production, Colombia itself can be 
seen as a transit country; from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s Bolivia and Peru were the principal producers of cocaine 
base, but that product went to Colombia for processing into 
cocaine hydrochloride and then on to the US.12  Venezuela, as 
Colombia’s neighbour but with a government more tolerant 
of the cocaine trade in recent years, has become an important 
transshipment country.13
Over time, Afghanistan’s neighbours have served in varying 
degrees as major routes for the export of heroin from the 
nation that has dominated world production for almost 20 
years.  Indeed, given that Afghanistan is land-locked and poorly 
connected to Western Europe by either commerce or traffic, it is 
almost inevitable that some of its six neighbours (i.e. China, Iran, 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) would be involved 
in transshipment.
Though the data available are indicative rather than quantitative, 
it appears that Iran has consistently been a major trafficking 
route, reflecting both its historic importance as a market for 
Afghan-origin heroin and its relatively good connections to 
European markets via Turkey. The emergence of a Central Asia 
route (particularly through Tajikistan) came only after the break-
up of the Soviet Union and the development of a large Russian 
heroin market, separate but related phenomena.14  The extent to 
which Pakistan has served as a route to major European markets 
is hard to determine but there have been more reports of that 
connection in recent years. Seizure quantities are the standard 
indicator, though with well-known flaws. Pakistan’s heroin 
seizures are regularly second amongst Afghanistan’s neighbours 
but generally between one-tenth and one-third as large as 
those of Iran, which has always had the highest heroin seizure 
total since 2004. The Taliban ban year and the two immediately 
after showed a different pattern with more seized in Pakistan. 
The table below records seizures for the period 2001-2011. 
10 There are occasional maritime shipments directly from Honduras to the US coast. See Julie Marie Bunck and Michael Ross Fowler, Bribes, 
Bullets, and Intimidation: Drug Trafficking and the Law in Central America (Penn State Press, 2012).
11 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013 (New York: United Nations, 2013), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_
Report_2013.pdf.
12 Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
13 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf
14 Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be Cut? (Oxford University Press, 2009).
15 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013.
Table 1.  Heroin Seizures in Central Asian Nations, 2001-2011 15
Heroin Seizures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Iran 4001 3977 3327 4715 5554 10665 15899 23129 24926 27141 23096
Pakistan 6931 5870 6363 3487 2144 2819 2873 1900 2061 4236 7651
Afghanistan n.r. 1291 815 2388 7112 4052 5038 2782 2188 9036 10235
Tajikistan 4239 3958 5600 4794 2344 2097 1549 1632 1132 985 509
Turkmenistan 131 53 76 258 172 201 325 244 419 133 39
Uzbekistan 466 256 336 591 466 537 479 1471 754 1004 622
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Beyond Geography
Proximity, indeed even being on a sensible geometric path 
between source and destination, is not necessary for a nation 
to become a transshipment country. Nigeria illustrates the 
issue most vividly, a nation that seems to have little potential 
for a role in the international drug trade but is definitely a 
significant player. 
Nigeria is isolated from any of the principal producer or 
consumer countries and lacks a significant base of traditional 
domestic production or consumption.16 Nonetheless, Nigerian 
traffickers, including many in the substantial Nigerian diaspora 
of roughly 3 million, have come to play a substantial role in 
the shipping of heroin between Southeast Asia and the United 
States as well as to Europe.  More recently these traffickers 
have even entered the cocaine business, although the cocaine 
production centres are even more remote from their home 
country. For example, Nigerians accounted for more than half 
of all those arrested for cocaine trafficking in Switzerland in 
2011.17  In 2012 there were 450 Nigerians in Brazilian jails 
for drug trafficking.  When police searched all passengers 
on two flights from São Paulo to Luanda, Mozambique, they 
found over 20 passengers, mostly Nigerians, in each flight 
carrying cocaine.18 Nigeria itself is an important hub as well. 
For example, 57 percent of those arrested for cocaine 
trafficking on flights from West Africa into Europe from 2004-
2007 were Nigerians. There have been substantial seizures in 
Nigeria itself.19
The explanation for Nigerian resident and diaspora involvement 
surely involves a multiplicity of factors. Nigerians are highly 
entrepreneurial, have been misruled by corrupt governments 
over a long time and have large overseas populations, weak 
civil society, very low domestic wages and moderately good 
commercial links to the rest of the world. Thus, it is relatively 
easy to buy protection for transactions in Nigerian airports (due 
to corruption and a weak governmental tradition) to establish 
connections in both the source and the rich consuming 
nations (due to large overseas populations); and to use existing 
commercial transportation (note that the drugs travel with 
passengers rather than cargo since Nigerian exports, apart 
from oil, are modest) and smuggling labour is cheap due to 
low domestic wages. Moreover, Nigeria’s entrepreneurial 
tradition produces many competent and enthusiastic 
smuggling organizers. Nigeria is not unique in most of these 
dimensions; however, its size and connections with the rest 
of the world distinguish it from other West African nations. 
Perhaps accident played a role in that country’s initiation into 
the trade, but these other factors plausibly play a major role.
16 Gernot Klautschnig, ‘West Africa’s drug trade: reasons for concern and hope,’ Addiction 108 (11) 2013, 1871–1872.
17 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa, A Threat Assessment (Vienna: UNODC, 2013): 15,  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 44.
21 Pino Arlacchi, Addio Cosa Nostra (Biblioteca Univerzale Rizzoli, 2004): 6-7.
22 Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien,  The European Turks: Gross domestic product, working population, entrepreneurs and household data.  
(Essen: Centre for Studies on Turkey, 2013).
23 Letizia Paoli and Peter Reuter ‘Drug trafficking and ethnic minorities in Europe,’ European Journal of Criminology 5 (2008): 13-37.
Drugs travel in the pipelines of regular commerce and traffic.  Thus 
some aspects of the distribution of routes between a producer and 
consumer region can be easily explained.  Consider for example 
two of the major portals for cocaine coming into Western Europe. 
The UNODC reports that for the period 2006-2011, between 40 
and 70 percent of the seizures of cocaine in Portugal come from 
Brazil, with another 20 percent usually coming from Lusophone 
Africa.20  In contrast, during the same period, Brazil accounted for 
less than 10 percent of seizures headed for Spain; the bulk there 
came from Spanish-speaking Latin America.  These patterns reflect 
the trading partnerships of the two Iberian countries. 
Patterns of immigration may be particularly important for 
trafficking.  The causal direction can be difficult to disentangle; 
the immigrant group in the consumer countries may make their 
home country an attractive transshipment site or the fact of being 
a transit country may increase the attractiveness of migrating to 
the destination country.   
The large Albanian diaspora in Western Europe is a post-Cold War 
phenomenon.21  Albania is just one of many potential routes from 
Turkey to the richer Western markets.  The diaspora, including 
many poorly-educated and poorer workers, may have made that 
country an attractive route.  
Western Europe is home to an estimated 5 million Turkish citizens, 
many of whom are the children or grandchildren of the original 
immigrants.22 In the constant flow of communication and exchanges 
linking them to relatives and friends in their home country, heroin 
loads can be easily disguised. Whether the diaspora benefits from 
Turkey being a transit country or whether Turkey’s transit role is a 
function of the existence of many potential traffickers in Western 
Europe again cannot be determined. 
Immigrants in the destination country who are from the producing 
and trafficking countries have advantages in managing the 
smuggling sector, with better knowledge of potential sellers and 
corruption opportunities. Paoli and Reuter examined the heroin 
trade in Western Europe and found that it was indeed dominated 
by immigrants from the transit countries; on the other hand, 
natives dominated the trade in synthetics and other domestically-
produced drugs.23 
Crossing more borders would 
seem to increase the risk of 
interception of the drugs.  
However, borders represent   
varying levels of risk.  
‘ ,
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The drug trade also readily uses indirect paths for smuggling. 
Drugs seized in Germany sometimes turn out to have travelled 
through Scandinavia into Russia and then exited through 
Poland to their final market. Ruggiero and South describe
‘a joint Czech-Colombia venture to ship sugar, rice  
and soya to Czechoslovakia….This operation was  
used to smuggle cocaine, destined for Western 
Europe. In 1991, police say that 440 lbs. of cocaine 
were seized in Bohemia and at Gdansk in Poland, 
which would have been smuggled onward to the 
Netherlands and Britain.’ 24  
Crossing more borders would seem to increase the risk 
of interception of the drugs.  However, borders represent 
varying levels of risk.  A plane from Bogota landing in New 
York is likely to be subject to an intense search.  Doing the 
same trip via Santiago, Chile will probably generate less 
vigorous scrutiny even when adding together the customs 
inspection at both airports.  Of course there are other 
costs associated with the intermediate stop that have to be 
weighed in the calculation but complex routes, perhaps 
many such routes, is one possible response to interdiction. 
 
THE IMPACT oF INTERDICTIoN oN 
TRAFFICKING RoUTES
As noted above, it is not hard to explain why interdiction might 
shift trafficking routes.  By increasing the risk of seizures along 
one particular route, interdiction makes alternative routes 
relatively more attractive.  Perhaps with a lag, the traffic then 
moves partially or completely from its original routes.  That 
leaves many questions – for example, how intense does 
interdiction have to become to have this effect? And how 
permanent is the shift?
We begin by illustrating some important instances of 
interdiction-generated shifts.  The claim of causality, that a 
particular change in trafficking routes is a consequence of 
a specific interdiction event, is never tightly supported by 
empirical evidence; only rarely is  the interdiction itself precisely 
enough described and data on the distribution of trafficking 
volumes across routes are never well-documented. High 
plausibility is all that can ever be offered.
Note an important information asymmetry.  Because more is 
known, or at least publicly disseminated, about route shifts than 
about interdiction itself, we only rarely learn of unsuccessful 
interdiction intensification.  Nations or alliances (particularly 
NATO) do not provide enough specifics of an intensified effort 
24 Vincenzo Ruggiero and Nigel South, Eurodrugs: Drug use, markets, and trafficking in Europe (UCL Press, 1995): 75.
25 Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century, (Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf.
26 For an excellent account of the implementation of the 100 percent search policy and its consequences see Ernestien Jensema, Fighting Drug 
Trafficking With a Substance–Oriented Approach:A Matter of Substance (Transnational Institute, 2010).
27 UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: A threat to stability and development (with special reference to Guinea Bissau) (Vienna: 2007), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf.
at disrupting some specific route and then follow-up information, 
such as whether one can identify instances of the traffic not moving 
in response two or three years later.  Thus, all that we can establish 
is that there are instances of movements in response to interdiction. 
Netherlands Antilles and the West African route
At the beginning of the last decade, authorities at Schiphol 
Airport in Amsterdam began to make many seizures of cocaine on 
passengers flying in from the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands 
Antilles was conveniently located close to the coast of Venezuela 
which has for at least a decade been used for exporting Colombian 
processed cocaine to both North America and Western Europe.25 
By 2001, the total number of Schiphol seizures and the quantity 
seized rose to levels regarded as representing a crisis; some of 
the arrested had to be released because of inadequate detention 
capacity.  Moreover it was estimated that the 1300 arrested in 2001 
were only about five percent of the total number of couriers.26 
As a consequence, the Dutch government in December 2003 
imposed a policy of  searching all passengers suspected of 
possessing cocaine coming off the plane from the Antilles. 
Anyone detected with less than three kilograms of cocaine was 
not arrested.  Instead, the cocaine was seized, the courier’s name 
was added to a list of persons not eligible for flights and/or his or 
her passport was confiscated for three years.  This was labelled a 
‘substance-oriented’ rather than an ‘offender-oriented’ approach.
The results were exactly what the Dutch authorities hoped for. 
The number of detected couriers in the first quarter of 2004 
was 343 and actually rose in the following quarter to a peak 
of 483; it then fell rapidly to 40 by the third  quarter of 2005. 
In the third quarter of 2006 it had fallen further to only 17. 
The authorities felt confident enough of the criminal justice 
system’s capacity to handle these new numbers through 
conventional processing; the three kilogram limit was dropped to 
1.5 kilograms and the sentencing regime moved back to what had 
conventionally been applied.
There were claims that this made little difference to the total 
quantity of cocaine imported into the Netherlands – and certainly 
into Europe – and that it simply diverted trafficking to new routes. 
In particular for the first time substantial quantities of cocaine 
were detected entering West Africa, exiting then to Western 
Europe.  Whereas in 2003 only 1.1 tons of cocaine were seized 
in Africa, by 2007 that number had risen to 5.5 tons, mostly from 
West Africa. Figure 1 provides UNODC estimates of the 
quantities of cocaine trafficked to Western Europe through West 
Africa, 2004-2010.
The nation of Guinea-Bissau became a transshipment country.27 
This tiny and impoverished country has no military or police capacity 
to deal with smugglers; the government is easily corrupted. 
Smugglers started using landing strips there for large shipments. 
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In 2007 there was one seizure of three quarters of a ton and it is 
believed that an even larger quantity from that shipment made 
it out of the country.28
Ghana, a larger nation than Guinea-Bissau but one also with 
fragile institutions, saw a sudden influx of cocaine traffickers; 
in 2005 Accra accounted for more seized cocaine at London’s 
Heathrow than did any other city.29  Until about 2010 there 
were regular reports of multi-kilo seizures of the drug either in 
Ghana itself or at airports after flights from Ghana.    
Was the opening of the West African route a response to 
the closing of the Netherlands Antilles smuggling channel? 
The timing is roughly right.  Venezuela was once again 
identified as the principal source of the cocaine for the 
African route as it had been for the Antilles.  That is about 
all one can offer in the absence of interviews with traffickers. 
Mexico and its Central American neighbours
Figure 1. Tons of Pure Cocaine Transiting West Africa on their way to Europe. 
28 K. Sullivan, ‘Route of Evil: How a Tiny West African Nation Became a Key Smuggling for Colombian Cocaine and the Price it is Paying’ 
Washington Post, 25 May 2008, A1.
29 European Commission, ‘A report on Global Illicit Drugs Markets 1998-2007, 2009, 50, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/anti-drugs/files/report-drug-
markets-short_en.pdf.
30 The film Maria, Full of Grace provides a heart-rending and persuasive portrayal of the work conditions of those who carry the drugs by 
swallowing condoms stuffed with the powder.  
31 For example, US Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
ondcp/ndcs2011.pdf shows that 95 percent of flows in 2010 were across the Mexico border.  
32 Kazakhstan serves the same role for Central Asian heroin traveling to Russia.  None of Tajikistan, Kyrgizstan or Uzbekistan have borders with 
Russia, so heroin trafficked through those countries have to pass through Kazakhstan or (less frequently) Turkmenistan to reach Russia.  There 
are no claims that Kazakhstan-resident individuals or organisations play an important role in the trade.  
For 25 years, from about 1985 to 2010, Mexico was the principal 
transshipment country for Colombian cocaine entering the United 
States.  The Caribbean, which served as the principal transshipment 
region in the early 1980s when the cocaine trade first became 
important, accounted for 75 percent of US cocaine seizures in 
1982; five years later it was less than half that.
In recent years, some cocaine has entered directly from Colombia, via 
both planes30 and small boats, but the US government consistently 
claimed that 90 percent entered via Mexico.31  Until about 2007 
it was thought that the countries between Colombia and Mexico 
(the seven nations of Central America) served as transshipment 
countries only in the passive sense that the drug passed through 
their territory; no transactions were thought to take place there.32
At the end of 2006 the newly-elected Mexican president Felipe 
Calderón launched an intense campaign against his nation’s major 
Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTO).  This resulted in major 
conflict within the cocaine-smuggling sector; violence reached 
extraordinary levels, with over 60,000 drug-related homicides in 
the six years of the Calderón presidency.
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Table 2. Cocaine Seizures in Central American nations, 2001-201134
 
Cocaine Seizures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belize 3854 7 56 735 244 90 32 16 0 2600 0
Costa Rica 1748 2955 4291 4590 7049 22909 32435 16167 20875 11265 8952
El Salvador 31 2075 2044 2710 38 107 4075 1347 442 150 0
Guatemala 4107 2934 9200 4481 5085 287 711 2214 6936 1458 3960
Honduras 717 79 5649 3934 472 2714 0 6468 0 0 13904
Nicaragua 2717 2208 1110 3703 6951 9720 13 19500 9800 17500 0
Panama 2660 2587 9487 7068 18314 36000 60000 51000 52443 52429 34132
By 2007 there were signs that the northern triangle of Central 
America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) had become an 
area of much greater drug smuggling activity.  Seizures became 
substantial for the first time (see Table 2) and there was a very 
large increase in homicides, many of which were thought to be 
drug-related.  It is now claimed that Guatemalan gangs were 
actively involved in smuggling itself, paid by either Colombian or 
Mexican DTOs in cocaine rather than cash.  Oddly enough, the 
largest seizures have been farther south, particularly in Panama, 
but there is some question as to whether these are double 
counting of Colombian seizures.  
The suggestion here is that the intensification of enforcement 
in Mexico has led to a shift of some trafficking activities to 
countries lying between Colombia and Mexico.  There does 
indeed seem to be more such activity.33  What is unclear though 
is what exactly has shifted from Mexico, since there are almost 
no direct deliveries to the United States from Central America.  It 
may simply be that the Mexican government crackdown makes 
it sensible to hold inventory further south, where government 
protection is more cheaply bought, a reminder that smuggling is 
33 An excellent source for this is the website Insight Organized Crime in the Americas, http://www.insightcrime.org.
34  The years with zero entries should be taken to be years of missing data.
not a single event but a combination of activities.  Alternatively, it 
may be that what has shifted across Mexico’s southern border is safe 
operating space for the principals.
For the purposes of this contribution, this may be a counter-example 
to the balloon effect hypothesis.   Mexico has cracked down but the 
result has been a relatively minor displacement of certain activities 
rather than a large-scale shift of routes.
 
Interdiction around Afghanistan
As already noted, there have been shifts in the routes from 
Afghanistan, now 15 years into its dominance as the world’s leading 
producer of opium and heroin, and to the major wealthy markets 
in the West.  Seizure data, presented earlier, show such shifts. 
Unfortunately, there are no data about interdiction programmes that 
would permit testing of the balloon effect hypothesis.   Iran always 
notes the intensity of its efforts to deter trafficking and to suppress its 
domestic heroin market, but there are no figures on how the intensity 
of interdiction has varied over time.  The same is true for the countries of 
Central Asia.    
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The balloon effect can be seen as a simplifying metaphor; after all interdiction is just one 
contributing factor to the observed shifts of trafficking.35 To test the balloon effect hypothesis 
properly requires a kind of data that is never likely to be available: estimates of the intensity 
of interdiction along specific routes and the flow of drugs along those same routes over a 
period of time.  Even the most basic data, drug flows along routes, are hard to obtain.  For 
instance ‘US drug officials claim that 70 percent of cocaine consumed in Europe was shipped 
through West Africa in 2007, while the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
estimate that 25 percent of Europe’s cocaine transits through the sub-region’.36 There is 
simply no systematic methodology for making such estimates.37  We rely on impressions, 
weakly reinforced by seizure data.  It is probably asymmetric, with false positives less likely 
than false negatives but with a delay in knowledge about the shift in routes, particularly in 
countries around Afghanistan.
Surely the balloon effect contains at least a grain of truth, even if it is not the whole story. 
Smugglers, like other profit-making enterprises, have incentives to respond to changes in 
costs.  The trope of a globalised world is true for illegal drugs as it is for legal trade.  But the 
question is how much increased interdiction can erode the competitive advantage of existing 
routes, and that remains in the domain of pure speculation.  
What should decision-makers do in light of this uncertainty about the mobility of trafficking? 
One response of interdiction agencies is to cheer what appears to be good news.  If the 
balloon effect is punctured, then the justification for intense interdiction is strengthened; it 
is not merely moving traffic around but has some prospect of actually reducing total world 
consumption.  However, that flies in the face of the macro-evidence against interdiction’s 
effectiveness.  
Fluctuations in the share of cocaine seized in recent years has not been reflected in estimated 
global consumption.  The quantitative basis for clear statements is weak; seizure estimates 
are hampered by lack of purity data, while consumption estimates are notoriously fragile 
in the few countries where they exist. Nonetheless, it has been consistently difficult to find 
any connection between interdiction success and final market outcomes; Pollack and Reuter 
provide a brief review of the available evidence. 38 
An alternative response is to note that there are some instances in which the balloon effect 
does indeed occur.  The Dutch decision to crack down in the Netherlands Antilles has cost 
West African development dearly.  Globalisation is not just a phenomenon to be observed; 
it is a fundamental aspect of decision-making.  Interdiction crackdowns by one country may 
well affect others.  Co-ordinating this element of decision-making internationally will be 
extremely difficult both institutionally and operationally but without such co-ordination, this 
kind of immiserating effect will no doubt occur again. ■ 
35 Cornelius Friesendorf, ‘Squeezing the balloon? United States Air Interdiction and the Restructuring 
of the South American Drug Industry in the 1990s,’ Crime, Law and Social Change 44  
(2005): 45-78.
36 Gernot Klautschnig, (2012) ‘Africa and the war on drugs fighting ahistorical analysis,’ 2012, 
http://africanarguments.org/2012/10/18/africa-and-the-war-on-drugs-fighting-a-historical-analysis-
of-the-west-african-trade-%E2%80%93-by-gernot-klantschnig/ 
37 Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany Bond and Peter Reuter Reducing Drug Trafficking 
Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help? (RAND 
Occasional Paper, 2010) http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf
38 Harold Pollack and Peter Reuter, ‘Does tougher enforcement make drugs more expensive,’ 
Addiction (forthcoming). 
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Improving Supply-Side 
Policies: Smarter Eradication, 
Interdiction and Alternative 
Livelihoods – and the 
Possibility of Licensing
Vanda Felbab-Brown
THE GLoBAL CoUNTERNARCoTICS MooD: 
THE EMERGING DISSENSUS
Over the past three decades, US counternarcotics efforts abroad 
have strongly emphasised eradication of illicit crops, interdiction 
of drug flows and dismantling of drug trafficking organisations 
(DTOs). At the core of these policies lay the assumption that such 
drug suppression policies not only accomplished the key US objective 
of reducing US drug consumption by reducing the volume of drug 
flows to the United States, but also fostered other crucial US goals 
of weakening, if not outright defeating, terrorist and militant groups 
involved in the highly lucrative drug trade. Yet the cumulative 
evidence of the outcomes of these policies over the past three 
decades has proven these basic assumptions of US counternarcotics 
policies wrong. Premature forced eradication, unfocused interdiction 
and nonstrategic break-up of DTOs – policies often exported and 
force-fed to supply-side and transshipment countries – came with a 
host of negative side-effects. These include: extensive human rights 
violations; further political, economic and social marginalisation of 
illicit crop farmers; destabilisation of local governments; alienation of 
local populations; strengthening of bonds between militant groups 
and local populations; and increases in violence perpetrated by DTOs 
and other criminal groups. 
Frustration and strong dissatisfaction with US-supported policies 
have stimulated increasing debates in Latin America about how to 
redesign policies toward the drug trade, including various forms of 
decriminalisation and legalisation of at least some narcotics, such 
as cannabis.
Such calls for reform have not been echoed in other parts of the 
world, however. Russia in particular has been at the forefront of calls 
for toughening policies. China has also embraced existing policies 
and many countries in Asia and the Middle East continue to defend 
their harsh punishments of users as well as local dealers. 
Among many drug policy reformers, there is an emerging consensus 
that decriminalisation, public health, treatment and harm reduction-
based policies and even legalising some drugs (such as cannabis 
in Uruguay) are more appropriate than punitive policies for 
controlling consumption. 
 
   Summary
 ■ The past three decades of US counternarcotics 
efforts abroad have strongly emphasised 
eradication of crops, interdiction and 
dismantling of drug trafficking  
organisations (DTOs). 
 ■ Policies were aimed at reducing US drug 
consumption and weakening militant groups. 
The cumulative evidence has proven these basic 
assumptions wrong. 
 ■ Successful cases of eradication and  
interdiction have at most succeeded in 
generating a two-year lag before production 
and supply recovered.
 ■ In poor countries eradication strengthens the 
political capital of the belligerents.
 ■ This is not to say that eradication should never 
be used. Rather, eradication needs to be well-
crafted, used judiciously and, crucially, properly 
sequenced with other measures.
 ■ Just like eradication, alternative livelihoods 
can only shift production from one area to 
another (the ‘balloon effect’). But, when 
designed as broader development efforts, they 
make enforcing the law, including eradication, 
politically and socially acceptable, preventing 
dangerous instability. 
 ■ Focused-deterrence strategies, selective 
targeting and sequential interdiction efforts 
are often more promising law enforcement 
alternatives than flow-suppression or zero-
tolerance approaches.
 ■ States should move law enforcement forces 
away from random non-strategic strikes and 
blanket ‘zero-tolerance’ approaches against 
lowest-level offenders, and toward strategic 
selectivity to give each counter-crime operation 
enhanced impact. 
 ■ Governments and international organisations 
need to thoroughly consider to which locales 
the illicit economy will shift if suppression 
efforts in a particular locale are effective and 
whether such a shift is desirable.
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1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 World Drug Report, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf.
2 See, for example, Tom Kramer, Martin Jelsma and Tom Blickman, Withdrawal Symptoms in the Golden Triangle: A Drugs Market in Disarray 
(Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, January 2009).
3 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
ondcp/policy-and-research/2013_data_supplement_final2.pdf: 76.
4 Ibid., 75. Note that in US databases, and this report, cocaine prices are given per two grams while heroin prices are given per gram.
5 See, for example, Jonathan P. Caulkins’ contribution to this report.
6 See Peter Reuter’s contribution to this report.
There is, however, no equivalent consensus among reformers on 
how to restructure supply-side policies and how to mitigate the 
multiple threats that the drug trade poses, including threats to 
public  safety from violent drug trafficking organisations and to 
national security from the nexus of militancy and drug trafficking. 
Many proponents of legalisation argue that legalisation by itself 
will eliminate violence, criminality and the militancy nexus. This 
contribution does not support that contention. Instead, it argues 
that even in markets of legal commodities, law enforcement plays 
a key role. Thus, rather than jettisoning eradication, interdiction 
and alternative livelihoods efforts altogether, there is a great and 
urgent need to make them smarter.
THE FAILURES oF ERADICATIoN AND  
HoW To IMPRoVE IT
A key premise of counternarcotics strategies that emphasise the 
eradication of drug crops is that the reduction in supply will reduce 
consumption by increasing street prices. Yet although eradication 
efforts have been extensive and occasionally have succeeded (for 
example China in the 1950s and 1960s and Vietnam in the 1990s 
and 2000s), they have failed to dramatically increase overall 
prices, including in key consumption markets.
In the US, consumption of cocaine has been declining steadily 
mainly because hardcore users have been aging. At the same 
time, consumption of methamphetamines and of synthetic and 
prescription drugs has increased. Cocaine consumption has 
meanwhile been on the rise in Western Europe. Iran and Pakistan 
remain extensive markets for heroin and other opiates. Russia 
and Brazil have an illicit drug consumption problem that rivals 
the West and continues to expand.1 In localities where traditional 
drug production and traffic have been suppressed, such as 
in Burma or Laos, people have not abandoned use. Instead, 
they frequently switch to home-cooked synthetic drugs that 
often cause even more health damage than traditional alkaloid-
based substances.2
Indeed, despite determined eradication efforts over the past 
thirty years, drug prices in the West have been for the most part 
falling. In the United States, retail heroin prices fell from $1896 
per gram at 11 percent purity in 1981 to $408 per gram at 28 
percent in 2011, with the lowest price of $378 at 34 percent 
purity in 2008. 3 Cocaine prices fell from $669.18 per two grams 
at 40 percent in 1981 to $177.26 at 42 percent purity level in 
2011, with the lowest recorded price of $132.89 at 64 percent 
purity in 2007.4 US heroin prices are thus 21 percent in nominal 
terms of what they were in the early 1980s, and cocaine prices 
are at 26.5 percent.
A counterargument could be raised that in the absence of 
such intense supply-side suppression measures, prices would 
be far lower and availability far greater, with accompanying 
expansion in consumption.5 Such a counterargument reveals 
the inherent difficulties of drawing inferences without analytic 
control comparisons of alternative policies. Imagine the following 
scenario: a sick patient has been taking a pill as treatment, but is 
not getting better. 
Does that justifiably imply that the pill is not effective treatment? 
Possibly. But there are several other possibilities:
(1)   The dosage needs to be higher, for example  
       more  intense eradication campaigns. 
(2)   The pill is at least partly effective, and without  
       it,  the patient would be much sicker. 
(3)   Not only is the pill ineffective, but is in fact  
       counterproductive – like the eradication  
       programmes detailed below which have  
       complicated efforts to suppress militancy  
       and terrorism. 
(4)   The treatment is effective in attacking the  
       disease (analogous to wiping out the poppy  
       crops in a  particular locale), but is killing the  
       patient at the same time – worsening human  
     rights and complicating counterinsurgency   
       and counterterrorism efforts. 
Indeed, counternarcotics suppression efforts have consistently 
failed in their second key promise: to diminish militants’ and 
terrorists’ physical capabilities by bankrupting them. Suppression 
efforts raise the price of illicit commodities – thus, in the cases 
of only partial suppression of production, frequently resulting 
in little change in the belligerents’ income. Given fairly stable 
or increasing international demand, full and permanent 
suppression of supply is extraordinarily hard to achieve. 
The extent of the belligerents’ financial losses from suppression of 
illicit economies depends on the adaptability of the belligerents, 
traffickers and peasants. Adaptation methods are frequently 
plentiful, especially in the case of illicit drugs. Belligerents can 
store drugs, which are essentially nonperishable. Belligerents can 
put some money away. Farmers can replant after eradication 
and offset losses from areas eradicated. Farmers, traffickers and 
belligerents can shift production to areas where the crops are 
not being eradicated and where detection is difficult. Traffickers 
can switch their trafficking, their means of transportation or take 
various other evasion adaptations. 
Successes of law-enforcement and counter-narcotics supply-side 
policies frequently last only briefly. Without reductions in global 
demand, they inevitably give way to supply recovery in the same 
locale, or elsewhere (the so-called ‘balloon effect’6). Coca and 
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opium cultivation and processing are archetypal footloose 
industries: they require little capital, few labour skills and the 
necessary technologies are simple and well-known. Source 
country suppression policies – eradication and interdiction – 
have at most succeeded in generating a two-year lag before 
production and supply recovered.7
There is not one single case over the past five decades where 
eradication policies succeeded in bankrupting or defeating 
belligerents. Even in Colombia, eradication hampered 
governmental efforts to defeat the FARC.8 Indeed, suppression 
of narcotics crops has proved outright counterproductive 
to defeating militants, obtaining actionable intelligence on 
terrorists and ending violent conflict. This is because belligerents 
often obtain not only financial resources, but also political 
capital from their involvement in the illicit economies such as the 
drug trade. The increases in the belligerents’ political capital are 
especially pronounced if they are involved in labour-intensive 
illicit economies, such as sponsoring illicit crop cultivation in 
poor regions where legal job opportunities are lacking. There, 
local populations, over whose allegiance terrorists, militants 
and governments compete, are fully dependent on cultivation 
of drug crops for basic economic survival, human security and 
any social advancement. 
Belligerents who use their sponsorship of illicit economies 
and the income they derive from them to provide otherwise-
lacking public goods and socio-economic benefits, such as 
schools, clinics and roads – and who protect the population 
against abusive traffickers and particularly against government 
eradication efforts  – obtain the strongest political capital. 
The population bonds with them, often providing them with 
material benefits, such as food and shelter, and critically 
denying intelligence on the belligerents to the government 
and counterinsurgent forces. In poor countries or regions, 
eradication of illicit crops thus critically strengthens the political 
capital of the belligerents. 
On the other hand, during periods and in places where 
interdiction has been undertaken without eradication, and 
especially during periods and in locales where laissez-faire 
 7 Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 93.
 8 For the case of Colombia as well as Afghanistan, Peru, Burma and Thailand, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and 
the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010). 
 9 Ibid., ‘Chapter 3: Peru,’ 35-68.
10 See, for example, Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003); Kathryn 
Ledebur, ‘Bolivia: Clear Consequences,’ in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005), 143-182.
All of the above are not to say  
that eradication should never be 
used as a counternarcotics  
policy tool. Rather, eradication  
needs to be well-crafted, used 
judiciously and, crucially, properly  
sequenced with other measures.
‘ ,
toward narcotics crop cultivation or non-prosecution of illicit crop 
farmers have been the policy, the belligerents’ political capital has 
declined and the population has been more inclined to cooperate 
with and provide intelligence to the governing authorities, 
strengthening counterinsurgency and anti-militant efforts.9
Conditions necessary for eradication to be effective in reducing 
cultivation in specific areas:
1) First and foremost, if a government’s goal is to suppress 
production in the entire country, then it needs to have control 
over the entire country. It must have detailed knowledge of 
where production is shifting as a result of eradication and 
be able to counter this trend. It must also have a continuing 
presence on the ground to prevent replanting. It cannot face 
an armed opposition able to exploit the popular anger against 
eradication.  
In addition to firm government control throughout the country, 
either one of the two following conditions needs to be present:
2) The government has the will and capacity to be very harsh 
to the population – ignoring their economic plight that is 
worsened by eradication; cracking down on protests and 
rebellions against eradication; and removing any opposition 
leaders who embrace the counter-eradication cause and 
could effectively mobilise against the government. And the 
government has to be prepared to carry out such repression 
on a repeated basis for years to come. Needless to say, such a 
policy is inconsistent with democracy and human rights – and 
not recommended by this author.  
3) Alternative economic livelihoods are in place – not simply 
promised to take place in the future, but already generating 
legal economic alternatives. Like eradication, alternative 
livelihoods will not eliminate the world’s production of illicit 
crops or the world’s illicit economies. However, like eradication, 
they can be effective in reducing or even eliminating the illicit 
production in particular regions or countries – if they are well-
designed, integrated into overall poverty reduction strategies 
and enjoy broader auspicious economic growth contexts. 
Often, however, they are not designed and implemented 
effectively and produce disappointing results. How to improve 
their effectiveness is discussed below.
The harsh repression model has so often been successful only 
on a temporary basis, and has mostly broken down within a few 
years. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan picked up within one year 
after the Taliban’s 2000 prohibition. Despite a combination of 
repression and localised alternative development programmes in 
Bolivia, production increased there since 2000. 10 Mao’s eradication 
of opium poppy cultivation in China in the 1950s and 1960s has 
been the most effective and lasting eradication campaign ever; 
but it involved levels of brutality that would be, appropriately so, 
intolerable in most countries.
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11 For a review of how Bolivia’s uno-cato policy and the broader strategy of ‘yes to coca, no to cocaine’ has evolved and the many difficulties it 
has run into, see Coletta Youngers, ‘Shifts in Cultivation, Usage Put Bolivia’s Coca Policy at the Crossroads,’ World Politics Review, December 5, 
2013, 1-3.
All of the above are not to say that eradication should never 
be used as a counternarcotics policy tool. Rather, eradication 
needs to be well-crafted, used judiciously and, crucially, properly 
sequenced with other measures. 
Using eradication to prevent the cultivation of illicit crops in 
national parks, for example, might be highly appropriate. Such 
a policy, however, will only be effective if suppression measures 
are less intense outside of national parks. 
Similarly, once alternative livelihoods efforts have generated 
the necessary and sufficient resources for illicit crop farmers to 
switch to sustainable licit livelihoods, eradication may well be 
an important tool to catalyse such an economic switch. Such 
smart eradication will be socially viable and will strengthen 
the rule of law. But premature eradication – in the context of 
insurgency and without alternative livelihoods in place – will 
be counterproductive with respect to improving the security 
situation in the country and also ineffective with respect to 
suppressing the illicit crops.
In sum, governments should not rely on suppression of 
illicit economies to defeat or even substantially weaken 
belligerents. Most likely, belligerents will find a host of 
adaptations to escape from the resource-limitation trap, 
making the focus on limiting the belligerents’ resources a 
highly risky strategy for the government. If a government 
seeks to achieve a preponderance of military power, it needs 
to do so through strengthening its own military resources. 
In the case of labour-intensive illicit economies in poor 
countries, governments should postpone suppression efforts 
toward the illicit economy, which target the wider population, 
until and after belligerents have been defeated or have 
negotiated an end to the conflict. Premature suppression 
efforts, such as eradication, will alienate the population and 
severely curtail intelligence flows from the population. It will 
lose hearts and minds and severely hamper the military effort 
against the belligerents. Nor will eradication be effective in 
the context of violence because traffickers and producers will 
find a way to adapt in the context of limited state presence. 
Interdiction at borders and destruction of labs do not target the 
population directly.  
Consequently, it does not alienate the population to the same 
extent as eradication and is thus more easily compatible with 
the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism effort. 
Military forces – whether domestic or international – should 
focus on directly defeating the belligerents and protecting 
the population. They do have an important role to play 
in counternarcotics policy and in suppressing other illicit 
economies, namely to provide security. Without such security, 
efforts to suppress illicit economies will not be effective. 
But they should not engage in eradication themselves.
If belligerents have not yet penetrated an illicit economy in a 
country – for example, narcotics cultivation in a particular region – 
governments should make every effort to prevent the belligerents 
from penetrating the economy, such as by establishing a cordon 
sanitaire around the region. 
If the belligerents themselves undertake suppression of a labour-
intensive illicit economy the government should immediately 
step in and provide economic relief to the population. It should 
also intensify the military effort against the belligerents at that 
time as they will be extremely vulnerable politically and not have 
a robust population support base. Most likely, belligerents will 
themselves undertake eradication only when they first encounter 
the illicit economy – which could be a highly auspicious moment 
for the government to undertake a robust offensive against the 
belligerents. But such an opportunity could also arise as a result of 
a change in leadership, intensified ideological fervour, or the need 
to appease some outside patron.
Efforts to limit the belligerents’ resources should focus on 
mechanisms, such as those targeted against money laundering, 
that do not directly harm the wider population. Such measures 
cannot remain localised but need to be strengthened on the global 
level. It is important to recognise, however, that anti-laundering 
measures are no panacea and will remain of limited effectiveness. 
 
If the government itself undertakes suppression efforts toward a 
labour-intensive illicit economy — efforts which target the wider 
population – it should at least complement such a dangerous 
policy by providing immediate relief to the population by way 
of humanitarian aid and alternative livelihoods programmes. 
Alternative livelihoods programmes will not have a chance to really 
take off until conflict has ended and security has been established; 
but the government needs to demonstrate to the population right 
away that it is not indifferent to its plight. 
Even after the conflict has ended, eradication of illicit crops 
should only be undertaken once the population has access to 
alternative livelihoods that address the entire scope of structural 
drivers of illicit crop cultivation. That may well entail delaying 
eradication for several years while alternative livelihoods efforts 
are being implemented; eradication should only be undertaken 
when the household is receiving sufficient legal income. However, 
a well-sequenced eradication may well be undertaken in areas 
where households are not economically dependent on drug 
crop cultivation. The so-called uno-cato policy that President Evo 
Morales adopted in Bolivia, permitting households to cultivate a 
small area of land with coca, provides many lessons.11
A failure to actually provide such comprehensive alternative 
development – only promising it for the future and undertaking 
eradication prematurely – will result in social instability, critically 
destabilising the government immediately after conflict. 
In that case, the government will only be able to maintain 
eradication by resorting to very harsh measures toward the 
population and will have to maintain such repression for 
many years. 
LSE  Exper t  Group on  the  Economic s  of  Drug  Po l i cy  |  45
12 For a good overview, see Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand, 1970-2000: A Thirty-Year Journey (Bangkok: UNDCP Silkworm 
Books, 2001). 
13 Ibid., 36 and UNODC, Southeast Asia: Opium Survey 2012, December 2008, 5.
14 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, ‘Drugs and War Destabilize Thai-Myanmar Border Region,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 2002; and Pierre-Arnaud 
Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of Poppy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
15 For a discussion of how, in the context of insecurity and ongoing military conflict, alternative livelihoods efforts will be of limited effectiveness 
and can be even counterproductive, see Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between 
Aid and Security in Afghanistan (Tufts University, Feinstein International Center, January 2012); and Vanda Felbab-Brown, Aspiration and 
Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution  
Press, 2013).
16 David Mansfield, ‘The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality—Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,’ paper 
prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing (Munich),  
January 7–12, 2002.
17 David Mansfield and Adam Pain, ‘Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan?’ AREU Briefing Paper, October 2005, 
 http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=187&Pdf=524E-Substance or Slogan BP.pdf.
...the absolutist goal of a 
complete suppression of 
drug trafficking (or organised 
crime overall) will mostly be 
unachievable, and will be 
particularly problematic in the 
context of acute state weakness 
where underdeveloped and weak 
state institutions are the norm. 
‘
,
 
THE  FAILURES  oF ALTERNATIVE 
LIVELIHooDS EFFoRTS AND WAyS To 
IMPRoVE THEM
Even if smart alternative livelihoods efforts were undertaken 
globally, they would not eliminate the global drug trade. 
Some people with plentiful legal economic options would 
be tempted to make a high income from breaking the law. 
Just like eradication, alternative livelihoods can only shift 
production from one area to another. But alternative livelihoods 
efforts when designed as broader development efforts make 
enforcing the law, including eradication, politically and socially 
acceptable, preventing dangerous instability. However, in order 
to accomplish these goals, they need to be properly sequenced 
and well-designed.
In their current design, alternative livelihoods programmes 
have been no more successful than eradication on a country-
wide scale (although they have been relatively more successful 
at local levels). This is partially because alternative livelihood 
programmes have been neither sufficiently long-lasting nor 
well-funded and well-managed. Thailand provides the most 
significant example of success. There, three decades of multi-
faceted, comprehensive, well-funded and well-managed rural 
development since the 1970s – significantly accompanied 
by very impressive and crucial economic growth and 
industrialisation that generated extensive new employment 
opportunities outside of drug areas led to the elimination 
of poppy cultivation.12 Thus cultivation fell from17,920 
hectares at its peak in 1965-1966 to 209 hectares in 2012.13 
It is important to point out that even at its peak, cultivation was 
about a tenth of the size of the problem in Afghanistan today 
or (in the case of coca) in Latin America. Moreover, Thailand 
continues to have flourishing traffic in synthetic drugs as well 
as in opiates from other countries.14
For alternative livelihoods programmes to be effective in 
reducing illicit crop cultivation in a lasting way, good security 
needs to be established in the rural regions. In other words, 
military conflict needs to be ended.15
Moreover, alternative livelihoods programmes cannot be 
construed as only crop substitution. Price profitability is only 
one factor. Even in rich Western countries, cultivation of illicit 
cannabis is more profitable than the many legal jobs, yet the vast 
majority of the population chooses to obtain legal employment. 
The key for alternative livelihoods should not be to match the 
prices of the illicit commodity – a losing game – but rather 
to create such economic conditions that allow the population 
to have a decent livelihood without having to resort to the 
illicit economy. 
Other drivers of illicit economies, such as insecurity and a lack 
of access to necessary productive resources, value-added chains 
and markets are frequently far more important determinants of 
the decision to participate in illicit economies. Thus, farmers, 
such as those in the Shinwar and Achin regions of Afghanistan 
or the Shan hill areas of Burma, continue to cultivate illicit crops 
even though legal crops, such as vegetables, fetch greater 
prices and would bring a greater profit.16 Risk-minimisation 
in a high-risk environment is often more important than 
profit-maximisation. A mixture of many other factors 
also matters: security, rule of law, assured property rights 
and moral considerations, as well as other economic 
structural drivers.17 
For alternative livelihoods to have any chance to take off and 
be sustained, they must address all the structural drivers of illicit 
economies. They must encompass the generation of sufficient 
employment opportunities (such as through the promotion 
of high-value, labour-intensive crops), infrastructure building, 
distribution of new technologies (including fertilizers and 
better seeds), marketing help and the development of value-
added chains, facilitation of local microcredit, establishment 
of access to land without the need to participate in the illicit 
economy and development of off-farm income opportunities, 
to name a few. 
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Focused-deterrence strategies, 
selective targeting and sequential 
interdiction efforts should often be 
considered as more promising law 
enforcement alternatives than  
flow-suppression measures or  
zero-tolerance approaches.
‘ ,
18 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America,’ Brookings 
Latin America Initiative Paper Series, December 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/05%20latin%20
america%20slums%20felbabbrown/1205_latin_america_slums_felbabbrown.pdf.
Alternative livelihoods efforts will be ineffective if they are 
conceived as discreet handouts and isolated interventions, 
as is indeed often the case in both rural settings, where 
the goal is to suppress drug cultivation, and in urban 
environments where socio-economic policies are meant 
to reduce drug trafficking and other criminality.18 
Alternative livelihoods really mean comprehensive rural 
and overall economic and social development. As such, the 
programmes require a lot of time, the politically difficult 
willingness to concentrate resources and lasting security in the 
area where they are undertaken. 
trafficking groups during the administration of President Felipe 
Calderon broke up the groups, but also provoked extremely 
violent turf wars among and within the crime groups over territory 
and access to corruption channels. In Afghanistan, interdiction 
efforts of the mid-2000s that focused on the least powerful 
small traders led to a vertical integration of the illegal and gave 
rise to powerful and well-connected drug capos and enabled 
the Taliban to reintegrate itself into Afghanistan’s drug trade. 
Similarly, zero-tolerance approaches to drugs and crime, popular 
around the world since the late 1980s, have often proven 
problematic. They have frequently failed to suppress criminality 
while increasing human rights violations and police abuses. And 
the absolutist goal of a complete suppression of drug trafficking 
(or organised crime overall) will mostly be unachievable, and will 
be particularly problematic in the context of acute state weakness 
where underdeveloped and weak state insti tutions are the norm. 
Yet well-crafted interdiction efforts remain a crucial policy tool 
– but not because they will significantly reduce the income 
of belligerents or significantly limit supply. Rather, they are an 
important tool because they allow the state to prevent criminal 
groups from cooperating with militant actors. They also allow 
the state to prevent criminal groups from accumulating extensive 
coercive and corruptive power which threatens the security, rule 
of law and political integrity of the country. They further help the 
state in minimising the violence associated with criminal markets. 
 
Smart interdiction policies for achieving the above goals include the 
following measures:
(1) Governments should avoid unnecessarily strengthening 
the bond between the criminal traffickers and the belligerents 
by treating the two as a unified actor and should explore 
ways to pit the two kinds of actors against each other. 
Far from being comrades in arms, they have naturally conflicting 
interests, and governments should avoid helping them to align 
their interests. One way may be to temporarily let up on the group 
that represents a smaller threat to the state and to exploit that 
group for intelligence acquisition.
But it is also important to be conscious of the possibility that such 
efforts may set up perverse incentives to corrupt the state. Selectively 
targeting only traffickers linked to belligerents, for example, will 
send a signal that the best way to be a trafficker is to be a part of 
the government. That may well be beneficial in the short run with 
respect to counterinsurgency objectives, but it may generate long-
term problems of corruption. Thus planning needs to be taken as 
to how to reclaim state dominance and limit corruption once the 
security threat from the belligerents has subsided. 
(2) Interdiction efforts need to be designed carefully with the 
objective of limiting the coercive and corruption power of 
crime groups. The goal of interdiction should thus be to have 
the illicit economy populated by many small traders, rather 
than a few vertically integrated groups. Although the former 
will likely require an intensification of intelligence resources 
THE FAILURES oF INTERDICTIoN  
AND HoW To MAKE INTERDICTIoN  
MoRE EFFECTIVE
Over the past several decades, interdiction policies have been 
predominantly designed to stop or minimise the volume of 
illicit flows. Occasionally, but rarely, they have succeeded in 
disrupting trafficking and rerouting it from particular regions, 
or in reshaping the structures of criminal markets. Interdiction 
efforts were, for example, successful in destroying the so-called 
‘French connection’ and disrupting heroin smuggling from 
Asia through Turkey in the 1970s (attributable to successful 
interdiction plus the licensing of Turkish opium cultivation for 
medical purposes). But the outcome of disrupting the ‘French 
connection’ also included the emergence of substantial 
heroin production elsewhere—namely Mexico. During the 
1990s, the United States was highly effective in disrupting the 
drug trade through the Caribbean, pushing trafficking into 
Central America and Mexico. With US assistance, Colombia 
ultimately prevailed against the Medellín and Cali cartels 
and broke up large cartels into smaller, less threatening 
ones – but those successes also empowered the Mexican drug 
trafficking groups.
Indeed, interdiction measures preoccupied with the suppression 
of flows or otherwise mis-designed have often turned out to 
produce a set of undesirable effects. In Mexico, premature 
and nonselective frontal assault by the state on Mexico’s drug 
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devoted to keeping track of the many small actors, such an 
outcome will benefit public safety because small traders will 
not have the power to systematically corrupt or threaten 
the state.
Focused-deterrence strategies, selective targeting and sequential 
interdiction efforts should often be considered as more promising 
law enforcement alternatives than flow-suppression measures 
or zero-tolerance approaches. These former approaches seek to 
minimise the most pernicious behaviour of criminal groups, such as 
violence or engagement with terrorist groups, and help law 
enforcement in stitutions overcome resource deficiencies.19
Defining ‘the most harmful’ behaviour can vary. The broad 
concept is to move law enforcement forces away from random 
non-strategic strikes and blanket ‘zero-tolerance’ approaches 
against lowest-level offenders, and toward strategic selectivity 
to give each counter-crime operation enhanced impact. 
The decision whether to focus selective interdiction on 
high-value targets or the middle layer of criminal groups is 
importantly related to whether incapacitation or deterrence 
strategies are privileged.20
Meanwhile, before the state takes on extensive and powerful 
crime networks, it needs to have the law enforcement and 
intelligence resources ready to prevent and suppress violence 
resulting from turf wars over illicit markets. 
(3) The state and international partners sponsoring interdiction 
and suppression measures in source countries keenly need 
to watch the watchdogs. Organisations and individuals 
tasked with eradication and interdiction are ideally placed to 
become the top traffickers in a country because they have 
access to intelligence and can manipulate suppression efforts 
to augment their power and target political or ethnic rivals. 
In many source countries subjected to intense suppression 
efforts, the top law enforcement officials became the top 
traffickers. Consequently, relentless internal monitoring 
is critical.
(4) Governments and international organisations also need to 
thoroughly consider to which locales the illicit economy will 
shift if suppression efforts in a particular locale are effective 
and whether such a shift is desirable. Suppression will only shift 
production elsewhere – for example, where a major terrorist 
group operates. Such a group consequently would receive a 
19 For details on focused-deterrence strategies and selective targeting, see David Kennedy, Daniel Tompkins and Gayle Garmise, ‘Pulling Levers: 
Getting Deterrence Right,’ National Institute of Justice Journal (236), 1998, 2-8; Mark Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less 
Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Targeted Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug 
Trafficking and Organized Crime: Concepts and Practicalities,’ IDPC-IISS-Chatham House, Modernizing Drug Law Enforcement, Report No. 2, 
February 2013.
20 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Despite Its Siren Song, High-Value Targeting Doesn’t Fit All: Matching Interdiction Patterns to Specific Narcoterrorism 
and Organized-Crime Contexts,’ The Brookings Institution, October 1, 2013.
21 For analysis of licensing efficacy in India and Turkey, see David Mansfield, ‘An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey,’ 
author’s copy.
22 For a detailed analysis, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Opium Licensing in Afghanistan: Its Desirability and Feasibility,’ Foreign Policy Studies Policy 
Paper, No. 1, Brookings Institution Press, August 2007, http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf.
23 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘The Disappearing Act: Species Conservation and the Illicit Trade in Wildlife in Asia,’ Brookings Foreign Policy 
Working Paper No. 6, Brookings Institution, June 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/06_illegal_wildlife_trade_felbabbrown.aspx; 
Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Not as Easy as Falling off a Log: The Illegal Timber Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region and Possible Mitigation Strategies,’ 
Brookings Foreign Policy Working Paper No. 5, Brookings Institution, March 2011.
major windfall, both in terms of military capabilities and political 
capital. The mere fact of relocation will be highly disruptive to 
the new recipient region with respect to public safety, national 
security and political, judicial and law-enforcement institutions. 
Moreover, governments and international organisations need to 
consider what illicit economy will replace the existing one and 
whether it is potentially even more pernicious. 
 
THE PRoMISE oF LICENSING AND 
LEGALISATIoN AND WHy THEy ARE NoT  
A PANACEA
Source-country policies toward illicit economies can also encompass 
licensing of the illicit economy for legal purposes. For example, the 
licensing of opium poppy cultivation for medical opiates (morphine, 
codeine and thebaine) in Turkey eliminated the illegal cultivation 
of poppy there. The fact that some form of licensing is feasible 
and effective in one context does not mean it would be equally 
effective in other contexts. Turkey had a strong state that had firm 
control over the territory concerned. Furthermore, Turkey was 
able to utilise a particular technology, the so-called poppy straw 
method, that makes diversion of morphine into the illicit trade very 
difficult. India’s licensing system for the cultivation of opium poppy 
for medical opiates proved considerably less effective in preventing 
diversion of opium into illicit uses, as India never adopted the 
poppy-straw method.21 Although both India and Turkey have a 
guaranteed market in the United States under the so-called 80/20 
rule, both are being displaced from the licit market by new industrial 
suppliers of medical opiates, such as Australia. Trying to apply such 
a licensing scheme, say to Afghanistan today, would face a host of 
legal, political, economic and efficacy obstacles, foremost among 
them the lack of security and state presence, but also the lack of a 
guaranteed market and stiff international competition.22
In addition to opiates, licensing of limited production can and 
has also been adopted in the case of the illicit logging of tropical 
forests, mining or wildlife trafficking. In some cases, such as in 
the case of farming of crocodeleans, licensing turned out to be a 
highly effective policy, saving many species from extinction. 
In many other cases, however, licensing of wildlife trade, logging 
and mining merely turned out to be a white-wash of consumer 
consciousness, masking undesirable practices, complicating law 
enforcement and increasing demand.23
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Proponents of legalisation as a mechanism to reduce organised 
crime often make two arguments: that legalisation will severely 
deprive organised crime groups of resources; and that legalisation 
will also free law enforcement agencies to concentrate on other 
types of crime, such as murders, kidnappings and extortion. 
A country may have good reasons to want to legalise the 
use and even the production of some addictive substances 
and ride out the consequences of possible greater use. 
Such reasons could include providing better health care to 
users, reducing the number of users in prison and perhaps 
even generating greater revenues and giving jobs to 
the poor. 
Yet without robust state presence and effective law enforcement, 
there can be little assurance that organised crime groups would 
be excluded from the legal drug trade. In fact, they may have 
numerous advantages over legal companies and manage to hold 
onto the trade, including through violent means. 
Further organised crime groups may intensify their violent power 
struggles over remaining illegal economies, such as the smuggling 
of other illegal commodities or migrants, prostitution, extortion 
and kidnapping.
Nor does legalisation imply that law enforcement would be liberated 
to focus on other issues or become less corrupt: the state would 
have to devote substantial resources to regulating, monitoring and 
enforcing the legal economy, with the legal economy potentially 
serving as a mechanism to launder illegally produced drugs.
Additionally, a grey market in drugs would likely emerge: the 
higher the tax on the legal drug economy imposed to deter use 
and generate revenue, the greater the pressures for a grey market 
to emerge. Organised crime groups could set up their own fields 
with smaller taxation, snatch the market and the profits and the 
state would be back to combating them and eradicating their 
fields. Such grey markets exist alongside a host of legal economies, 
from cigarettes to stolen cars.
Smartening  the design of  
supply-side policies – eradication, 
interdiction, alternative livelihoods –  
and carefully monitoring and adjusting 
the design of licensing and legalisation 
measures will go a long way to improving 
the effectiveness of policies toward the 
drug trade and minimising their  
often intense negative side-effects.,
‘
Thus there is no guarantee either that marginalised groups, 
such as farmers of illicit crops, would retain their jobs in a 
legal drug economy: The legal drug cultivation would likely 
shift to other more developed areas of agricultural production 
which are inaccessible to the marginalised groups to begin 
with, being the result of exclusionary political-economic 
institutional arrangements. Indeed, redesigning political and 
economic institutions to achieve greater equity of access 
and accountability to the overall population, and hence 
dismantling state institutional capture by powerful economic 
and political elites, are often the necessary prerequisites to 
make licensing and alternative livelihoods work.
CoNCEPTUALISING CoUNTERNARCoTICS 
PoLICIES AS STATE-BUILDING EFFoRTS
Without capable and accountable police that are responsive 
to the needs of the people –  from tackling street crime to 
suppressing organised crime – and that are backed-up by an 
efficient, accessible and transparent justice system, neither 
legal nor illegal economies will be well-managed by the state. 
Smartening  the design of supply-side policies – eradication, 
interdiction, alternative livelihoods – and carefully monitoring 
and adjusting the design of licensing and legalisation measures 
will go a long way to improving the effectiveness of policies 
toward the drug trade and minimising their often intense 
negative side-effects. Reducing the violence associated with 
drug trafficking should be a priority for law enforcement 
agencies. Governments that effectively reduce the violence 
surrounding illicit economies often may not be able to rid 
their countries of organised crime;  they can, however, 
lessen its grip on society, thereby giving citizens greater 
confidence in government, encouraging citizen cooperation 
with law enforcement and aiding the transformation of 
a national security threat into a public safety problem. 
That can well be accomplished – and many countries have 
succeeded in doing so – in the absence of legalisation. 
Counternarcotics policies as well as other anti-crime measures 
should therefore be conceived as a multifaceted state-
building effort that seeks to strengthen the bonds between 
the state and marginalised communities dependent on or 
vulnerable to participation in illicit economies for reasons 
of economic survival and physical security. Efforts need to 
focus on ensuring that peoples and communities will obey 
laws – by increasing the likelihood that illegal behaviour and 
corruption will be punished via effective law enforcement, but 
also by creating a social, economic and political environment 
in which the laws are consistent with the needs of the 
people so that the laws can be seen as legitimate and hence 
be internalised. ■  
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Addressing the  
Costs of Prohibition:  
Internally Displaced 
Populations in Colombia  
and Mexico
Laura H. Atuesta Becerra
The creation of internally displaced populations (IDPs) is one of the indirect costs of the drug prohibition policies implemented in Colombia and Mexico during the 2000s. Although in Colombia the problem has been quantified and recognised, and the government has changed the legislation in order to provide the 
IDPs with humanitarian assistance, in Mexico policies are inexistent, there is no registry for quantifying them 
and the government has not recognised its responsibility for the problem. Currently, the discussions about 
the failure of the ‘war on drugs’ are taking place at various national and international levels. Experts have 
argued that new drug policies should be focused more on addiction treatments, consumption prevention and 
health programs. However, some important questions should be kept in mind while discussing these new 
policies. What would happen to peasants in Colombia who abandoned their land and to civilians in Mexico 
who moved to safer places because their lives were threatened? Would these drug policies focused on health 
issues, consumption and treatments cover the humanitarian assistance these IDPs need? Would the cartels 
stop their extortion practices just because currently illicit drugs were legalised and their main source of 
income taken away? Would rebel groups in Colombia do the same? This article uses a simulation analysis of 
the legalisation of drugs in Colombia and a migration analysis in Mexico to answer  some of these questions.
Colombia and Mexico face challenges in order to solve the 
humanitarian crisis created by IDPs’ living conditions. Although 
Colombia has approved the Victims’ Law to protect IDPs, its 
implementation has been difficult and the rebel groups keep 
resisting the return of victims to their hometowns. In Mexico, the 
situation is exacerbated because of the inexistence of academic 
research that quantifies the size of the IDP, the lack of public policies 
to address the situation and the increasing insecurity for the civilian 
population in areas with high levels of drug-related violence.
This contribution concludes that the legalisation or regularisation 
of illegal drugs would not by itself ameliorate the IDP problem. In 
Colombia, the creation of new rebel groups after the demilitarisation 
of the paramilitary groups are enough evidence to suggest that, even 
if illegal drugs were legalised, and the rebels’ main source of income 
were taken away, they would find new financial sources through 
extortion or other illegal activities. Results from a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model1 using data from Colombia suggest 
that the economic welfare of households would be improved 
only if the government reassigned the military budget to other 
 1 CGE models are a type of economic analysis that use real world data to estimate the economic impacts resulting from changes in policy, 
technology or other factors.
 
     Summary
 ■ The creation of internally displaced 
populations (IDPs) is one of the indirect costs 
of the drug prohibition policies implemented 
in Colombia and Mexico during the 2000s.
 ■ There is a need for national governments 
to recognise and work to ameliorate the 
problems associated with the creation  
of IDPs.
 ■ This article concludes that the legalisation or 
regularisation of illegal drugs would not by 
itself ameliorate the IDP problem.
 ■ If the legalisation of drugs ends the armed 
conflict in producer and transit countries, 
the welfare of households is improved only 
when the government reinvests the security 
expenditures in other productive sectors such 
as health, education and transportation.
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 2    ‘Decreto por el que se expide la Ley General de Víctimas,’ Diario Oficial de la Federación, January 9, 2013, 
         http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5284359&fecha=09/01/2013
 3    ‘La Comisión de Víctimas queda fuera del presupuesto 2014,’ Animal Político, 2013,
         http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/11/la-comision-de-victimas-queda-fuera-del-presupuesto-2014/#axzz2mzouOxoO.
 4 Ana M. Ibañez, El desplazamiento forzoso en Colombia: un camino sin retorno hacia la pobreza (Universidad de los Andes, 2009).
 5    ‘Protección de tierras y patrimonio de población desplazada: Síntesis de la experiencia del Proyecto Protección de Tierras y Patrimonio de la  
Población Desplazada,’ Acción Social, 2010, http://restituciondetierras.gov.co/media/descargas/publicaciones/resumen_ejecutivo.pdf
 6 Luis Benavides and Sandra Patargo, ‘México ante la crisis humanitaria de los desplazados internos,’ Foreign affairs: Latinoamérica, 12/4  
(2012): 77-88.
 7 Although some already returned to their places of origin, it is estimated by the local government that, as of May 2012, 25,000 people 
remained displaced in Chiapas (IDMC, 2012).
Between 2000 and 2010, 
Colombia had the second-
largest IDPs (after Sudan)  
with a proportion of displaced 
over the total population  
of 7.8 percent. 
‘ ,
economic activities. The legalisation of drugs, without 
such reinvestments, would only produce ‘some’ return 
migration from urban to rural areas and a very small revival 
or regeneration of the countryside. Further, if new rebel 
groups were subsequently created, the government would be 
unlikely to reduce its military spending to reinvest it into other 
economic activities.
In the case of Mexico, the country needs first to recognise 
and quantify the IDPs in order to design public policies to 
address their needs. Congress approved the Victims’ Law 
in January 2013, which includes the creation of a Victims’ 
National System and restitution for the victims of up to 
500 days’ worth of minimum wages, depending on the 
damage they suffered.2 However, the Law does not have any 
budget assigned for its implementation and it has not found 
an equilibrium between the local support offered to the 
victims by some of the states and the federal jurisdiction.3 
The results of an internal migration economic model that 
includes as a determinant the drug-related violence differential 
between origin and destination suggest that violence is a 
determinant of migration. Further, they suggest that the 
relationship is stronger when the place of origin is a high-
violence state. These results suggest that people fled from 
violence in Mexico, even if economic opportunities were not 
better at their destination point. 
Given the role played by the drug cartels in provoking this 
migration in Mexico, one could ask if these migrants would 
be willing to return to their hometowns if illegal drugs became 
legal or regularised. Using the experience of Colombia and 
the evidence of the creation of new rebel groups there, this 
return-migration scenario does not seem likely. The drug cartels 
in Mexico are already extorting migrants from Central America 
passing through on their way to the US. Further, the fact that 
they already control territory, mostly in the northern states, 
makes it probable that current clashes with the military forces 
would continue. This situation of violence and extortion would 
generate a pull effect for migrants who would consider returning 
to their places of origin. If return migration is difficult, it becomes 
evident that we need more immediate and integrated approaches 
to this issue while discussions on the future of drug policies take 
place. Meanwhile, although much of the current discourse about 
reversing the damage caused by the ‘war on drugs’ centres on 
issues of consumption and treatment, it must be recognised that 
these changes will have limited impacts in countries such as Mexico 
and Colombia which suffer systemic illicit drug-related violence, 
homicides and IDPs.
This contribution continues as follows. The second section below 
briefly describes the forced displacement situation in Mexico 
and Colombia. Following this the contribution will examine a 
Colombian CGE model and a welfare analysis under a potential 
scenario of drugs being legalised. Next it will look at the migration 
model and its estimates for Mexico including the drug-related 
violence differential as a determinant of the migration decision. 
This contribution concludes with an analysis of the costs associated 
with the IDP and examines new approaches for the future of drug 
policies in the Americas.
 
INTERNALLy-FoRCED DISPLACEMENT AS AN 
INDIRECT CoST oF PRoHIBITIoN
Between 2000 and 2010, Colombia had the second-largest IDPs 
(after Sudan) with a proportion of displaced over the total population 
of 7.8 percent.4 Forced displacement is associated with the internal 
armed political conflict. During the 1990s the conflict was intensified 
by the strengthening of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries being 
financed by the illegal drug business. Colombia is considered one 
of the countries in the region with the most advanced legislation to 
protect IDPs. These efforts started in 1997 with the creation of the 
National System for Attending the Displaced Population and were 
strengthened in 1999 with the creation of the Displaced Population 
Registry (RUPD). In 2005, with the approval of the Justice and Peace 
Law, the government established the right for victims to seek truth, 
justice and reparations. Later on, in 2007, the Constitutional Court 
recognised land restitution as a fundamental right for IDPs. This 
was based on the principle of ensuring victims could attain the 
same situation he or she had before the displacement.5 Finally, in 
2011, Congress approved the Victims’ Law with the purpose of 
providing reparation to the victims through land restitution.
Mexico, on the other hand, has had three waves of displacement:6 
(1) during the Mexican Revolution (with no data available); 
(2) during the uprising of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas (with 
around 35,000 people displaced);7 and (3) during the current ‘war 
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 8 Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Veracruz.
 9      ‘Global Overview 2012: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, Norwegian Refugee Council,’ Internal Displacement Monitoring   
Centre, 2012, http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2012.
10 Parametría estimates are approximations based on a household survey, on which 2 percent of households reported having fled their homes  
due to violence related to the war on organised crime. 
11     ‘MEXICO: Displacement due to criminal and communal violence. A profile of the internal displaced situation,’ Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, 2013, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/59056C1DECFC954BC1257953004FDFA2/$file/
Mexico+-+November+2011.pdf
12 Ana Ibáñez and Andrea Velásquez, El proceso de identificación de víctimas de los conflictos civiles: una evaluación para la población desplazada 
en Colombia (Universidad de los Andes, CEDE, 2006).
13 El riesgo de volver a casa: Violencia y amenazas contra desplazados que reclaman restitución de sus tierras en Colombia (Human Rights Watch, 
September 2013).
14     ‘Actos de violencia amenazan el éxito de la Ley de Víctimas: HRW,’ El Tiempo, September 2013,  http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-
WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-13067095.html.
15     ‘Nuevo caso de amenaza contra líderes de restitución de tierras,’ Noticias Caracol, May 2013, http://www.noticiascaracol.com/nacion/video-
293532-nuevo-caso-de-amenaza-contra-lideres-de-restitucion-de-tierras. ‘Alerta en Colombia: Águilas Negras amenazan nuevamente a la Liga 
de Mujeres Desplazadas,’ Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia, November 2012,  http://www.redlad.org/alerta-en-colombia-
%C3%A1guilas-negras-amenazan-nuevamente-la-liga-de-mujeres-desplazadas.
The latest Human Rights Watch 
report  on displacement in 
Colombia documented 21 cases 
where individual IDPs have lost 
their lives since 2008, 80 cases 
where they have received serious 
threats and 30 cases where they 
have been displaced again. 
‘
,
a survey in 2004 of 2,342 displaced households located in 48 
municipalities in 21 departments.12 This survey has been used in 
several academic studies with the purpose of estimating the costs 
of displacement.
The implementation of the Victims’ Law in Colombia has been 
extremely difficult. The insecurity faced by IDPs and their leaders is 
still one of the main problems, not only for the implementation of 
the Law but for ensuring the return of the victims to their places of 
origin. The latest Human Rights Watch report13 on displacement 
in Colombia documented 21 cases where individual IDPs have lost 
their lives since 2008, 80 cases where they have received serious 
threats and 30 cases where they have been displaced again. 
From December 2005, more than 500 IDPs who claimed their 
land have received threats, and more than 360 IDPs and leaders 
are considered at ‘extreme risk’. The Attorney General’s Office 
is investigating more than 56 homicides committed in activities 
related to land restitution since 2000.14 The safe return of IDPs 
often cannot be guaranteed because of the existence of new rebel 
groups conducting illegal activities in the abandoned land (mainly 
the production of illegal crops and illegal mining).15
Colombia still has a long way to go. The implementation of the 
Victims’ Law has been complicated and the insecure conditions 
have jeopardised land restitution. Mexico, on the other hand, 
has not yet even officially recognised these victims of the ‘war on 
drugs’. Comparing both situations, can we use the Colombian 
experience to forecast what could happen in Mexico? Is it 
possible that drug cartels could jeopardise return migration, 
even if they stop receiving funding from narco-trafficking? 
Drug cartels in Mexico are already involved in other criminal 
activities such as human trafficking, extortion and kidnappings. 
Further, controlling territories is crucial for conducting these 
activities. Return migration for IDPs will therefore be problematic, 
with or without either narco-trafficking or changes in drug policy. 
The next two sections of this contribution describe two 
quantitative studies, one in Colombia and the other in Mexico, 
to understand the costs of the current drug policy on household 
welfare and population movements. Understanding these costs is 
crucial to analyse the potential impact of changing drug policies 
on households.
on organised crime’ in which thousands of households have 
fled from the violence generated by clashes between the drug 
cartels and the military forces, mainly in the northern states.8 
The numbers are unclear: while IDMC reported that 160,000 
people have been displaced since 2007,9 a private consultant 
firm reported that the number of IDPs is more than 1.5 million 
people.10 In contrast to the efforts made by Colombia to 
recognise the existence of IDPs, the Mexican government has 
not yet recognised the problem, despite the approval of the 
Victims’ Law in early 2013.
Since Mexico does not have an official registry to provide 
assistance to IDPs, no one really knows the number of 
displaced households, or the causes of their displacement. The 
most informative survey was conducted by the Universidad 
Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez in 2010, reporting that 220,000 
people have abandoned Ciudad Juárez since 2007 as a result 
of violence. From this figure, half have remained in the country 
as IDPs and the rest have migrated to the US.11
Several organisations in Colombia have provided assistance to 
this vulnerable group. One of the most recognised is CODHES 
(Consultant firm for Human Rights and Displacement), an 
NGO that promotes the protection of human rights of IDPs and 
refugees. On the other hand, the Universidad de los Andes, 
in collaboration with the Conferencia Episcopal, conducted 
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AN ECoNoMIC WELFARE ANALySIS oF THE 
LEGALISATIoN oF DRUGS IN CoLoMBIA
Results from a CGE model used to simulate the Colombian 
economy after legalisation of illegal drugs suggest that 
government reinvestments of military expenses are crucial in 
determining changes in household welfare. Without these 
reinvestments, the benefits of legalisation are not significant, 
and the economic welfare of rural and urban households is only 
slightly improved. 
For the simulations, the analysis uses data from 2006 with 
10 legal sectors and one illegal sector on the production 
side, and a disaggregated demand by income deciles and by 
geographic location (urban and rural). Because of legalisation, 
the government receives more money from taxes, rural 
households receive most of the gains of the drug market and 
money laundering is reduced to zero. In terms of security, the 
military aid received from the US to finance the ‘war on drugs’ 
is reduced, and the government has the option to distribute 
military expenses in other productive sectors if the armed 
conflict is terminated.
The results of the simulation suggest that the economic 
welfare of rural and urban households is slightly improved 
with legalisation. However, the results change significantly 
depending on whether there is continuity of the armed conflict 
and whether there is reinvestment of military expenses. With 
the perpetuation of the armed conflict (through the creation 
of new rebel groups or the generation of new illegal activities), 
the economy continues in an ‘economy of war’ situation. The 
increasing drug production in rural areas, the higher taxes 
received by the government and the linkages between the 
security sector and other productive sectors are reflected in a 
welfare increase for all income deciles. However, this economic 
 In contrast to the efforts  
made by Colombia to recognise 
the existence of IDPs, the 
Mexican government has not yet 
recognised the problem,  
despite the approval of the  
Victims’ Law in early 2013. 
‘ ,
16     William Stanley, ‘Economic migrants or refugees from violence? A time-series analysis of Salvadoran migration to the United States,’ Latin 
American Research Review, 22/1 (1987): 132-154.
17 Andrew Morrison and Rachel May, ‘Escape from terror: Violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala,’ Latin American Research 
Review, 29/2 (1994): 111-132.
18 Pratikshya Bohra-Mishra and Douglas Massey, ‘Individual decisions to migrate during civil conflict,’ Demography, 48/2 (2011): 401-424.
19 The data was collected by the Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, and obtained from the El Universal webpage, ‘El detalle mes a mes de los 
homicidios del narco,’ January 2013, (http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/736970.html). 
model does not consider the losses on welfare generated by the 
indirect costs of the conflict such as homicides, extortion, threats 
and the impossibility of the displaced households to return to 
their hometowns.
Under the other scenario, if the legalisation of drugs ends the 
armed conflict, the welfare of households is improved only 
when the government reinvests the security expenditures 
in other productive sectors such as health, education and 
transportation. With this reinvestment, welfare increases, with 
the gains being higher for the lowest deciles both in rural and 
in urban areas. 
 
INTERNAL MIGRATIoN IN MExICo: ARE 
PoPULATIoN MoVEMENTS DETERMINED By 
DRUG-RELATED VIoLENCE?
The results of an econometric model of migration in Mexico 
suggest that wage differentials are an important determinant of 
migration. However, when migrants are coming from a state with 
high levels of drug-related violence, the violence differential is 
also significant in explaining migration decisions. Some studies of 
forced migration due to internal conflicts have been conducted 
in other countries. These have shown that political violence was 
a dominant motivation for explaining international migration,16 
but only when some critical level of violence is reached.17 This 
suggests a non-linear effect between violence and migration: 
moderate levels of violence reduce the likelihood of movement, 
while high levels increase it.18  Using data from the 2010 Mexican 
Census to identify migrants (if they lived in a different state in 
2005), wages in different locations are estimated by comparing 
the pool of migrants to the residents of each state. Then, using an 
econometric model of migration, we calculate how relevant the 
violence and the wage differentials are for explaining migration. 
For the violence differentials, we use the rate of alleged homicides 
related to organised crime from 2006-2010 as a proxy.19
The results show that migrants coming from states with high levels 
of violence have potential wages lower than migrants coming from 
states with low levels of violence. On average, if a migrant from 
a high-violence state decides to migrate to a low-violence state, 
his or her wage would be 3.65 percent lower than the wage of a 
migrant from a low-violence state deciding to migrate to another 
low-violence state. Moreover, migrants coming from violent states 
are willing to lose money in order to gain ‘safety,’ and migrants 
moving to violent states from non-violent states are demanding 
significant economic gains in order to compensate for their 
‘safety’ losses. 
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Migration from high-violence states does not behave like 
traditional economic migration. These migrants are willing to 
earn lower wages just to flee from violence.  In most cases, 
their wage differential between current wages and the wages 
they would have earned had they remained in the same 
state as in 2005 is zero or negative. Educational attainment, 
a determinant factor for explaining migration, is not useful 
in determining migration from and to high-violence states: 
while more educated migrants from low-violence states are 
more willing to migrate to low-violence states, more educated 
migrants from high-violence states are not willing to migrate to 
high-violence states.
Without knowing the reason for migration or the conditions 
in which this migration took place, it is not possible to identify 
which ones are IDPs and which ones are economic migrants. 
However, if these people migrate because of security reasons, 
one could expect that they would want to come back, but this 
return migration is not guaranteed if the security conditions are 
not improved in their hometowns.
The results of this statistical analysis are in line with the anecdotal 
evidence already existent in Mexico. People living in high-
violence states fled from violence looking for safety, and some 
of them migrate without any economic opportunity in the state 
of destination. Animal Político,20 in collaboration with Insight 
Crime, prepared three case studies about forced displacement 
in Sinaloa, Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, reporting the existence 
of the phenomenon by interviewing several families that leave 
their homes looking for safety. In the three cases, the rises in 
crime and homicide rates were accompanied by an increase 
of IDPs; however, when governmental authorities were asked 
about the topic, they denied its existence, or simply said that 
there was not enough evidence on displacement to recognise 
it as a problem.
 
20     ‘Desplazados del narco en México,’ Animal Político, September 2013, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/09/nota-especial-desplazados-del-
narco-en-mexico/#axzz2hEaz23tQ.
21 Daniel Mejía, ‘Qué falló con la prohibición?,’ Foco Económico, October 2013, 2013, http://focoeconomico.org/2013/10/08/que-fallo-con-la-
prohibicion/.
22 Ibid., Animal Político.
CoNCLUSIoN
The blog Foco Económico posted an analysis of the costs of 
prohibitionist drug policies.21 According to the article, one of the 
reasons prohibition did not work is that the collateral costs and the 
indirect costs of the ‘war on drugs’ were too expensive for producer 
and transit countries. The increasing drug-related violence, in both 
Colombia and Mexico, was accompanied by thousands of families 
who left everything behind to migrate to safer places. 
There are two main costs associated with IDPs. The first is the 
humanitarian crisis generated by the poor living conditions they 
face in their destinations. In Colombia, they have arrived in the 
big cities and have become homeless, begging for money at 
traffic intersections. In Mexico, they generally do not receive 
humanitarian assistance from the government, and when they 
do, it is under deplorable conditions. According to testimonies 
of displaced families from Ciudad Juárez,22 they were placed 
in warehouses (often without air conditioning) by the city 
government in Mexico City, where they had to stay 24 hours per 
day for several months while fighting for every inch of space. 
 
The second cost is associated with ensuring their return to their 
hometowns. Given the humanitarian crisis created by their poor 
living conditions as IDPs, the main solution, both for them and 
for the government, would be to provide a safe return. However, 
as discussed above, even if legislation guarantees this return, in 
practice the situation is more problematic. The creation of new 
rebel groups, the perpetuation of violence and the absence of state 
presence are just a few of the many obstacles to ensuring security 
for the returning IDPs.
In the final assessment, prohibition did not work.  It generated 
enormous costs both in producer and transit countries. The main 
question is therefore: what are we going to do about these costs 
and with policies going forward? The new debates on alternative 
drug policies are focused on addiction treatments, consumption 
prevention, regularisation of the drug market and in some cases, 
‘legalisation’ is on the agenda. However, for countries such 
as Mexico and Colombia, it is too soon to think about these 
alternative policies. The drug policy based on prohibition and the 
‘war on drugs’ left these countries with serious problems that we 
cannot ignore just by approving a drastic change in drug policies. 
It was because of prohibition that the guerrillas, paramilitaries and 
drug cartels were able to finance their criminal activities. However, 
it is naïve to expect that if prohibition is ended and the earnings of 
the illicit drug market are reduced, these organisations are going to 
become legal, conditions are going to be safer and IDPs are going to 
return to their hometowns. Colombia has been an important case 
study in this regard. Although the paramilitaries were demilitarised 
and the Victims’ Law was approved, new rebel groups have been 
created that conduct new illegal activities and leaders of IDPs risk 
being killed if they decide to go back and participate in the land 
restitution project.
...if the legalisation of drugs 
ends the armed conflict, 
the welfare of households 
is improved only when the 
government reinvests the 
security expenditures in  
other productive sectors  
such as health, education  
and transportation. ,
‘
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Drug policies in Mexico and Colombia should go through a 
transition period in which the security component is also present. 
The costs of prohibition were too extensive and they generated 
long-term consequences that we cannot ignore. In the short and 
medium term, drug policies should advance solutions to reverse 
these consequences. Thinking about drug legalisation, addiction 
treatment and consumption prevention as the only new alternatives 
for the current drug policies would leave Mexico and Colombia 
with a security problem that sooner or later would be translated 
into other repressive, prohibited and ‘war on something’ policies.
Colombia and Mexico have a big challenge ahead. Asking ‘what 
next?’ and proposing a single solution is impossible and unrealistic. 
Drug policies in the Americas have been a trial-and-error exercise, 
and it would be a mistake to presume that legalisation by itself 
would solve all problems. The political, social and economic 
implications of the ‘war on drugs’ are so broad that it is not possible 
to reverse them in just a few years. This contribution refers only to 
the IDP phenomenon and the welfare losses caused by prohibition, 
but the drug-related violence is too embedded in Latin American 
societies and political systems for it to be ignored. In the end, it 
is worth analysing the beginning of the problem to understand 
different actors’ motiviations. Why do youths decide to be members 
of drug cartels and rebel groups? What has been the role of the 
government in these decisions? Which policies have been effective 
and which ones have been counterproductive in fighting organised 
crime? What has been the experience of countries facing similar 
situations? What is next would still be a trial-and-error process, 
but the more information we have, the better our chances of 
minimising error.  ■  
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The Constitutional Costs of 
the ‘War on Drugs’
Alejandro Madrazo Lajous1
The war on drugs has had many and diverse consequences internationally. Increased violations of human rights, violence, corruption, direct economic costs, economic divestment from certain regions affected by violence, mass displacement of population,2 increased risk and harm of consumption, 
massive budget allocations to security forces, etc. have all been documented as costs that need to be 
included when assessing the results of the war on drugs. To these we must add one more type of cost: 
the impact the drug war has had on the constitutional commitments of countries. Constitutional texts, 
interpretations and practices have been transformed in order to, in theory, better tackle drugs. Many of 
these changes undermine long-standing commitments to specific constitutional principles, values and rights. 
These are not problems of unconstitutional behaviour on the part of authorities, but rather an alteration in 
what is deemed constitutional so as to accommodate the policies and practices deployed by authorities in 
order to better enforce prohibition. This contribution will make this phenomenon visible and offer an initial 
analytical framework through which to explore it. It offers three preliminary case studies drawn from the 
three key countries engaged in the war on drugs in the Americas: Mexico, Colombia and the US.
The current prohibitionist drug policy has several and different costs, 
among which are violence, discrimination and human rights violations. 
Yet the war on drugs carries with it another important type of cost: 
constitutional costs. By this, I refer to changes in legal systems (texts, 
interpretations and/or practices) of countries engaged in the war on 
drugs, which run counter to previously held substantive normative 
commitments (that is, constitutional commitments) of the polity. The 
usual stated purpose of adopting such changes is to adapt the legal 
and institutional framework so as to better enforce drug prohibition and 
pursue crime. This type of statement, however, is seldom accompanied 
by an attempt to flesh out the impact of such changes on preexisting 
constitutional commitments. This contribution seeks to evaluate precisely 
that impact. Many of the legal changes adopted so as to better enforce 
prohibition consist of major alterations to the constitutional system as 
a whole. Such alterations, when they run counter to previously held 
normative and political commitments which are not explicitly renounced, 
should be understood as the ‘constitutional costs’ of the war on drugs.
My aim is to offer, through an overview of the Mexican case, a 
preliminary analytic framework that simultaneously allows us to visualise 
the constitutional costs of the war on drugs and begin to devise the 
analytical tools with which to understand these phenomena. This text 
builds on a previous effort to identify and categorise the constitutional 
costs of Mexico’s recent efforts to enforce prohibition (2005-2012) and 
then turns to other countries – namely Colombia and the US –  so as 
to test the usefulness of an analytic framework developed around the 
Mexican experience and as an initial attempt to explore whether this is, 
in fact, a phenomenon that crosses borders and which manifests itself in 
similar ways across borders. 
1 This text is based on an ongoing project called ‘The Constitutional Costs of the War on Drugs’. The first version was presented at the ISSDP 
Conference, Bogota, 2013.
2 See Laura Atuesta’s contribution to this report. 
   Summary
 ■ To the list of costs of the war on drugs 
we must add the impact the drug 
war has had on the constitutional 
commitments of countries.
 ■ Many of the legal changes aiming to 
better enforce prohibition consist of 
major alterations to the constitutional 
system. Such alterations, when they run 
counter to previously held normative 
and political commitments, should be 
understood as the ‘constitutional costs’ 
of the ‘war on drugs’.
 ■ Creating an ‘exceptional’ regime of 
diminished fundamental rights goes 
against the logic of fundamental rights: 
that they be universal. 
 ■ Once regimes of exception are 
admitted, they tend to broaden and 
serve purposes different from those 
originally sought.
 ■ The structural design of constitutional 
government should not be adjusted 
in function of specific, purportedly 
transitory policies. 
 ■ The blurring of previously clear 
distinctions of government agencies’ 
roles makes citizens more vulnerable 
to arbitrariness and authorities less 
accountable for their actions.
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By ‘constitutional costs’ of the ‘war on drugs,’ I mean the 
permanent curtailment, abandonment, impingement, carving 
out from or any other affectation to long-held values – principles, 
rights or institutions – that inform our systems of government 
and which is justified not in and of itself, but rather as a means to 
achieve a very specific objective: to better enforce the prohibition 
of illicit drugs and/or confront criminal organisations involved in 
drug trafficking. Such costs have political as well as legal effects, 
for constitutions are not only legal but also political documents 
which reflect the values on which a political community 
is founded. 
The constitutional costs are generated in different ways. 
First, many of the legal changes adopted change the constitution 
by becoming a part of it (i.e. formal constitutional amendments) 
– they cannot technically be charged with impinging or violating 
the constitution. The difference between the rights, principles, 
values or institutions as they were prior to a ‘war on drugs’ 
amendment and the way they come out of the amendment 
process is the constitutional cost of a constitutional amendment. 
Second, other constitutional costs need not take this approach: 
legal changes, with no constitutional amendment that explicitly 
accommodates them, can impinge upon the constitutional 
commitments. Finally, interpretations of legal texts – whether 
constitutional or otherwise – without formal amendment 
can also be considered a change that can represent a 
constitutional cost.
I propose we consider at least three types of constitutional costs, 
a classification that stems from studying the case of Mexico in 
recent years: 
(1)   The curtailment of fundamental rights; 
(2)   The restructuring of our forms of government; and 
(3)   The undermining of legal security, by conflating  
       legal concepts and state functions.  
Most likely, these categories will be either insufficient or 
inadequate for studying other countries. Nevertheless, this 
contribution makes a first attempt at trying them out in countries 
other than Mexico, which was used as the initial case study.
Fundamental rights are, in theory, the core value commitments of 
the political community which governments are bound to respect 
or even guarantee or foster.3 They are universally attributed. So, 
curtailment of fundamental rights can mean one of two things: (i) 
the restriction of fundamental rights across the board, or (ii) the 
carving out of a regime of reduced rights for certain people. I want 
to focus on the phenomenon of carving out ‘special’ regimes of 
reduced rights. A recurrent argument that exceptional powers be 
granted to authorities so they can effectively pursue the ‘war 
on drugs’ has had important corrosive effects on the system of 
fundamental rights, but that was not the stated objective of the 
war on drugs. The exceptions can be temporary or can affect 
3  Victor Abramovich and Christian Courtis, Los derechos sociales como derechos exigibles, (Trotta: 2004).
A recurrent argument that 
exceptional powers be granted to 
authorities so they can effectively 
pursue the war on drugs has had 
important corrosive effects on the 
system of fundamental rights....
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only one group – e.g. drug dealers, drug users, organised 
crime – but in and of itself creating an ‘exceptional’ regime 
of diminished fundamental rights cuts against the logic of 
fundamental rights: that they be universal. Furthermore, there 
is a risk that, as exceptions are admitted, they can broaden. 
Restructuring government can be defined as substantive 
adjustments to arrangements under which the powers and 
responsibilities are distributed between branches and/or levels 
of government. The reconfiguration of federalist relationships, 
for instance, is one such adjustment. The delegation of 
legislative or judicial functions to the executive could be another. 
What matters is the way in which power distribution between 
various authorities is altered. That powers and responsibilities 
be redistributed in order to effectively enforce a specific 
policy should grab our attention. That is, it is counterintuitive, 
when thinking about the structural design of constitutional 
government that it should be adjusted in function of specific 
policies, which are contingent on the circumstances and the 
specific objectives which they aim to address. This, however, 
seems like a phenomenon that is easily expected or at least 
accepted in the context of the war on drugs.
The conflation of state functions can be defined as the 
blurring of distinctions between legal definitions or of 
powers and functions which results in diminished clarity 
and legal security for citizens when facing state action. 
This can be understood as an indirect constitutional cost, as 
opposed to the direct changes to the constitutional system 
that diminished rights or undermined principles such as 
those described in the previous two sections. This type of 
constitutional cost is indirect because in blurring distinctions 
or conflating state functions, legal uncertainty is fostered. 
Thus the principle of legality – a central constitutional 
commitment by which repressive state action should 
have clear and explicit legal grounding – is undermined. 
The distinction itself is not necessarily a constitutional value, 
but its blurring affects a core constitutional commitment: legal 
security. The blurring of previously clear (or comparatively clear) 
distinctions makes citizens more vulnerable to arbitrariness and 
authorities less accountable for their actions. 
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MExICo
Mexico adopted a prohibitionist regime long ago, but it was in 
the early years of this century, particularly during the presidency 
of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), that a ‘war on drugs’ was 
pursued as a government priority. In these years, starting in 
2005, but especially during the Calderon administration, a series 
of major constitutional and legal changes have been adopted in 
the context of – and motivated by – the war on drugs. Between 
2005 and 2012, seventeen amendments to various legal texts, 
including the Constitution, were made.4 Most are related to the 
punitive activities of the state: either to the criminal justice system 
or to the functioning of the security apparatus. Some measures 
included in these amendments represent constitutional costs that 
can be grouped into the three main types proposed above: 
(1) The curtailment of fundamental rights through the carving 
out of a regime of exception. In 2008 Mexico bifurcated its 
criminal procedure: it amended the constitutional text so as to 
include notions such as the presumption of innocence, oral and 
public trials, victims’ rights and an adversarial structure to criminal 
trials, to make it more transparent and adversarial.5 At the same 
time, an exceptional regime of reduced rights and extraordinary 
police powers was imbedded in the constitution for ‘organised 
crime’ delinquency (of which drug crimes are the main cohort 
by far). In addition, it defined organised crime loosely (‘three or 
more people who organise to commit crimes in a permanent 
or repeated manner as specified in law’6). All measures adopted 
under the exceptional regime of reduced rights are, of course, 
constitutionally banned under the ‘ordinary’ criminal justice 
process. This exceptional regime included: the possibility of 
being held incommunicado and without formal charges for up 
to 80 days if it is deemed instrumental to any ‘organised crime’ 
investigation (arraigo); a doubling of the time period allowed for 
police detention prior to presentation before judicial authority 
(from two days to four days); incommunicado while in prison 
(legal counsel excepted); incarceration in ‘special’ prisons 
separate from the general population; a blank authorisation to 
apply ‘special’ and unspecified ‘security measures’ within prisons; 
and the possibility of being charged anonymously.
The case of the arraigo is particularly illustrative of the 
‘constitutional costs’ Mexico is willing to pay to continue a war 
on drugs. The arraigo – theoretically a form of house arrest, 
but in practice detention at an undisclosed location – was 
deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005, but the 
2008 amendment overrode the impediment of constitutional 
incompatibility by inserting the policy of arraigo directly in the 
text of the constitution. The use of arraigo expanded enormously 
during Mexico’s recent ‘war on drugs’ – from 42 arraigos in 
2006, to over 1600 by 2011 – without a direct substantive effect 
on organised crime convictions.7
Limits and exceptions to other rights, such as privacy of 
communications and property rights, have also been carved out 
in recent years. For instance, a 2012 law allowed for prosecutors 
to demand from mobile phone providers, without a court order, 
the geographic location in real time of users.8
(2) The restructuring of forms of government refers 
specifically to the curbing of federalism and state powers. 
In recent years, the relationships between national, state 
and city governments in Mexico have been rearranged as 
security measures have been adopted in order to face ‘the 
threat of narco-trafficking’. Mexico’s Ley de Narcomenudeo 
illustrates this phenomenon of government restructuring.9 
Approved in 2009, it was the first occasion in over a century and a 
half in which the federal government formally intervened in state 
criminal policy. Since the toppling of the Santa Anna dictatorship 
in 1855 and the definitive establishment of Mexico as a federal 
(as opposed to centralist) republic with the 1857 Constitution, 
states had maintained complete autonomy regarding their 
internal criminal law (except for the limits established through 
federal constitutional rights). 
In 2005, the Constitution was amended empowering the federal 
Congress to dictate ‘the manner in which federal entities may 
participate in the persecution of crimes in concurrent matters’. 
Concurrent matters are those in which the Constitution 
4  Alejandro Madrazo, ‘The Constitutional Costs of the War on Drugs’.
5      ‘Decreto que reforma, adiciona y deroga diversas disposiciones de la Constitución,’ Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), June 18, 2008.
6  Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (art. 16).
7  Alejandro Madrazo and Angela Guerrero, ‘Más caro el caldo que las albóndigas’ in Nexos, December 2012; Catalina Pérez Correa and Elena   
 Azaola, Resultados de la Primera Encuesta realizada en los Centros Federales de Readaptación Social, (México: CIDE, 2012).
8 ‘Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones del Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales, el Código Penal     
 Federal, la Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, de la Ley que Establece las Condiciones Mínimas Sobre Readaptación Social de los  
 Sentenciados y de la Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública,’ Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), April 17, 2012; Alejandro  
 Madrazo, ‘The Constitutional Costs of the War on Drugs,’ forthcoming. 
 9 ‘Decreto por el que se expide la Ley de la Policía Federal,’ Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), June 2009.
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establishes the concurrent jurisdiction of the federation and 
the states, one of which is health, and drug crimes are formally 
categorised as ‘crimes against health’.  Thus drug crimes were, 
until 2009, exclusively the jurisdiction of the federal government. 
With the Ley de Narcomenudeo they also became a matter 
of state jurisdiction. The thrust of the reform established that 
possession and petty-dealing – up to a specified amount –  were 
to fall under state authority and, beyond that, under federal 
jurisdiction, effectively forcing the hand of state governments 
to join the Calderón Administration’s ‘war on drugs’. This was 
consistent with one of President Calderón’s key programatic 
objectives: to bring state and local governments on board with 
the ‘war on drugs’ which he claimed was being fought single-
handedly by the federal government.10
State criminal law as a matter to be decided by state 
governments was, until 2005, a long-standing constitutional 
arrangement and one of the most important powers reserved 
for the states in Mexico’s federal system. So, an exception 
to that principle was carved out in the context of the ‘war 
on drugs’.
(3) The undermining of legal security by conflating legal concepts 
and state functions. Historically in Mexico, there has been a sharp 
formal distinction between three different spheres: (i) national 
security, (ii) public security and (iii) criminal investigation and 
prosecution. Each of these concepts referred to a distinct area 
that a state organ was charged with: national security was the 
realm of the armed forces; public security the realm of police 
bodies; and criminal investigation and prosecution the realm 
of the (federal and state) Attorney General’s Office. Starting in 
2005, again in a purported effort to better vest authorities with 
the legal tools to enforce drug prohibition and fight organised 
crime (always emphasising narco-trafficking as the quintessential 
form of organised crime), with the novel National Security Law, 
these distinctions rapidly collapsed.11
The result of these conflations – between national security, 
public security and criminal investigation – has been a confusing 
situation in which it is unclear what each of the bodies 
involved  – Army, Navy, Federal Police and Attorney General’s 
Office – does and what each is responsible for (e.g. who can detain, 
investigate, question and charge whom). This translates into a 
context of enormous legal uncertainty for the civilian population. 
When everyone can do anything and nobody is responsible for 
actually getting things done, the result is deepened insecurity 
and uncertainty for everyone except empowered authorities.
CoLoMBIA: ExCEPTIoNAL  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE12
The constitutional costs of the war on drugs in Colombia follow 
somewhat similar lines, but over a more prolonged period of 
time and in a more complex political scenario. Manuel Iturralde 
explains how, during the second half of the twentieth century, 
Colombia suffered from both the presence of illegal armed groups 
(guerrillas and paramilitaries) and organised crime (drug cartels).13 
In response, the Colombian government took measures to 
facilitate the use of state force. The central thrust of these measures 
has been the creation of exceptional regimes outside the ordinary 
criminal justice system. In the case of Colombia, in contrast with 
Mexico, we need to keep in mind that a political conflict – a long-
standing civil war – predates the war on drugs and is the context in 
which drug policy is deployed and understood. Nevertheless, the 
war on drugs is a core component of the conflict and one of 
the central purposes of many of the legal reforms with which 
we are concerned.
The exceptional criminal justice regime has been perpetuated 
over three decades and has changed through this period. From 
the 1950s to the 1980s, social protest was criminalised and 
repressed through an overt regime of exception controlled 
by military courts. This repression contributed to the rise of 
leftist guerrillas and armed conflict in the 1960s. In the 1980s, 
with the involvement of guerrillas and paramilitaries in drug 
trafficking as part of their funding sources, government efforts 
focused on the war on drugs. In 1984 drug crimes came under 
military jurisdiction.14 Thus, government deemed the problem 
of drugs both a criminal matter and a national security matter, 
conflating functions between criminal and military jurisdictions. 
 
Features of this regime of exception 
which processes drug crimes include: 
increased sentences and reduced 
benefits; investigation, arrest and house 
searches of civilians without judicial 
authorisation; restrictions to habeas 
corpus for drug cases; detention and 
complete isolation without charges 
for up to seven days; expedition of 
extradition to the US; and wiretapping  
authorised by military justice. 
‘
,
10  Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007.
11 ‘Decreto por el que se expide la Ley de Seguridad Nacional,’ Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), January 3, 2005.
12  The information in this section is based on Manuel Iturralde, Castigo, liberalismo autoritario y justicia penal de excepción, (Columbia:   
 Universidad de los Andes, 2010). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
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The exceptional criminal justice regime remained under military 
control until 1987 when it was carved out as a new special 
jurisdiction. By 1990, most of the exceptions were systematised 
and recognised as permanent with the publication of the 
Statute for the Defense of Justice.15 Paradoxically, during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, legal and constitutional amendments 
(including a new constitution in 1991) sought to strengthen 
democratic institutions and the rule of law. Nevertheless, 
Colombian governments continued to use the exceptional 
criminal justice regime to combat the guerrillas, paramilitaries 
and drug trafficking. During the 1990s, exceptional criminal 
justice was expanded and became permanent as a branch of 
ordinary criminal justice and remains in force to this day. 
Features of this regime of exception which processes drug 
crimes include: increased sentences and reduced benefits; 
investigation, arrest and house searches of civilians without 
judicial authorisation; restrictions to habeas corpus for 
drug cases; detention and complete isolation without 
charges for up to seven days; expedition of extradition to 
the US; and wiretapping authorised by military justice.16 
The development and content of the exceptional criminal justice 
system has been cumulative and has varied depending on the 
government in power and the stage of the conflict. In general, 
however, many measures included in these exceptional regimes 
consistently represent constitutional costs of some form. Most 
of the measures that constitute the regime of exception can 
be classified, extrapolating the categories drawn from the 
Mexican case, into a specific type of constitutional cost: the 
curtailment of fundamental rights. However, it must be kept in 
mind that much of this has occurred in a context of conflation 
of functions between military and civil jurisdictions and so the 
indirect constitutional cost of engendering legal uncertainty is 
also a useful category in this case. Furthermore, the exceptions 
tend to identify specific groups, such as paramilitaries, drug 
cartels and guerrillas. Under these regimes, however, the 
repressive action of the State can be directed against a larger 
number of crimes, situations and people. 
15 Decreto 2790 of 1990
16 Ley 365 of 1997; Ley 884 of 2001; Decreto 182 of 1998; Decreto 1859 of 1989; Decreto 1860 of 1989, later repealed by the Constitution of 1991; 
Decreto 2103 of 1990.
17 The information of this section was based on Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (USA: The 
New Press, 2010). 
18 Ibid., 53.
19 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987)
20 517 US 456, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687, 1996 US
21 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
THE UNITED STATES17 
The war on drugs in the US has also engendered constitutional 
costs. Michelle Alexander has famously studied its costs in terms 
of antidiscrimination law. Her central claim is that the war on 
drugs has provided a complex mechanism for reinstating a legal 
regime of discrimination, which disproportionately affects the 
African American communities in the US. If this is true, the 
war on drugs is a vehicle that undermines one of the most 
valued commitments of the American constitutionalism of the 
twentieth century: anti-discrimination, famously crystalised 
in Brown vs. Board of Education as the foundational case 
of modern American constitutional law. If so, then the war 
on drugs as a whole is a major constitutional cost for the 
United States.
Even if we do not share Alexander’s interpretation of  prohibition, 
her research documents many measures – both through statutory 
changes and judicial rulings – that should be deemed constitutional 
costs of the war on drugs. In 1988 the US Congress established 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, by all accounts an extraordinarily and 
intentionally punitive piece legislation. It included new ‘civil 
penalties’ for drug offenders extending beyond traditional criminal 
punishments. For instance, it authorised public housing authorities 
to evict any person who allows any drug-related criminal activity to 
take place on or near public housing; it eliminated federal benefits 
(for example, student loans) for those sentenced for a drug 
offence; it expanded the use of the death penalty for serious drug-
related offences and created new mandatory minimum sentences 
for drug offences. According to Alexander the legislation marked 
a legal watershed. As she wrote: ‘Remarkably, the penalty would 
apply to first-time offenders. The severity of this punishment 
was unprecedented in the federal system. Until 1988, one year 
of imprisonment had been the maximum for possession of any 
amount of any drug’.18 Such measures carve out a civil regime of 
reduced rights for certain people – drug offenders – through the 
criminal justice system. 
The Supreme Court should, in theory, protect against such 
curtailment of rights. But some precedents suggest otherwise. 
In 1996, for instance, in Whren vs. US, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that the use of traffic violations by the police as a means to 
take arrests for drug offences did not violate equal protection. In 
McCleskey vs. Kemp,19 they ruled that racial bias in sentencing, 
even if shown through credible statistical evidence, could not 
be challenged under the 14th Amendment in the absence of 
clear evidence of conscious, discriminatory intent.  In May 1996, 
in Armstrong vs. US,20 the Supreme Court reversed its previous 
decision about the recognition that racially selective enforcement 
violates equal protection of the law.21 Finally, in 1995, in Purkett 
vs. Elm, the Court supported the exclusion of black jurors, another 
In 1984 drug crimes  
came under military jurisdiction.   
Thus, government deemed the problem 
of drugs both a criminal matter and 
a national security matter, conflating 
functions between criminal  
and military jurisdictions.
‘ ,
60  |  End ing  the  Drug  Wars
Many countries and societies  
have undertaken profound 
restructuring of some of their 
key normative and political 
commitments so as to wage 
 a more effective war on drugs. 
‘ ,
22  Andrew Claycroft, Something Smells Rotten in the State of Florida: Harris, Jardines And the Inequitable Landscape of Canine Sniff    
 Jurisprudencie, final paper presented for Drug Policy in the Americas: a Critical Appraisal, at Georgetown Law Center, 2013.
case that seems to go against fundamental rights. In Florida vs. 
Harris, the Supreme Court ruled that an alert by a dog trained 
to detect drugs could be deemed probable cause to carry 
out a warrantless search in private property, regardless of the 
accuracy of the dog’s performance in the past, thus reducing 
the standards for state intrusion in the private sphere in the 
case of drug searches.22
In the Mexican case these changes affected important aspects 
of the Mexican legal system: fundamental rights (related to the 
creation of a special criminal system), distribution of functions (the 
curbing of federalism and state powers through the modification 
of concurrent matters) and legal uncertainty (the conflation of 
functions) based on this analysis of the Mexican experience, 
we can identify three categories of constitutional costs: (a) the 
curtailment of fundamental rights by either (i) the restriction of 
fundamental rights across the board, or (ii) the carving out of a 
regime of reduced rights for certain people); (b) the restructuring 
of forms of government; and (c) the undermining of legal security.
In the Colombian case, we see that for several decades, subsequent 
governments have established exceptional criminal process regimes 
in order to support the war on drugs. 
The contents of these have changed over time, but in all cases it is 
possible to find a common thread in the curtailment of fundamental 
rights for drug offenders. In Colombia, the exceptional criminal 
justice system is not temporary or exceptional, but has coexisted 
for five decades with ordinary criminal justice. 
Consequently, in the Mexican and Colombian cases, the 
constitutional costs appear as statutes, constitutional amendments 
or both. The case of the United States is somewhat different. We 
can find legislative changes, but the affectation of constitutional 
commitments manifests itself most importantly in judicial opinions. 
Some measures of the war on drugs imply the curtailment of 
fundamental rights. These are apparently neutral, but in fact 
have deep discriminatory implications, as Michelle Alexander has 
famously argued.
When we sacrifice the core values we hold collectively and renounce 
core commitments previously held by a political community, we must 
be sure that it is for good reason. So far, these constitutional costs 
are most often not understood as such but as extraordinary and 
exceptional measures we must adopt to achieve our objective. But 
these measures are fundamentally reshaping political communities 
and if we continue to accept them without understanding 
them as costs in terms of the way we exist as communities, 
we will soon find that we no longer recognise our polities. ■ 
 
CoNCLUSIoN
The costs of the prohibition of drugs – or, in its more bellicose 
version, the ’war on drugs’ – are many and significant. The 
war on drugs consistently demands great sacrifices from 
societies around the world. Among them we need to take into 
consideration what fundamental changes political communities 
should be willing to undergo. Further, the sacrifices we as 
political communities accept must be tallied among the other 
many costs of the war on drugs. So, to the list costs, we need 
to add a new category: the constitutional costs of the war 
on drugs. 
Many countries and societies have undertaken profound 
restructuring of some of their key normative and political 
commitments so as to wage a more effective war on drugs. In 
order to face the purported threat drugs and drug trafficking 
represent to our societies, our leaders and governments have 
time and again requested and obtained broader powers and/
or the evisceration of constitutional barriers to state power. 
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Mass Incarceration as  
a Global Policy Dilemma: 
Limiting Disaster and 
Evaluating Alternatives
 Ernest Drucker 
 
     Summary
 ■ Modify drug laws to end long mandatory 
sentences – something that’s already 
beginning in the US.  
 ■ Declare a blanket amnesty for drug users 
serving long terms that no longer apply to 
their original offences. 
 ■ Identify and release populations that pose 
little or no risk to public safety.  
These include non-violent drug offenders  
and older prisoners serving out long 
mandatory sentences. 
 ■ End the long, restrictive parole arrangements 
that often re-incarcerate drug users for 
administrative and drug violations. 
 ■ Replace punitive parole programmes with 
community-based support services not linked  
to corrections.  
 ■ Expand voluntary access to evidence-based 
drug treatment services , uncoupled from  
court mandates.  
 ■ Convert prison-based drug programmes 
to residential schools and mental health 
facilities, staffed with well-trained medical 
and mental health personnel.
 ■ Revise international treaties to develop 
a single convention for the control of all 
psychoactive drugs, both licit and illicit.
 ■ Publicly monitor progress using sentinel 
metrics of drug use and drug policies such 
as overdose and drug treatment outcomes. 
These should assist with re-examining the 
entire spectrum of public health and clinical 
responses to changing patterns of  
drug abuse.
With over 9 million in prisons worldwide (25 percent of these in the US), large-scale systems of punishment now 
represent an important determinant of population 
health. This has particular relevance for the harms 
of drug use and the many new challenges facing 
global drug policies. The measures used to punish 
individuals involved in drug use include hard 
labour, severe mental and physical conditions, long 
periods of punitive isolation, bodily mutilation 
and execution. These all have profound effects 
on the trajectory of individual drug use, the social 
construction of addiction and the human rights of 
drug users. As penal systems expand their roles, so 
too do their public health impacts on drug use in 
society – including collateral effects upon families 
and communities of those imprisoned.
 
Any public health analysis of drug use and its relationship to 
criminal justice policies has to take account of both individual 
and population effects. These include the patterns of morbidity 
and mortality (i.e. suicide and homicide). They also include the 
course and outcomes of addiction treatment methods along 
with their relationship to individual health and psychopathology. 
Each of these impacts the lives of former prisoners and their 
families – including prospects for successful marriage, family 
life and employment. Aggressive drug criminalisation also has 
intergenerational impacts upon the children of incarcerated 
parents – affecting mortality, risks for drug use and health 
problems resulting in decreased life expectancy and elevated 
infant mortality rates.
Some limited international comparative data are available on 
the public health impact of drug policies. However, it is the 
American experience with mass incarceration that most clearly 
highlights the ‘dose relationship’ of punitive drug policies to 
many of these phenomena. While the US is atypical in its scope 
and severity, it is still instructive as a case study given that it is the 
nation with the world’s largest number of prisoners and highest 
rate of imprisonment. And while mass incarceration of drug 
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users is not seen in most other developed democratic nations, 
it is on the rise in many developing countries facing burgeoning 
drug markets such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The case 
of America demonstrates how high rates of imprisonment 
can become socially ‘toxic’ – damaging population health, 
deforming vital family, community and societal structures and 
compromising human rights on a massive scale.  
LESSoNS IN DISASTER:  
MASS INCARCERATIoN AND  
GLoBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
The two main premises of this section are (1) that drug use 
may be usefully understood as a public health issue; and 
(2) that any public health analysis of drug use must 
therefore now include serious consideration of criminal 
justice systems and drug-related incarceration (as well as 
the dangers of drug use per se) as major determinants of 
population health. In addition to the value of employing a 
public health lens to examine drug use and addiction, these 
tools are especially relevant to understanding the breadth 
and depth of the serious and negative consequences of 
criminal justice polices based on global drug prohibition. 
Measuring the intended and unintended outcomes of drugs 
and drug policies, we must examine immediate and long-term 
health and social consequences of incarceration. This requires 
common public health metrics and methods. The US system 
(admittedly an extreme case) can provide the initial data set by 
which we can demonstrate the value of applying public health and 
epidemiological principles to incarceration. 
As state systems of punishment expand, they become a determinant 
of macro population health outcomes. Therefore, we are drawn 
first to mass or hyper-incarceration and its health and ‘dosage 
effects’ upon populations in terms of health and social outcomes.1
The prevalence of imprisonment at national levels ranges by a full 
order of magnitude from less than 50 to over 700 per 100,000 
population. Drug offences are estimated at 40 percent of the  9 
million individuals incarcerated globally. Such wide variations in 
the magnitude and methods of punishment for drug use between 
societies enable a closer examination of their specific consequences 
and population impacts.   
The Prisons’ Revolving Door: Re-entry and Recidivism 
Most of those who are incarcerated are ‘incapacitated’ by removal 
from society (considered by criminologists as one of the ways 
imprisonment increases ‘public safety’), but only temporarily. Most 
eventually return to their communities – usually worse for the 
experience.3 Recidivism (readmission to prison), due to new offences 
or (more commonly) due to administrative parole violations (e.g. 
relapse into drug use), can be viewed as a failure of the rehabilitation 
potential of arrest and imprisonment. An analysis of US recidivism 
patterns of 40,000 offenders released from state prisons in 1994 
discovered that 56.2 percent resumed their pre-incarceration 
Figure 1. Global Rates of Imprisonment 2
1  Ernest Drucker, A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America (The New Press, 2013).
2  Map of World Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population. Charts Bin 2013 http://chartsbin.com/view/eqq.
3  Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry (Urban Institute Press, 2005).
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Figure 2. Lifetime Imprisonment Rates for US Birth Cohorts by Race and Age.4  
4 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/future_of_children/v020/20.2.wildeman_tab01.html
 
Risk of imprisonment by age 30-34:  Men born 1945-49, 1970-74 
 
Percent 
 
Born 1945-49  
 
Born 1970-74
White men 1.2 2.8
 
All non-college 1.8 5.1
High school dropouts 4.2 14.8
High school only 0.7 4.0
Some college 0.7 0.9
Black men
9.0 22.8
 
All non-college 12.1 30.9
High school dropouts 14.7 62.5
High school only 10.2 20.3
 
Percent 
 
1945-49
 
1950-54
 
1955-59
 
1960-64
 
1965-69
 
1970-74
 
1975-79
White men
 
High school dropouts 4.2 7.2 8.0 8.0 10.5 14.8 15.3
High school only 0.7 2.0 2.1 2.5 4.0 3.8 4.1
All non-college 1.8 2.9 3.2 3.7 5.1 5.1 6.3
Some college 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2
All men 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.3
 
Black men
 
High school dropouts 14.7 19.6 27.6 41.6 57.0 62.5 69.0
High school only 10.2 11.3 9.4 12.4 16.8 20.3 18.0
All non-college 12.1 14.1 14.7 19.9 26.7 30.9 35.7
Some college 4.9 3.5 4.3 5.5 6.8 8.5 7.6
All men 9.0 10.6 11.5 15.2 20.3 22.8 20.7
Source: Bruce Western and Christopher Wildeman, ‘The Black Family and Mass Incarceration,’ 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 621, no.1 (2009): 231.
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offending trajectories after release, with no apparent effect of 
imprisonment on future risk of re-incarceration.5 Another meta-
analysis concluded that the absolute impact of incarceration is, ‘at 
best, marginal and at worst, iatrogenic’ in predicting recidivism.6 
Complementing these patterns, other studies have found that 
shorter sentences or early release pose no added risk – with 
equal or decreased rates of arrest for new crimes after release. 
 
Incarceration as population exposure
We can now view the consequences of involvement with the 
criminal justice system as we would the long-term effects of 
a toxic exposure – in this instance to punishment. The US 
data for lifetime risks of imprisonment (Figure 2) clearly show 
the wide disparities in this exposure by race  and its powerful 
association with educational attainment  – a marker for future 
economic and social outcomes (such as marriage) and for life 
expectancy itself. 
The graphic representation of these same data (Figure 3) 
illustrates the exposure history of the entire US population 
to imprisonment – showing its tripling over successive birth 
cohorts between 1940 and 1980. 
Figure 3. Percentage of Adults Ever Incarcerated in State or Federal Prison, by year of birth and age9                                           
5 T. Loughran, E. P. Mulvey, C. A. Schubert, J. Fagan, S. H. Losoya and A. R. Piquero, ‘Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship between Length 
of Stay and Future Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders,’ Criminology 47(3) (2009): 699-740. See also Pathways to Desistence, 
http://www.pathwaysstudy.pitt.edu/publications.html.
6 F. T. Cullen, C. L. Jonson and D. S. Nagin, ‘Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science,’ The Prison Journal  
91(3) (2011).
7 Christopher J. Mumola and Jennifer C. Karberg, ‘Drug Use and Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004,’ US DOJ, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, (Washington, DC, 2006). 
8 E, Drucker, R. G. Newman, E Nadelmann, A. Wodak et al., ‘Harm Reduction: New Drug Policies and Practices,’ in Substance Abuse: A 
Comprehensive Textbook,  Fifth Edition, ed. Pedro Ruiz and Eric Strain, (Williams and Wilkins, New York, 2011).
9 T. P. Bonczar  and A. J. Beck, ‘Lifetime likelihood of going to state or federal prison,’ US DOJ, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington,  
DC, 1997).
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Drugs, Addiction and Their Treatment in Prisons 
Significant problems with drug use and alcoholism are 
ubiquitous in US prison populations.7 US studies estimate that 
60 to 83 percent of the nation’s correctional population has 
used drugs at some point in their lives, twice the estimated 
drug use of the total US population (40 percent).
 
Drug offenders 
accounted for 21 percent of the US state prison population in 
1998 (up from six percent in 1980), 59 percent of the federal 
prison population in 1998 (up from 25 percent in 1980) and 
26 percent of all jail inmates, mirroring the steady increase in 
arrests for drug offences over this period. 
Women in US prisons are more likely than males to be involved 
in problematic drug use (62 percent versus 56 percent in the 
month before their offence) and more likely to have committed 
their offence under the influence of drugs or while engaging in 
petty theft or prostitution to get cash for drugs. 
While the US has generally opposed substitution treatment in 
prison for those addicted to opiates, there is clear data on the 
benefits of such treatment globally.8  Further, a  programme 
recently instituted in Baltimore provided methadone 
maintenance for prisoners who were soon to be transferred 
to community-based methadone programmes at release. These 
Percentage 
of adults ever 
incarcerated in a 
State or Federal 
prison
Year born
Age
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prisoners had significantly better outcomes than a control 
population provided only counselling and passive referral 
after discharge. Results included more time spent in treatment 
during the twelve-month post-release period and far fewer 
positive urine tests for heroin and cocaine.10
 
However, because of hostility toward the use of methadone 
in correctional settings in the US (it is also barred in almost 
all drug courts), such programmes are rare. Accordingly, the 
first thing many released prisoners do on getting out is seek 
relief by injecting heroin – often with lethal results. Over 25 
percent of drug fatalities due to overdose are now thought to 
stem from this phenomenon. Multiple studies have confirmed 
that overdose deaths among people who used heroin prior 
to incarceration are increased tenfold in the two weeks after 
release from prison, as compared to the usual overdose rate.
11
Meanwhile, the failure to address addictions in the criminal 
justice system is the single most significant reason for re-arrest 
and recidivism once released.12 
Internationally many other countries now also have large 
proportions of drug users in prison, but many now also 
offer a wide range of treatments (including methadone) to 
incarcerated drug users.13 Many also have employed harm-
reduction strategies to reduce HIV and Hepatitis C (HCV) 
transmission in prisons (e.g. methadone substitution treatment 
and access to clean injecting equipment) and now also seek to 
avoid imprisonment for those with addictions.14
10 M. S. Gordon, T. W. Kinlock, R. P. Schwartz and K. E. O’Grady, ‘A randomized clinical trial of methadone maintenance for prisoners: findings at 
6 months post-release,’ Addiction 103(8) (2008): 1333–1342.
11 I. A. Binswanger, M. F. Stern and J. G. Elmore, ‘Mortality after Release from Prison,’ New England Journal of Medicine 356 (2007).
12 E. Drucker, ‘Prisons: From Punishment to Public Health,’ in Oxford Textbook of Public Health, Sixth Edition, ed. R. Detels,  M. Gulliford, Q. A. 
Karim and C. C. Tan, (OUP, 2014).
13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation in Prison Settings,’ (Vienna: UNODC, 2013),  
http://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/111_PRISON.pdf.
14 Kate Dolan, Wayne Hall and Alex Wodak, ‘Methadone Maintenance Reduces Injecting in Prison,’ letter to the editor, BMJ 312(7039) (1996): 
1162; Kate Dolan, Scott Rutter and Alex D. Wodak, ‘Prison-based syringe exchange programmes: a review of international research and 
development,’ Addiction 98 (2) (2003): 153–158.
15 Drucker et al., ‘Harm Reduction’.
There is now growing 
evidence that mass 
incarceration is contributing 
to the continued high 
incidence of HIV in the US, 
particularly among  
racial minorities. 
‘ ,
Most US prisons have been resistant to this approach. While 
there are many very dedicated peer drug counsellors in 
prisons, their efforts to rebuild self-esteem and equip inmates 
to deal with dependency and the high risk of relapse are 
often thwarted by anti-therapeutic environments dominated 
by punishment. There is little incentive to offer effective drug 
treatment in modern American prisons and most adopt a 
moralistic tone, depicting addiction as evidence of personal 
weakness. The treatment of drug addiction in US prisons 
has become an extension of the moral crusades of America’s 
‘war on drugs’ – where legitimate questions of how best to 
minimise the harm from drugs are subordinated to the goals 
of zero tolerance – even for therapeutic drugs that soften the 
pains of withdrawal. 
This result has been seen in the United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia, which all have drug problems similar to that 
in the United States but incarceration rates of drug users that 
are only about one quarter of US rates.
 
Opiate overdoses are 
thought to be due to the loss of tolerance associated with 
the greatly reduced use of opiates in prison. In the United 
States, the most significant reason for this can be found in the 
failure to treat opiate dependency adequately in prisons, for 
example, through methadone or buprenorphine substitution, 
which are known to be the most effective methods available 
to treat opiate addiction.15 When there is drug treatment 
(consisting mostly of prisoners talking in groups), it is usually 
modelled after the drug-free therapeutic communities that 
philosophically dominate American drug treatment – generally 
to the exclusion of approaches that employ medications such 
as methadone or buprenorphine.
The high rate of drug incarcerations ensures that drug 
problems will be very common in prison populations 
worldwide. In the US, state correctional officials estimate 
that between 70 and  85 percent of inmates need some level 
of substance abuse treatment. But sustained, professional, 
supervised drug and alcohol treatment is currently available 
in fewer than half of federal, state and local adult detention 
facilities. Juvenile correctional facilities are also staffed to 
serve only a fraction of those who need treatment services. In 
approximately 7,600 correctional facilities surveyed, 172,851 
inmates were in drug treatment programmes in 1997, less 
Policy Implications
Maintenance programmes have proven efficacy 
in treating drug addiction – particularly opiate 
dependency – but are not widely available in 
US prisons and remain under-resourced and 
underutilised in prison environments worldwide. 
Governments should drastically scale up their 
implementation and ensure supportive cultural and 
organisational changes are fostered.  
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than 11 percent of the inmate population and less than 20 
percent of those with addiction histories.16
 
While some state 
prison systems expanded drug treatment programmes in the 
1990s, these have now been cut severely in most systems – for 
example, a 40 percent reduction in California in 2009 alone.17
The injection of heroin within correctional facilities persists 
worldwide despite vigorous attempts to deter.
 
Although drug 
injecting inside these facilities is generally far less frequent 
than in the community, adverse consequences (including HIV 
infection) are well-documented.18 While the use of methadone 
or buprenorphine maintenance for addiction treatment is 
prohibited in US state and federal prisons, a small number of 
local jails do offer brief detoxification programmes using these 
medications. In the past decade, some jail facilities have begun 
to offer methadone maintenance treatment as well. 
A large-scale methadone maintenance treatment programme, 
serving two thousand patients per year, was established in 
New York City’s Riker’s Island Correctional Facility in the 1970s 
– operated by the Montefiore health service – the first jail 
programme to offer this treatment in the United States. This 
programme paved the way for several small pilot methadone 
programmes in prisons and jails in Maryland, Puerto Rico and 
New Mexico. But all face formidable struggles to maintain their 
modest gains in the face of widespread correctional hostility 
to this approach, despite the powerful evidence of its benefits 
elsewhere in the world. 19
By contrast, as of January 2008, methadone maintenance has 
been implemented in prisons in at least 29 other countries or 
territories, with the proportion of prisoners in care ranging 
from less than one percent to over 14 percent. In Canada, 
prisoners have access to methadone maintenance throughout 
their incarceration and many heroin users are started on 
16 Mumola and Karberg, ‘Drug Use and Dependence’.
17 Michael Rothfeld, ‘State to Eliminate 40% of Funding Designed to Turn Prisoners’ Lives Around,’ Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17.
18 Drucker et al., ‘Harm Reduction’.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 P. Spiegel ‘HIV/AIDS among Conflict-affected and Displaced Populations: Dispelling Myths and Taking Action,’ Disasters 28(3) (2004): 322–339.
22 B. M. Mathers, L. Degenhardt, H. Ali et al., ‘HIV prevention, treatment, and care services for people who inject drugs: a systematic review of 
global, regional, and national coverage,’ The Lancet, 375(9719) (2010): 1014-1028.
23 H. Irene Hall et al., ‘Estimation of HIV Incidence in the United States,’ JAMA 300(5) (2008): 520-29.
24 Thomas A. Peterman, Catherine A. Lindsey and Richard M. Selik, ‘This Place Is Killing Me: A Comparison of Counties Where the Incidence 
Rates of AIDS Increased the Most and the Least,’ Journal of Infectious Diseases 191 (2005): 123-26.
25 Anne C. Spaulding, Ryan M. Seals, Matthew J. Page, Amanda K. Brzozowski, William Rhodes and Theodore M. Hammett, ‘HIV/AIDS Among 
Inmates of and Releasees from US Correctional Facilities, 2006: Declining Share of Epidemic but Persistent Public Health Opportunity,’ PLoS 
ONE 4(11) (2009): e7558.
methadone during federal incarceration. Further, in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, some prisons now offer methadone maintenance 
or a short course of methadone-to-detoxification in some pretrial 
detention facilities.20 
 
AIDS and Incarceration 
Due to its powerful linkages to injection drug use and sex work, 
the global HIV epidemic now directly implicates national criminal 
justice policies and imprisonment. Policies which involve large-scale 
arrests and the disproportionate incarceration of impoverished 
marginal populations drive HIV before them.21 Case incidence 
patterns are shifting rapidly as HIV enters new human populations 
and selects new channels of transmission. 
While sexual transmission remains the principal mode of 
transmission worldwide, injecting drug use continues to spread 
to new regions (most recently Sub-Saharan Africa) and remains a 
major vector of infection.22 These factors are allied to increased 
imprisonment of these populations, particularly in those nations 
addressing burgeoning drug markets with harsh punitive criminal 
justice responses. Once again the US is an unhappy poster child for 
this modern plague and in 2008, the US Center for Disease Control 
(CDC) estimated that approximately 56,300 Americans are newly 
infected with HIV annually.
23
 
There is now growing evidence that mass incarceration is 
contributing to the continued high incidence of HIV in the US, 
particularly among racial minorities. While constituting 12 percent 
of the US population, African Americans account for 45 percent of 
all new HIV diagnoses and have an incidence rate eight times that 
of whites. 
For African American women, the magnitude is even more 
pronounced – their HIV rates are nearly 23 times the rate 
for white women.
 
Discovering the causes of such dramatic 
disparities is crucial for efforts to control the epidemic. 
Research on HIV risk is now examining the social conditions 
and structure of this group’s community networks, especially 
within African American populations. These data suggest a 
strong correlation between high incarceration rates and high HIV 
prevalence within many African American subpopulations and their 
communities.
24
 Further, the US association of incarceration and the 
HIV epidemic is now very strong: between 17 and 25 percent of 
all people in the United States who are estimated to be infected 
with HIV disease will pass through a correctional facility each year, 
roughly 190,000 to 250,000 of the country’s estimated total of 1 
million HIV-positive individuals.
25
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The cost of care of HIV-infected inmates is a major issue in nations 
with high rates of HIV. Thus New York State (with over 53,000 
prisoners in 2010) has about 1,700 HIV-infected inmates receiving 
medical care using antiretroviral drugs, at an annual cost of more 
than $25 million. But best estimates are that these 1,700 are only 
about one-third of those infected; most do not know they are 
infected and there is no routine testing. There is great need for 
testing programmes to identify infection and initiate treatment 
as early as possible – both for the individual’s benefit and for 
reducing transmission risk in the broader communities. 
HIV rates among African Americans in New York state prisons 
are estimated at five to seven percent among men and seven 
to nine percent among women, and the risk appears to carry 
over to their sexual partners in their home communities.
26 
Recent evidence also suggests that cyclical patterns of release 
and re-incarceration may foster instability in sexual and social 
networks. In conjunction with unstable housing, untreated 
drug addiction and recurrent imprisonment, a ‘churn’ in social 
networks occurs. These destabilising effects act within the 
social networks established in the prison feeder communities 
of many cities to produce increases in risk for HIV transmission 
both by sex and by drug use. This pattern of serial disruption 
spreads risk across these communities, with ’risk networks’ 
extending to sexual partners of ex-prisoners, who may form a 
bridge to the surrounding population. This connection between 
the widespread incarceration of African American males and 
high rates of HIV in many urban communities dramatically 
demonstrates an important long-term community health impact 
of the criminal justice system. 
MENTAL HEALTH 
Mental health problems represent another source of the 
mounting toll of lifelong disabilities that incarceration imposes. 
In the US, 400,000 to 600,000 prison inmates (15–20 percent of 
all prisoners) have a major acute or chronic psychiatric disorder.
 
In addition to failing to treat many pre-existing mental health 
problems, incarceration itself, and especially new practices of 
isolation and solitary confinement, often create new mental 
health issues that handicap individuals long past the end of their 
prison sentences.28 
Following the US ‘deinstitutionalisation’ from psychiatric hospitals 
for the chronically mentally ill (from the 1950s through the 
1970s), the criminal justice system became the default response 
for these former hospital patients – most dramatically among 
the poor and homeless (see Figure 4). Chicago political scientist 
Bernard Harcourt notes that a growing number of individuals 
‘who used to be tracked for mental health treatment are now 
26 Adaora A. Adimora and Victor J. Schoenbach, ‘Social Context, Sexual Networks, and Racial Disparities in Rates of Sexually Transmitted 
Infections,’ Journal of Infectious Diseases 191 (2005): 115-22.
27 Source: Harcourt http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/institutionalized-final.pdf 
28 Atul Gawande, ‘Hellhole,’ New Yorker, March 30, 2009; Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner, ‘Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. 
Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics,’ Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 38(1) (2010).
Figure 4. Institutionalisation in the United States (per 100,000 adults)27
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getting a one-way ticket to jail.’29 A US Justice Department 
study released in September 2006, found that 56 percent of 
those in state prisons (and a higher proportion of those in local 
jails) reported mental health problems within the past year.30 
Harcourt writes that, ‘over the past 40 years, the United States 
dismantled a colossal mental health complex and rebuilt – bed 
by bed – an enormous prison’. 31 However there is a growing 
movement in the US and elsewhere to establish mental health 
courts to deflect these cases (often with dual diagnosis of 
substance abuse) to alternatives to prisons, with some positive 
results now being seen.32 But this system is also very limited 
due to severe shortages of properly trained and supervised 
mental health personnel and inadequate budgets. 
MINIMISING THE PRoBLEMS  
oF INCARCERATIoN
A number of trends in US mass incarceration are important to 
consider in any prescriptive approach to policy in other countries 
and serve as a guide to those prison and incarceration policies 
for drugs offences that can be extrapolated across borders so 
other countries don’t make the same mistakes. 
 
Punitive Isolation and Solitary Confinement  
The United States, with only five percent of the world’s 
population (and 25 percent of its prisoners) now has over 
half of all the world’s prisoners who are in long-term solitary 
confinement. More than 25,000 inmates are permanently in 
isolation in US ‘supermax’ prisons (short for ‘super-maximum 
security’), where they may spend years locked in small, often 
windowless cells with solid steel doors, let out for showers 
and solitary exercise in a small, enclosed space once or twice 
each week. A report by Human Rights Watch found that 
supermax prisoners have almost no access to educational or 
recreational activities and are usually handcuffed, shackled and 
escorted by two or three correctional officers every time they 
leave their cells.33 Supermax prisons were ostensibly designed 
to house the most violent or dangerous inmates – ‘the worst 
of the worst’. 
29 Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment,’ in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Supplement II, ed. Leonard Levy, Kenneth 
Karst and Adam Winkler (New York: Macmillan, 2000); Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘The Mentally Ill, Behind Bars,’ New York Times, January 15 , 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/opinion/15harcourt.html?_r=0.
30 D. J. James and L.E. Glaze, ‘Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates,’ US DOJ, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC, 2006), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
31 Harcourt, ‘The Mentally Ill, Behind Bars’. 
32 V.A. Hiday, H. W. Wales and B. Ray, ‘Effectiveness of a Short-Term Mental Health Court: Criminal Recidivism One Year Postexit,’ Law and 
Human Behavior (2013).
33 Supermax Prisons: An Overview (Human Rights Watch Report, 2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/Sprmx002.htm.
34 Gawande, ‘Hellhole’. 
35 Diane C. Hatton and Anastasia A. Fisher, eds. Women Prisoners and Health Justice: Perspectives, Issues, and Advocacy for an International 
Hidden Population (Oxford: Radcliffe, 2009); Pamela M. Diamond et al., ‘The Prevalence of Mental Illness in Prison,’ Administration and Policy 
in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research 29 (1) (2001).
36 Lynn M. Paltrow, ‘Roe v Wade and the New Jane Crow: Reproductive Rights in the Age of Mass Incarceration,’ American Journal of Public 
Health 103(1) (2013): 17-21. 
In the US the trend toward more long-term solitary confinement 
is inseparable from the explosive growth of mass incarceration. In 
2009, Harvard surgeon Atul Gawande published a startling article 
about the use of solitary confinement in American prisons, noting 
that in the US ‘[t]he wide-scale use of isolation is, almost exclusively, 
a phenomenon of the past twenty years’.34
 
Indeed, sustained 
isolation has now become institutionalised as a cornerstone of 
America’s criminal justice system and its requirement for extreme 
sanctions to handle the huge population of prisoners. 
 
Women and Prisons 
Women’s healthcare needs, always more prominent than those of 
young males, are also typically inadequately addressed in prisons. 
In addition to facing all the routine gynaecological, reproductive 
and nutritional issues of all women, the overwhelming majority of 
women in prisons are survivors of violence and trauma.
35 
Further, 
more than 60 percent of incarcerated women are parents, who 
must deal with separation from their children and families, along 
with depression, anxiety and low self-esteem. Not surprisingly, 
incarcerated women suffer from serious mental illnesses at much 
higher rates than male inmates.
In the US over the last 25 years the number of women and girls 
caught in the criminal justice system has risen dramatically  – with 
more than 200,000 women behind bars and more than 1 million 
on probation and parole. The percentage of women behind bars 
increased by 757 percent between 1977 and 2004, twice the 
increase of the incarcerated male population during the same 
period. The number of women in prison – along with the number 
of women giving birth in prison – continues to rise each year.  Few 
get the services they need. Notably, despite the persistence of 
racial disparities, white women are the now among the US groups 
with the fastest growth rate in US prison systems. The increased 
incarceration of women for drug offences has, in some states, also 
served as a proxy for efforts to ban abortions.36 
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The Privatisation of Correctional Services 
The use of privately contracted security corporations is growing 
worldwide.37 The UK was Europe’s first country to establish 
prisons run by the private sector (Wolds Prison opened in 1992) 
under the government’s Private Finance Initiative contracts.38 
There are now 14 prisons in England and Wales operated under 
contract by private companies with a total combined capacity 
of about 13,500 prisoners or approximately 15 percent of 
the entire prison population. There are also two privately run 
prisons in Scotland and nine contracts to run private prisons 
are currently under consideration in England and Wales.
The US led the movement to employ private firms to operate 
state prisons and, with the world’s largest prison system, now 
leads in the proportion of its facilities contracted to private 
firms. While 50 percent of the US state prison systems (with a 
total of 1.2 million inmates) currently use no privately-operated 
prison services, the 25 states that do now rely on private 
services for over 25 percent of their operations are located 
mainly in Southern and Western states. As of December 2000, 
there were 153 private correctional facilities operating in the 
US with a capacity of over 119,000.39 Prison privatisation is 
an aggressively entrepreneurial business – working to increase 
its market and buying entire prisons from cash-strapped 
states in exchange for 20-year management contracts and a 
guaranteed occupancy rate of 90 percent. Critics argue that 
the contractual obligations of states to fill the prisons to 90 
percent occupancy are poor public policy and end up costing 
taxpayers more than state-run prisons would.40
37 http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/corporate-reports
38 Alan Travis, ‘Nine prisons put up for tender in mass privatisation programme,’ The Guardian, July 13,  2011,  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/13/nine-prisons-tender-privatisation-programme.
39 American Civil Liberties Union Report : Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration, November 2, 2011,  
https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration
40 Chris Kirkham ‘With States Facing Shortfalls, Private Corporation Offers Cash For Prisons,’ Huffington Post, February 14, 2012,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buying-state-prisons_n_1272143.html; 2012 Solicitation letter from CCA  
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/ccaletter.pdf
41 Ernest Drucker, ‘Prisons: From Punishment to Public Health’ in Oxford Textbook of Public Health, 6th Edition, 2014.
42 C. Shedd, ‘Countering the carceral continuum. The legacy of mass incarceration,’ Criminology and Public Policy - Special Issue on Mass 
Incarceration 10 (3) (2011): 865–871.
43 E. Drucker and M. Trace, ‘An Amnesty for Prisoners of the War on Drugs,’ Huffington Post, September 22, 2013,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ernest-drucker/an-amnesty-for-prisoners-_b_3957493.html.
CoNCLUSIoN 
The rapid rise in incarceration in the US and several other 
countries from the 1970s through the 2000s has often been 
driven by the incarceration of drug users. As discussed above, 
these policies have had very broad effects. They have impacted 
those imprisoned but also their families and communities. The 
expansive reach of ‘mass incarceration’ and its collateral effects has 
been accompanied in many cities by increased contact between 
citizens and law enforcement, increases in the time and financial 
impositions on individuals awaiting trial, a decline in the quality 
of correctional health care and a reduction in available services for 
formerly incarcerated individuals. These complex and inter-related 
patterns show the ways in which imprisonment, human rights 
and public health are now intimately related. With their growing 
concentration of vulnerable populations and their relationship to 
drug markets, immigration, human trafficking, border security 
and global pandemics associated with sex and drugs (HIV), the 
international public health significance of criminal justice systems 
and prisons grows apace. 
This examination of prisons through the lens of public health has 
documented the long- and short-term implications of criminal 
justice involvement, particularly incarceration, for public safety 
as well as their economic, social and health effects on society.41 
With this new public health basis of concern, there is renewed 
professional interest in the possibilities for families, schools and 
neighborhood institutions to divert individuals from criminal 
offending, recidivism and the continued risks of jail and prison. 
The fiscal burdens of incarceration in the US and elsewhere 
have also animated new efforts to develop and strengthen 
community-based sanctions as alternatives to custodial ones. 
These challenges, their individual and collective effects and 
their concentration within the most vulnerable racial and ethnic 
minority communities in many nations have motivated an intense 
re-examination of the ‘carceral continuum,’ now viewed across 
the multiple domains of public health, health care and social 
services. 42 Most recently, there is renewed interest in sweeping 
reform of drug criminalisation and ending the continued 
criminalisation of drug users – including developing programmes 
of general amnesties for prisoners of the drug wars.43   ■   
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Costs and Benefits 
of Drug-Related  
Health Services
Joanne Csete
Health services for people who use drugs are important on many levels. In addition to the clinical benefits to the individual and the benefit to the community of reducing drug-related harms such as HIV and drug-related crime, they represent an alternative to arrest and detention for some offenses 
and thus are a possible starting point for developing less repressive drug policies. In spite of a significant 
body of evidence that drug-related health services are a very good investment for society, they remain 
woefully underfunded and unavailable. 
1 See US Office of National Drug Control Policy, ‘The National Drug Control Budget FY 2103 Funding Highlights’ and Drug Policy Alliance,  
‘The Federal Drug Control Budget: New Rhetoric, Same Failed Drug War,’ 2013,  
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact%20Sheet_Federal%20Drug%20War%20Budget.pdf 
2 Count the Costs, ‘The war on drugs: Wasting billions and undermining economies,’  
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Economics-briefing.pdf. 
3 Bradley Mathers, Louisa Degenhardt, Hammad Ali, Lucas Wiessing et al., ‘HIV prevention, treatment and care services for people who inject 
drugs: a systematic review of global, regional and national coverage,’ Lancet 375 (2010): 1014-1028.
The policy approach to drug control in most countries features 
heavy spending on policing, interdiction of drugs, judicial 
processes and incarceration. In the United States, for example, 
it is estimated that about $50 billion a year from state and 
federal budgets goes to drug control, of which the majority is 
devoted to law enforcement and interdiction.1 One estimate of 
drug-related law enforcement expenses globally puts the figure 
at about $100 billion per year.2 Drug-related health and social 
services are nonetheless often underfunded and inadequate to 
meet the need. Treatment for drug dependence, for example, 
is frequently inaccessible or unaffordable to people who need 
it, and this service may not exist without (often grudging) 
public sector support. Millions of people who need them are 
without services to protect themselves from injection-related 
harms, such as provision of sterile injecting equipment and 
medicines, such as methadone, that stabilise cravings and do not 
require injection.3  
Good-quality treatment for drug dependence and drug-
related harm reduction services have been widely studied 
and can be life-saving for those fortunate enough to have 
access to them. The clinical evidence for effectiveness of 
these measures, particularly with respect to outcomes such 
as averting HIV or hepatitis C transmission, is very strong. 
The purpose of this contribution is to review the evidence that 
they also have a larger economic and social value – that is, to 
assess their costs and benefits in a broad sense, including with 
respect to social outcomes such as crime reduction.
 
  Summary
 ■ Governments should ensure that health 
services for people who use drugs (at adequate 
scale) are a priority for public resource 
allocation.  These services currently have a very 
low availability relative to need.
 ■ Governments should develop standards and 
monitoring systems to ensure good-quality 
health services for people who use drugs in 
both public and private sector facilities. Further, 
they should not impede those services.
 ■ Governments should ensure that police do 
not interfere with health service provision.  
They should, for example, not use numbers 
of arrests of drug users as a basis for police 
compensation or performance review.  Police, 
prosecutors and judges should be trained on 
the importance of basic health services for 
people who use drugs.
 ■ Governments may find it useful to invest in 
benefit-cost studies of these services and 
should inform the public and legislators in user-
friendly ways of their benefits.
 ■ In multilateral bodies, health services for 
people who use drugs are in dire need of 
member state champions. United Nations 
agencies, especially WHO and UNAIDS, have 
commissioned research and made statements 
in support of most of these services, but 
international debates remain dominated by 
positions based on fear and ideology rather 
than evidence.
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BASIC IDEAS: CoST oF DRUG USE AND 
PRoMISE oF TREATMENT 
Not all drug use is problematic, and thus not all drug use requires 
a health service response. The most recent annual report of the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) uses the rough estimate 
that globally 167 to 315 million persons aged 15-64 used illicit 
substances.4 The large range of the estimate reflects the paucity 
of countries with population-based surveys that would allow 
more precise estimates and the fact that people who use drugs 
are highly criminalised in many places and thus may be hidden 
from surveys. UNODC defines ‘problem drug use’ to include 
people who inject drugs and people who are diagnosed with 
drug dependence or other drug-related disorders. It estimated 
that in 2011 there were 16 to 29 million persons whose drug use 
was problematic, less than 10 percent of the total of people who 
use drugs.5 Thus, part of the challenge of drug-related health 
services is to target those most in need of services and ensure that 
the services are effective and readily accessible. (A corresponding 
challenge of economic importance is to ensure that people who 
use drugs but do not have problematic use are not obliged or 
otherwise directed into services that they do not need.) 
Treatment for drug addiction takes many forms – residential and 
non-residential, assisted by medications such as methadone or 
not, ‘12-step’ programmes and other group support approaches, 
behavioural and cognitive therapies, and many others. It is plain 
from clinical experience, as noted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and UNODC, that while all of these have some record of 
success for some people, none is effective 100 percent of the time.6 
It is common for people with drug dependence, if they have 
varied services available to them, to attempt several forms of 
therapy before finding the one that succeeds for them, whether 
‘success’ is judged as complete abstinence or less problematic 
drug use. There is also evidence from many settings to suggest, 
not surprisingly, that drug treatment combined with support in 
the form of stable housing, food assistance and support to family 
members has the greatest chance of success.7 Based on evidence 
to date, it is safe to say that drug treatment (combined or not 
with some form of social support) can reduce problematic drug 
consumption and thus the costs associated with it, and we take 
that as a point of departure in this contribution. 
Cost-benefit analysis – comparison of the cost of an intervention 
or programme to a monetary estimate of its benefit – is an essential 
tool for evaluation of health interventions. (The technique of cost-
benefit analysis produces results usually expressed as benefit-cost 
ratios – that is, an estimate of the benefits derived divided by the 
cost incurred. Positive net benefits are indicated by benefit-cost 
ratios greater than one.) It is important to assess costs and benefits 
of treatment of drug dependence, not least because many of the 
people needing this intervention are reliant on publicly supported 
treatment, thereby making it particularly susceptible to political 
controversy.8 While many studies demonstrate the clinical 
benefit to the individual of various forms of treatment for drug 
dependence, consideration of social and economic costs has 
generated a smaller literature. Indeed, the multifaceted nature 
of the costs of drug dependence and benefits of reducing it 
pose considerable methodological challenges, a full treatment of 
which is beyond the scope of this contribution. For our purposes, 
it is useful to note that WHO, recognising these challenges, has 
established guidelines suggesting that quantifying the economic 
impact of drug use on society should include assigning monetary 
value to the following costs:
 
WHo: ‘Tangible’ elements of economic impact  
of problematic drug use
 ■  Health, social and welfare services (i.e. reduced 
drug dependence should result in a lower 
burden of health and social services related to 
drug dependence).
 ■  Productivity loss in the workplace and the home.
 ■  Drug-related crime, law enforcement and  
criminal justice.
 ■  Road accidents.
 ■  Cleaning up the environment (e.g. of unsafely 
discarded injection equipment).
 ■  Research and prevention activities.9
These are the categories of ‘tangible’ cost; loss of life, pain and 
suffering are noted by WHO as intangible costs. WHO’s guidelines 
then seek to consider the various measurement challenges, 
necessary simplifying assumptions and other elements of putting 
cost figures on the tangible items in an effort to enable national 
governments to make estimates that will be comparable to 
some degree. 
For some of these items, methodological debates will possibly 
never be completely settled. Quantifying crime-related costs, for 
example, includes obvious criminal justice activities, including 
incarceration (though drug-related activities may not always 
be distinguished); costs of drug-related crime to individuals, 
including material loss and loss of time and productivity; and the 
‘esoteric and ephemeral’ costs to the legitimate economy of the 
human resources represented by people who are involved with 
drug trafficking or other drug-related crimes.10 It is recognised 
that for many of these elements, there will not be good data 
 4 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013  (Vienna: United Nations, 2013), appended fact sheet,  
http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr/Fact_Sheet_Chp1_2013.pdf 
 5 Ibid.
 6 WHO and UNODC, ‘Principles of drug dependence treatment: discussion paper.’ (Vienna: United Nations, 2008),  
https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/UNODC-WHO-Principles-of-Drug-Dependence-Treatment-March08.pdf.
 7 Ibid.
 8 Susan L. Ettner, David Huang, Elizabeth Evans, Danielle Rose Ash et al., ‘Cost-benefit in the California Treatment Outcome Project: does 
substance abuse treatment ‘pay for itself?,’ Health Research and Educational Trust 41 (2005):193-194.
 9 Eric Single et al., International guidelines for estimating the costs of substance abuse, 2nd ed. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004).
10 Single et al., 59-62.
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in even the best-organised jurisdictions, and simplifying 
assumptions will be necessary. In addition, WHO experts note 
that many drug-related crimes, particularly assaults and thefts, 
are habitually under-reported by victims and thus not captured in 
official data.11 Ideally, moreover, these factors should be studied 
over a long period, which is rarely possible in practice.
 
METHoDS
This contribution benefits from a number of careful reviews of 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies of health services 
for people who use drugs, particularly of treatment for drug 
dependence, which were complemented with an updated search 
of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies of drug-related 
health services.12 
 
CoSTS AND BENEFITS oF TREATMENT oF 
DRUG DEPENDENCE
An important review of 11 cost-benefit analyses published before 
2003, all of them conducted in the United States, included only 
published peer-reviewed studies that attempted cost-benefit 
analyses of one of more of these factors: crime, health services 
utilisation, employment earnings and expenditure on illicit drugs 
and alcohol.13 The authors note, in sum:
 ■ The average total net benefit accruing from all 
categories of cost reductions estimated over the 
12-month period was $42,905. The average 
benefit-cost ratio for studies in which it was 
calculated was 8.9, ranging from 1.33 to 23.33.
 ■ The greatest economic benefit was in reduced 
criminal activity, over half of the total.
 ■ The economic benefit of savings on health services 
averted was about 15 percent of the total, and 
of increased employment earnings was about 13 
percent. The authors note that the latter, measured 
only as actual in-pocket earnings, probably 
underestimates the importance of having any kind 
of stable employment as a determinant of long-
term ‘success’.14 
Since that review, there have been a number of interesting 
attempts to estimate social costs and benefits of treatment. 
Using data from 43 treatment facilities in the state of California 
supplemented by surveys, Ettner and colleagues used WHO 
guidelines to assess the benefits of treatment with respect 
to medical care, criminal activity, earnings of people treated 
and welfare programme (government transfer) payments.15 
Their finding was that treatment cost an average $1,583 per 
person but benefited society at the level of $11,487, a 7:1 ratio.16  
As in the earlier review, the authors estimate that the greatest 
savings – 65 percent – were in lower crime-related costs, with 29 
percent attributable to increased earnings and six percent due to 
reduced medical costs. They suggest that the actual benefit-cost 
ratio is probably closer to 9:1 because of the use of arrests as 
a proxy for crime, given that many crimes do not ever result in 
an arrest.17
A study that focused narrowly on costs related only to robbery 
looked at several forms of treatment for drug dependence in the 
United States.18 Across all forms of treatment, being in treatment 
was associated with a reduction in robbery incidence of at least 
0.4 robberies per patient per year. The authors conclude: ‘Given 
reasonable valuations associated with averting, at the margin, 
a single armed robbery, this one component of benefit may be 
large enough to offset the economic costs’ of drug treatment.19 
They further note that while residential treatment is generally 
considerably more expensive than outpatient care, the greater 
benefit of residential programmes in averting crime may ‘more 
than offset’ the added cost.20 Policymakers and service providers 
alike may tend to favour support for drug treatment programmes 
that admit older, more educated patients with no criminal record 
and no psychiatric disorders, but the results of this study suggest 
that much greater social benefits would derive from expanding 
treatment access for those patients with a propensity to 
commit crimes.21
 
11  Ibid., 60-61.
12  Kathryn E. McCollister and Michael T. French. ‘The relative contribution of outcome domains in the total economic benefit of addiction     
 interventions: a review of first findings,’ Addiction 98 (2003): 1647-1659; Louisa Degenhardt, Bradley Mathers, Peter Vickerman, Tim  
 Rhodes et al. ‘Prevention of HIV infection for people who inject drugs: why individual, structural and combination approaches are  
 needed,’ Lancet DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60742-8; Daniel Wolfe, M. Patrizia Carrieri and Donald Shepard, ‘Treatment and care  
 for injecting drug users with HIV infection: a review of barriers and ways forward,’ Lancet DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60832-X;  
 Center for Health Program Development and Management, ‘Review of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness literature for methadone or  
 buprenorphine as a treatment for opiate addiction,’ Baltimore, 9 May, 2007. 
13  McCollister and French, op. cit.
14  Ibid., 1655.
15  Ettner et al., 196.
16  Ibid., 205.
17  Ibid., 204, 206.
18  Anirban Basu, A. David Paltiel and Harold A. Pollack, ‘Social costs of robbery and the cost-effectiveness of substance abuse treatment,’  
 Health Economics (2008): 927-946.
19  Ibid., 939.
20  Ibid., 939-940.
21  Ibid., 940.
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Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST)
In part because of its link to HIV prevention and its long 
clinical track record, one of the most widely studied forms of 
treatment for drug dependence is medication-assisted therapy 
for opiate addiction, also called opioid maintenance treatment 
or opioid substitution treatment (OST hereinafter). Opium-
derived medicines, especially methadone and buprenorphine, 
can be administered daily by mouth – thus obviating injection 
– and can stabilise cravings of people with opiate dependence. 
As UN agencies have noted, this therapy can enable people to 
hold jobs and eliminate the need to commit crimes to obtain 
illicit opiates, as well as reducing heroin use, heroin overdose, 
overdose mortality and reducing other injection-related harms.22 
UN agencies have promoted OST as a central element of HIV 
prevention where illicit opiate use is significant because OST ‘can 
decrease the high cost of opioid dependence to individuals, their 
families and society at large by reducing heroin use, associated 
deaths, HIV risk behaviours and criminal activity’.23 They also 
note that it may be optimal for some patients to continue OST 
indefinitely,24 a response to the misinformed but still widely 
held view that methadone therapy should always be of limited 
duration as a bridge to abstinence from all opiates.25
OST is limited and stigmatised in many countries and banned 
outright in a few (notably the Russian Federation).26 In spite of 
OST’s track record of successful treatment of heroin addiction that 
dates from the late 1960s, some practitioners and policymakers 
deride it as substituting one addiction for another. The potential 
for diversion of methadone and buprenorphine to illicit markets 
also means that their medical use must be carefully controlled 
and the costs of that control figured into assessments. In many 
countries, including the US, the administration of methadone 
must be directly observed – that is, patients must come to a 
health facility every day and take their medicine in front of a 
health professional – an enormous inconvenience to the patient 
and a practice with considerable other costs. Buprenorphine, 
particularly in a formulation in which it is combined with the opioid 
antagonist naloxone, is considered to have a lower potential for 
diversion to illicit use, and in many places it is possible to receive 
take-home doses rather than requiring daily direct observation.  
Because drug injection is associated with high risk of transmission 
of HIV, a very expensive disease to treat, some cost-benefit 
studies of OST count benefits mainly in savings from HIV cases 
averted. In spite of hard-won victories in lowering the cost 
of HIV treatment, HIV remains quite expensive to treat.27 In 
addition, HIV transmission through injection with contaminated 
equipment is much more efficient than sexual transmission; even 
a very small number of injections poses a high risk.28 Given the 
high cost of HIV treatment, as some experts have noted, OST 
expansion carries a benefit so substantial as to be self-justifying 
‘regardless of what assumptions are made about the effect of 
opiate dependence or methadone prescription on the quality of 
life’.29 Reviewing the research on OST in 2004, WHO, UNAIDS 
and UNODC summarised it as follows:
According to several conservative estimates, every 
dollar invested in opioid dependence treatment 
programmes may yield a return of between $4 and  
$7 in reduced drug-related crime, criminal justice 
costs and theft alone. When savings related to health 
care are included, total savings can exceed costs by a 
ratio of 12:1.30 
Most studies of the cost and benefit of OST have been undertaken 
in countries of the global North. Recently, however, a number of 
studies from Asia have made cost-benefit calculations of OST, 
though generally only of benefits related to averting cases of 
HIV. A 2012 study in Dehong (Yunnan), China estimated that 
against a per-patient cost of OST of $9.10-16.70 per month over 
the 30-month period followed, methadone programmes averted 
HIV cases of which the cost would have been a net $4600 per 
22 World Health Organization, UN Office on Drugs and Crime and UNAIDS (UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS), ‘WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS position  
paper: Substitution maintenance therapy in the management of opioid dependence and HIV/AIDS prevention,’ Geneva, 2004,  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/Position%20Paper%20sub.%20maint.%20therapy.pdf 
23 Ibid., 1.
24 Ibid.
25 See, for example, Charles Winick, ‘A mandatory short-term methadone-to-abstinence program in New York City,’ Mount Sinai Journal of 
Medicine 68(2001): 41-45; the Manhattan and Brooklyn drug treatment courts in New York City as of 2013 require participants to use 
methadone only  as a short-term bridge to abstinence.  
26 Mathers et al., op.cit.
27 HIV treatment costs vary considerably based on the percentage of patients who may have developed resistance or intolerable side effects to  
generic first-line medicines, as well as whether countries have access to generic forms of some medicines. The cost of a WHO-recommended  
first-line regimen was about $112 per patient per year in 2012.  Second-line regimens cost on average about $450 per person per year  
in 2012, but much more in the US and other high-income countries. The cost of third-line treatments was $13,225 per person per year in  
Georgia, $7,782 in Paraguay, $8,468 in Armenia, and $4,760 in Thailand.  See World Health Organization, ‘Global update on HIV treatment 
         2013: results, impacts and opportunities,’ Geneva, United Nations, 99-100,  
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85326/1/9789241505734_eng.pdf.    
28 One review of the research indicates that HIV risk from one episode of vaginal (male-female) sex is as low as 0.05 percent (or 1 in 2000) while   
injection with contaminated equipment carries a risk of about 0.7 percent or 0.8 percent. Government of Canada, Public Health Agency, ‘HIV 
transmission risk: a summary of evidence,’ Ottawa, 2013, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/aids-sida/publication/hivtr-rtvih-eng.php. 
29 Paul G. Barnett and Sally S. Hui, ‘The cost-effectiveness of methadone maintenance,’ Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 67 (2000): 371.  
30 World Health Organization, Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and UN Office on Drugs and Crime. ‘Position Paper: Substitution 
Maintenance Therapy in the Management of Opioid Dependence and HIV Prevention,’ Geneva, United Nations, 2004.
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case to treat.31 A similar study over a five-year period estimated 
that OST programmes in the Xinjiang, China averted over 5600 
HIV infections that would have incurred a cost to the health 
system of over $4.4 million in the same period.32 These studies 
obviously rely on assumptions about risks of HIV transmission 
faced by people who inject drugs, mostly extrapolations from 
previous periods. They notably did not calculate the costs of 
sexual transmission of HIV to people who do not inject drugs 
and so probably underestimate the benefits accrued.  
A special category of treatment of drug dependence is the legal 
administration of medicinal heroin available in a few countries, 
generally only for small numbers of people with long-standing 
addictions who, for various reasons, have not benefited from other 
therapies. A review of evaluations of heroin-assisted treatment 
in Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada 
and the UK concluded that these programmes have generally 
demonstrated considerable benefits through the reduction of 
criminal activities among these patients, decline in use of illicitly 
obtained drugs and decline in risky injection.33 One study of the 
Swiss experience indicated that the incidence of the crimes of 
burglary, muggings and drug trafficking declined between 50 to 
90 percent among people in the prescription heroin programme, 
depending on the crime, but did not attempt to assign costs to 
this reduction.34 It is not expected that this intervention would 
ever be offered on a mass scale, but it illustrates the principle of 
achieving significant benefits by reaching those associated with 
the most problematic use. 
 
oTHER SERVICES FoR PEoPLE WHo  
USE DRUGS  
 
Needle and Syringe Programmes (NSPs)
Programmes that furnish clean injection equipment to people 
who inject drugs are proven to be extremely effective with 
respect to prevention of HIV. The review commissioned by WHO 
of the extensive research on this subject shows, in fact, that 
these programmes, most often established as needle exchanges 
(whereby used injection equipment can be exchanged for sterile 
equipment), are among the most effective and cost-effective 
programmes in the HIV prevention arsenal.35 These programmes 
should not be expected to have the range of potential social 
benefits that are associated with treatment of drug dependence 
since they do not necessarily reduce drug use or addiction, though 
they may present important opportunities for referral to treatment 
services and other social support – an element that has not been 
extensively evaluated economically in the published literature. 
 
A 2010 review of cost studies – mostly cost-effectiveness rather 
than cost-benefit – concluded that if averting HIV cases could 
be demonstrated, as they were convincingly in a number of 
studies, the benefit-cost ratio of these programmes should be 
expected to be very high because the programmes tend to cost 
little, and HIV care is expensive.36 A widely cited study by the 
government of Australia drew the following conclusion about 
these programmes across the country:
For every one dollar invested in NSPs, more than four 
dollars were returned (additional to the investment) 
in healthcare cost-savings in the short term (10 years) 
if only direct costs are included; greater returns are 
expected over longer time horizons….If patient/client 
costs and productivity gains and losses are included 
in the analysis, then…for every one dollar invested 
in NSPs (2000-2009), $27 is returned in cost savings. 
This return increases considerably over a longer time 
horizon.37  
As noted above, NSP programmes reach people who are actively 
injecting and who are more likely than non-injectors to have 
drug-related health problems, and NSP staff can provide a link 
to other health services and counselling. A 2010 review in The 
Lancet concluded that if the desired outcome is HIV control, the 
greatest cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost will be achieved by 
high coverage of both these interventions in combination with 
high coverage of HIV treatment, even though the last element 
31 Yan Xing, Jiangping Sun, Weihua Cao, Liming Lee et al., ‘Economic evaluation of methadone maintenance treatment in HIV/AIDS control 
among injection drug users in Dehong, China,’ AIDS Care 24 (2012): 756-762.
32 Mingjian J. Ni, Li Ping Fu, Xue Ling Chen et al., ‘Net financial benefits of averting HIV infections among people who inject drugs in Urumqi, 
Xinjiang, People’s Republic of China (2005-2010),’ BMC Public Health 2012, 12:572, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/572.
33 Benedikt Fischer, Eugenia Oviedo-Joekes, Peter Blanken, Christian Haasen et al., ‘Heroin-assisted treatment (HAT) a decade later: a brief update 
on science and politics,’ Journal of Urban Health 84 (2007): 552-562.
34 Martin Killias, Marcel F. Aebi and Denis Ribeaud, ‘Key findings concerning the effects of heroin prescription on crime,’ in Heroin-assisted 
treatment: work in progress eds. Margret Rihs-Middel, Robert Hämmig and Nina Jacobshagen (Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 2005).
35 Alex Wodak and Annie Cooney, ‘Effectiveness of sterile needle and syringe programming in reducing HIV/AIDS among injection drug users – 
Evidence for Action Technical Paper,’ Geneva, World Health Organization, 2004,  http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241591641.pdf 
36 Degenhardt et al., 35-36. 
37 Government of Australia, National Centre in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research’ ‘Return on investment 2: evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of needle and syringe programs in Australia,’ 2009,  
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/C562D0E860733E9FCA257648000215C5/$File/retexe.pdf. 
38 Degenhardt et al., 30.
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is very costly in most places.38 The authors bemoan the low 
availability of all these services for many people who use drugs, 
which is linked to the stigma they face and their fear of using 
services that may result in their drug use being brought to the 
attention of the police.39
Needle and syringe programmes may yield particularly high 
returns in prison settings. Countries including Germany, 
Switzerland, Spain, Moldova, Belarus, Luxembourg, Romania 
and Kyrgyzstan have programmes that furnish clean injection 
equipment in prison,40 an intervention that requires the 
politically courageous recognition that in spite of even the 
best efforts to stop it, drug injection occurs in prisons. All 
of those programmes studied have had dramatic results in 
reducing transmission of HIV and in some cases hepatitis C, 
though benefit-cost ratios have not been calculated.41 Since 
treating HIV among prisoners is the responsibility of the state 
and could be a long-term responsibility, the cost savings from 
HIV and hepatitis cases averted are likely to be considerable. OST 
is offered in prison in some countries, where it has an excellent 
track record (directly observed administration is facilitated by the 
prison environment), but many countries that offer OST in the 
broader community still do not offer it in prisons.42
 
Supervised Injection Facilities
Some countries committed to comprehensive HIV services 
for people who use drugs also authorise so-called supervised 
or safe injection facilities, places where people can inject 
illicit drugs with clean equipment in the presence of health 
professionals. These facilities exist in many western European 
countries – Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland were 
pioneers – as well as Canada and Australia.43 The facility in 
Vancouver, Canada, called Insite, has been extensively studied by 
public health and social science researchers. As of 2012, there 
were about 500 overdose episodes that occurred among people 
using Insite but no deaths,44 whereas the neighbourhood of Insite 
was previously known for frequent overdose-related incidents 
and deaths on the street. In addition, a 2011 study found that 
not only was overdose mortality averted in the facility itself, but 
in a 500-metre radius of Insite, overdose episodes dropped by 
35 percent in the first years of the facility’s operation, compared 
to a nine percent decline in the rest of the city.45 In benefit-cost 
terms, a 2010 study that made conservative assumptions about 
overdose mortality, other overdose complications and HIV cases 
averted estimated a benefit-cost ratio for Insite of about 5:1 or in 
monetary terms about $6 million a year.46  
 
Drug Treatment Courts
A number of countries, particularly the US and Canada, 
have invested in specialised drug courts or drug treatment 
courts in which some alleged offenders can be diverted to 
court-supervised treatment programmes as an alternative to 
incarceration. Drug courts in the US have been extensively 
evaluated, mostly on the criterion of criminal recidivism. 
The US model of courts raises a number of questions, including 
the due process issue of requiring people to plead guilty to 
whatever charge is before them as a condition of being diverted 
to treatment, the question of whether treatment should ever be 
coercive in any sense, and the fact that many courts refuse OST 
as a treatment option in spite of great need for it.47 An extensive 
drug court evaluation supported by the US Department of Justice 
included a cost-benefit calculation that assigned monetary values 
to components of a broad definition of benefits, including social 
and economic productivity of drug court participants, welfare 
programme savings, and criminal justice and health service savings 
and compared them to drug court costs, which are generally 
well documented.48 Their sophisticated analysis, involving many 
well-specified assumptions, concluded that drug courts in the US 
carry a benefit-cost ratio of 1.92:1.49 At this writing, the US is 
promoting drug courts heavily as part of its international drug 
control programmes.  
Drug treatment courts have potentially large economic benefits 
in theory from incarceration costs averted, but not if their rules 
39 Ibid.
40 See Rick Lines, Ralf Jürgens, Glenn Betteridge et al., ‘Prison needle exchange: lessons from a comprehensive review of international evidence    
and experience,’ (Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2006), http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.
php?ref=1173;  
and Ingo Ilya Michels and Heino Stöver, ‘Harm reduction – from a conceptual framework to practical experience: the example of Germany’.  
Substance Use and Misuse 47 (2012): 910-922.
41 Lines et al., ibid.
42 Kate Dolan, Ben Kite, Emma Black et al., ‘HIV in prison in low-income and middle-income countries,’ Lancet Infectious Diseases 7 (2007):  
32–41.
43 Harm Reduction International, Global state of harm reduction 2012: toward an integrated response, London, 2012,  
http://www.ihra.net/files/2012/07/24/GlobalState2012_Web.pdf.
44 Vancouver Coastal Health, ‘Supervised Injection Site – User Statistics,’  
http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca/research/supporting_research/user_statistics 
45 Brandon D.L. Marshall, M-J Milloy, Evan Wood, Julio Montaner and Thomas Kerr, ‘Reduction in overdose mortality after the opening of North   
America’s first medically supervised safer injection facility: a retrospective population-based study,’ Lancet 377 (2011): 1429-1437. 
46 Martin A. Andresen and Neil Boyd, ‘A cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis of Vancouver’s supervised injection facility,’ International       
Journal of Drug Policy 21 (2010): 70-76.
47 Ryan S. King and Jill Pasquarella, ‘Drug courts: a review of the evidence,’ (Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2009),  
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_drugcourts.pdf; and Drug Policy Alliance, ‘Drug courts are not the answer: toward a health-centered  
approach to drug use,’ New York, 2011, 
         http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Courts%20Are%20Not%20the%20Answer_Final2.pdf.
48 P. Mitchell Downey and John K. Roman, ‘Chapter 9 – Cost-benefit analyses,’ in Shelli B. Rossman, John K. Roman, Janine M. Zweig et al., eds. 
The multi-site adult drug court evaluation: the impact of drug courts. (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2011), 228-250.    
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are so onerous or their protection of due process so flawed as 
to make them unattractive to a significant percentage of those 
who might benefit from them. In places where opiate addiction 
is a public health problem, drug courts should follow the 
recommendation of the board of the US National Association 
of Drug Court Professionals and allow OST as a treatment 
alternative likely to be essential for many participants.50  
 
CoNCLUSIoN
In spite of methodological challenges, a significant body 
of evidence shows that health services for people who use 
drugs have significant social and economic benefits, including 
reduction of crime and increasing the ability of people who have 
lived with addiction to be economically productive. This evidence 
has figured insufficiently in policy and resource allocation 
decision-making on drugs, apparently frequently overshadowed 
by political factors. These services should be a high priority for 
fiscally-minded governments, which should especially ensure that 
they are not undermined, for example, by policing that targets 
health or needle exchange facilities to find drug users to fill 
arrest quotas, or by undue ‘not in my backyard’ neighbourhood 
opposition to the placement of drug treatment clinics. Moreover, 
drug-related health services derive the greatest benefits when 
they target marginalised people with a propensity to commit 
crime, in spite of the obvious political challenges posed by 
directing funding toward these individuals. ■  
49 Ibid., 247.
50 National Association of Drug Court Professionals: Resolution of the Board of Directors on the availability of medically assisted treatment 
(M.A.T.) for addiction in drug courts, 17 July 2011,   
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/NADCP%20Board%20Statement%20on%20MAT.pdf
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Lawful Access to Cannabis:
Gains, Losses and
Design Criteria
Mark A.R. Kleiman1 and Jeremy Ziskind
Much of the current argument about whether to legalise various currently illicit drugs is conducted at a high level of abstraction (morality and health vs. liberty and public safety). The details of post-prohibition policies are barely mentioned and concrete outcomes are either ignored or baldly 
asserted without any careful marshalling of fact and analysis. But it is possible to try to predict and evaluate 
– albeit imperfectly – the  likely consequences of proposed policy changes and to use those predictions to 
choose systems of legal availability that would result in better, rather than worse, combinations of gain and 
loss from the change.  
The analysis below focuses on cannabis, the drug for which serious legalisation efforts are now in motion. The difficulty of that 
analysis will provide some indication of how much more difficult it would be to evaluate the question for ‘drugs’ more generally. 
Cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug, so its legalisation would influence the largest number – in some countries an absolute 
majority – of all users of illicit drugs, and eliminate a large number of arrests. But since other drugs dominate drug-related violence 
and incarceration, many of the costs of the ‘war on drugs’ would remain in place after cannabis legalisation: 
1 Mark Kleiman would like to thank GiveWell and Good Ventures for supporting his work on cannabis policy. The views expressed are the 
author’s and should not be attributed to UCLA, GiveWell or Good Ventures, whose officials did not review this article in advance.
2 James M. Cole, ‘Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement,’ US Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 29 August 
2013,  http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
3 Gene M. Heyman, Addiction: A Disorder of Choice (Harvard University Press, 2010).
 
      Summary
 ■ Adopt policies that learn. Policymakers should 
try out ideas, measure their outcomes and make 
mid-course corrections accordingly. One extreme 
version would be to incorporate a ‘sunset’ clause 
into the initial regulation, requiring a legislative or 
popular re-authorisation of legal availability after a 
trial period.
 ■ Beware commercialisation. The commercial interest 
in promoting heavy use will prove difficult to 
control through taxes and regulations. Not-for-
profit-only production and sale on the one hand, 
and state monopoly on the other, are options to 
consider before rushing headlong into a replication 
for cannabis of something resembling the existing 
alcohol industry. 
 ■ Consider incremental approaches. Not all initial 
policies are equally easy to change. In particular, 
the greater the financial (and therefore political) 
power of a commercial, for-profit cannabis industry, 
the harder it will be to make policy adjustments 
that might reduce the revenues of that industry. 
Thus, pioneering jurisdictions may want to consider 
incremental approaches that begin – and might  
end – with non-profit regimes. 
 
 ■ Let the experiments run. The places that legalise 
cannabis first will provide – at some risk to their 
own populations – an external benefit to the rest 
of the world in the form of knowledge, however 
the experiments turn out. Federal authorities in the 
United States and other places where states  
or provinces try to innovate and the guardians of 
the international treaty regimes would be well 
advised to keep their hands off as long as the 
pioneering jurisdictions take adequate measures to 
prevent ‘exports’.2
 ■ Prevent price decreases. Any consumer concerned 
about cannabis prices is probably using too much.
 ■ Plan for prevention and treatment. Abuse will 
almost certainly go up under legal availability, but 
prevention and treatment efforts can help to limit 
the size of that increase and the suffering  
it creates. 
 ■ Consider user-set quotas and other ‘nudge’ options.  
If substance abuse is a ‘disorder of choice,’3 then 
managing the choice architecture might be  
one mechanism for preventing and managing  
that disorder.
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a point often omitted by proponents of legalisation as they 
skip directly from mass incarceration and illicit-market violence 
as problems to the legalisation of cannabis as a solution. 
The claims of advocates might be more convincing if they were 
more restrained. 
At the opposite pole from bare assertion either of moral claims 
(e.g. that drug-taking is inherently wrong, or alternatively 
that any drug prohibition violates basic human rights) or of 
factual predictions (about drug abuse or incarceration) lies the 
project of formal cost-benefit analysis, which aims to weigh all 
of the gains and losses from a proposed policy change on the 
same scale: the valuations of the individual gainers and losers, 
measured by their (hypothetical) willingness to pay to enjoy 
the gains or avoid the losses. It is possible to imagine doing an 
elaborate cost-benefit analysis of legalising cannabis,4  but doing 
so in practice would require one to predict the extent of changes 
in variables that cannot even be accurately measured in the 
present, and to perform implausible feats of relative valuation 
(e.g. comparing person-years of incarceration with person-years 
of cannabis dependency). 
The size of the gains from legalisation, and in particular the 
reduction in the extent of illicit activity and of enforcement effort, 
would be greater in high-consumption countries such as the 
United States than it would in the lower-consumption conditions 
characteristic of most other advanced economies.
Key uncertainties include: 
 ■ The demand-side responses to price changes  
after legalisation, more convenient access, the 
removal of legal sanctions and the diminution  
of social stigma.
 ■ The size and direction of changes in abuse risk  
(the probability of proceeding from casual to 
problem use).
 ■ Changes in product choice (to more or less risky 
forms of the drug).
 ■ Effects on the abuse of alcohol and other drugs.  
This last set of effects is both important and unknown. In 
particular, whether alcohol is a substitute for, or instead a 
complement to, cannabis remains to be ascertained, and the 
answer might not be the same for all populations and may differ 
in terms of short-run and long-run effects. 
Since the alcohol problem in all countries is much bigger than the 
cannabis problem, indirect effects on alcohol could overwhelm 
the direct effects, converting the results of cannabis legalisation 
from a net gain to a net loss or vice versa. 
Thus reasonable ranges of difference over valuations and 
predictions will probably span the break-even point. Moreover, 
the outcomes of legalisation depend very sharply on details of 
policy that are usually not specified in the debate. 
Thus it seems hard to justify any dogmatic statement that 
cannabis legalisation would, or would not, be beneficial on 
balance, without reference to a specific locale and a specific set 
of post-prohibition policies.
If legalisation is to be tried – as now in Colorado, Washington 
State and Uruguay, very likely soon in other US states and quite 
possibly within the next decade in the US on a national level – 
it ought to be tried in an experimental spirit. Given the huge 
range of potential gains and losses, and of policy options, the 
probability of finding the perfect combination right from the 
start must surely be near zero. Thus the best initial policy will not 
be the one that comes closest to some calculated optimum, but 
instead the one easiest to adjust in light of experience, which 
among other things means building in evaluation and policy 
feedback mechanisms. The pioneers of cannabis legalisation are 
all too likely to experience in practice the validity of von Moltke’s 
maxim that no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy. 
That is not, of course, a reason not to analyse and to plan, but 
some of that analysis and planning should involve building 
in to the process the capacity to improvise in the face of the 
predictable appearance of unpredicted phenomena.
 
CATEGoRIES oF GAIN AND LoSS
One way to start the analysis would be by cataloguing 
the categories of personal and social gain and loss that 
might arise from legalisation. The following list – far from 
exhaustive – suggests the range of possible considerations. 
Potential Gains:  
 ■ Reduce the size and revenue of illicit trade, the 
associated violence and disorder and the harm 
done by arrests and incarceration. 
 ■ Increase somewhat the range of licit economic 
opportunity and generate public revenue. 
 ■ Either reduce public expenditure on law 
enforcement or free enforcement resources for 
other uses. 
 ■ Reduce the risks of cannabis consumption by 
replacing untested, unlabelled and unregulated 
product with tested, labelled and regulated 
product. 
 ■ More speculatively, it might encourage 
consumption using less health-damaging means 
(e.g. vaporisation rather than smoking) or new 
cultural practices, such as cannabis use short of 
intoxication. 
 ■ All consumers would face lower prices and a 
wider choice of products, generating increased 
consumers’ surpluses among all whose 
consumption is well-informed and not the result of 
substance-abuse disorder, and even among some 
unwise or dependent consumers.
4 Stephen Pudney, Mark Bryan and Emilia DelBono, ‘Licensing and Regulation of the Cannabis Market in England and Wales: Towards a Cost/
Benefit Analysis,’ Beckley Foundation, 14 September, 2013.
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Potential Losses: 
 ■ Increased consumption for those consumers whose 
consumption is, on balance and at the margin, 
damaging rather than beneficial to themselves. 
That might be especially true of dependent users 
(including those not now dependent who might 
become so under conditions of legal access) and of 
minors. But as the examples of tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling and food all illustrate, fashion and 
present-orientation can lead even non-dependent 
adults to make self-harming decisions. 
 ■ Losses to those whose welfare is interdependent 
(materially or emotionally) with self-harming users 
who are their kin or friends and to those harmed 
by accidents, crimes or derelictions of duty caused 
by cannabis intoxication or dependency. There 
would be analogous gains related to users whose 
lives or social performance improves from using licit 
cannabis or who avoid legal penalties for using or 
selling it due to the repeal of prohibitory laws.
There might also be, as noted, either gains or losses from 
decreased or increased self-harming or socially harmful use of 
alcohol and other drugs.
PoLICy DETAILS
The actual outcomes of any scheme of legal access would 
depend strongly on details rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-
and-con discussion of whether to legalise. The risk of a large 
increase in damaging forms of consumption would be greater at 
a lower price; the need for enforcement against illicit production 
and sale, or tax evasion by licensed producers and sellers, would 
be higher. 
Another central decision is whether to allow private for-profit 
enterprises to produce and sell cannabis, or instead to restrict 
licit activity to:
(1)   Production for personal use and free  
distribution only. 
(2)   Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises  
such as consumer-owned cooperatives like the  
Spanish ‘cannabis clubs’
(3)   Some variety of state monopoly, perhaps  
of retail sales only, leaving production to  
private enterprise. 
If the private enterprise model is chosen, an additional choice 
must be made about whether to limit market concentration 
to ensure the existence of a variety of competing firms (thus 
perhaps limiting the marketing and political power of the 
industry as a whole and – again perhaps – increasing the rate of 
product innovation and the range of products easily available) 
or instead to allow the likely development of oligopolistic 
competition, as in the markets for cigarettes and beer. 
A potential advantage of legalisation would be the provision 
of consumer information superior to that available on the 
illicit market. The corresponding disadvantage might be the 
application of powerful marketing techniques to making 
excessive consumption seem desirable and fashionable.
Cannabis is a more complex product than beer, with at least two 
and perhaps dozens of significantly psychoactive chemicals and, 
to date, only limited scientific knowledge about their actions and 
interactions. Requiring accurate label information about chemical 
content seems a sensible approach, but not all consumers will 
be able to make good use of a collection of chemical names 
and percentages. Industry participants could be given the 
responsibility of providing sound consumer information, including 
due warnings about the risks of habituation, at the point of sale 
or via websites, or that responsibility could be assigned to NGOs 
or public agencies, perhaps financed by cannabis taxation. It 
seems at least arguable that cannabis sales personnel should 
have extensive training both about the pharmacology of the 
drug and about offering good advice to consumers, making their 
role closer to that of a pharmacist or nutritionist than of a mere 
sales clerk or bartender.
By the same token, decisions would have to be made and 
executed about whether and how to limit marketing efforts. 
To some eyes at least, the alcohol industry provides a warning 
by example of what could go wrong.  In the United States, 
the doctrine of ‘commercial free speech’ might gravely impair 
the capacity of the state to allow private enterprise but 
restrain promotion.
Again as with alcohol, rules would have to be set and (imperfectly) 
enforced about public intoxication, workplace intoxication, 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence and provision to 
or use by minors.
A central fact about cannabis – as about alcohol and many other 
activities that form a persistent bad habit in a significant minority 
of their participants – is that the problem minority consumes the 
dominant share of the product. (A generalisation often cited 
as ‘Pareto’s Law’ holds that 20 percent of the participants in 
an activity account for 80 percent of the activity.) As a result, 
a commercial industry, or a revenue-oriented state monopoly, 
would depend for much if not most of its sales on behaviour that is 
self-harming. In the case of cannabis in the United States, 
something like four-fifths of total product currently goes to 
consumers of more than a gram of high-potency cannabis 
per day; about half of those daily users, according to 
their own self-report, meet clinical criteria for abuse or 
dependency. That would create a commercial incentive directly 
contrary to the public interest, and potentially great political 
pressure to do away with any restriction that promises to 
be efficacious in reducing the frequency of drug misuse. 
Under contemporary conditions in advanced Western countries, 
it is difficult to make any commodity available to adults without 
increasing access to minors, since every adult is a potential point 
of ‘leakage’ across the age barrier. Teenagers are not merely an 
important current market segment; in the eyes of companies 
trying to increase their ‘brand equity,’ they are the future. Within 
legal constraints, the alcohol and tobacco industries do their 
utmost to compete for teenage market share, even where that 
consumption is illegal. There is no reason to think that formal 
bans on marketing to minors would have more than a trivial 
impact on the efforts of participants in a legal cannabis industry 
to penetrate the youthful demographic.
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TAxATIoN AND REVENUE
Cannabis, even under illegal conditions, is a highly cost-effective 
intoxicant. At prevailing prices in the United States, a drinker who 
has not built up a tolerance for alcohol might need about $5 
worth of store-purchased mass-market beer to become drunk; a 
similarly fresh smoker could become intoxicated on perhaps $2 
worth of cannabis, or even less. Medical dispensaries in Colorado 
already offer ‘weekly special’ strains of sinsemilla cannabis at 
$5 per gram (with volume discounts), where a gram represents 
more than two standard ‘joints’ (cannabis cigarettes), each more 
than adequate to intoxicate a non-tolerant user. Vaporisation 
seems likely to lower the effective cost substantially, both 
because concentrates trade at discount to herbal cannabis on 
an intoxicant-equivalency basis and because the vaporisation 
process loses fewer of the active chemicals to combustion or as 
sidestream smoke. 
Thus there seems to be no strong argument for letting prices fall 
much from existing levels; even a user of modest means will reach 
the point where his or her cannabis use is self-harming before 
reaching the point where it becomes a budget problem. But 
since production costs under legal conditions would be negligible 
(Jonathan P. Caulkins and his colleagues have estimated costs in 
the pennies-per-joint range5) maintaining current prices would 
require very heavy taxation, whether measured in terms of the 
tax share of the final price (more than 95 percent) or in terms 
of tax-per-unit-weight (roughly $300 per ounce). Collecting such 
taxes would pose a daunting challenge; in New York City, where 
a pack (roughly one ounce) of cigarettes bears a tax burden of 
approximately $8, full tax has not been paid on more than one-
third of all cigarettes consumed.6
This suggests that taxation be a specific excise (perhaps per unit 
of THC) rather than on an ad valorem (percentage-of-market-
price) basis. Taxation levels might also be varied with product 
composition to encourage the sale of less hazardous (e.g. 
lower-THC, higher-CBD) forms of the drug. Alternatively, annual 
production quotas could be set to restrict production to achieve 
some desired price level, and producers could be required to bid 
at auction for quota rights. A properly-designed auction ought 
to be able to capture for the state almost all of the producers’ 
surplus in the commodity cannabis market.
With taxes (or quota prices) high enough to maintain illicit 
prices, cannabis could be a significant, though not a major, 
source of public revenue, on about the same scale (low double 
digits of billions of dollars per year in the United States) as 
alcohol and tobacco. How to keep even a state monopoly 
from encouraging problem use to hit revenue targets – as 
American state lotteries notoriously do – would remain 
a problem.
CULTURE AND CANNABIS CoNSUMPTIoN
Though a very large share of all alcohol – in the United States, 
approximately 50 percent – is consumed as part of intoxication 
events (‘drinking binges’), the vast majority of drinking occasions 
do not involve the user becoming intoxicated. The opposite 
seems to be true now for cannabis, where ‘getting high’ is the 
socially understood purpose of using the drug. But it is possible 
– and might be easier with clearly labelled products and more 
controllable means of administration, such as vaporisation rather 
than smoking – to have the cannabis equivalent of a single 
alcoholic drink, and it is conceivable that, under legality, norms 
of using cannabis not to intoxication might establish themselves 
at least in some social circles. Doubtless some policies would be 
more favourable than others to such a development, but too little 
is yet known to allow more than mere speculation about what 
might, or might not, work in that regard.
ENFoRCEMENT
In the long run, a legal market should require less enforcement 
attention than an illegal market. But regulations and taxes do 
not enforce themselves, and an untaxed and unregulated illegal 
market has some natural advantages over a taxed and regulated 
legal market, especially when the legal market is new and 
competitive pressures and technological advances have not yet 
driven prices down. Just as the first step in making rabbit stew 
is catching a rabbit, the first step in running a controlled market 
is to draw customers in from the uncontrolled markets. That 
will require mounting sufficient enforcement efforts to shift the 
balance of competitive advantage toward licit activity.
PREVENTIoN AND TREATMENT
Drug consumption has risks, including the risk of progressing 
to problem use. ‘Just-say-no’ prevention efforts have limited 
efficacy.7 But the natural effect of legal availability, bringing lower 
prices and decreased non-price barriers to use, is to increase 
consumption, including problem consumption. Therefore a 
legalisation scheme ought, ideally, to include a comprehensive 
information and persuasion strategy, aimed at potential as well 
as current users, and designed to minimise the number of people 
who find themselves in the grip of a substance abuse disorder. 
There are lessons to be learned from both the successes and the 
failures of current efforts to prevent alcohol and tobacco misuse.
For those who do find themselves with harmful patterns of drug 
use that prove resistant to efforts at self-management, services 
directed at ameliorating the harm they do to themselves and 
others, and if possible to restoring normal volitional control. 
It would be wrong to expect that expanded drug treatment 
services would be capable of preventing a rise in the number 
5 Jonathan P. Caulkins, ‘Estimated Cost of Production for Legalized Cannabis,’ RAND Corporation, July 2010; Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. 
Caulkins, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Robert J. MacCoun and Peter H. Reuter, ‘Altered State? Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in 
California Could Influence Marijuana Consumption and Public Budgets,’ RAND Corporation, 2010; Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter, 
‘What Can We Learn from Drug Prices?,’ Journal of Drug Issues 28 (1998): 593–612. 
6  Paul McGee, ‘Fact Sheet: NYS Cigarette Tax Evasion,’ American Cancer Society (accessed Nov. 11, 2013)
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of persons currently suffering from cannabis abuse disorder, 
but the need for those services will increase. Designing ways to 
meet that need – to identify problem users, persuade them to 
seek help, and ensure an adequate supply of services and a 
means of paying for them – ought to enter into the legalisation 
planning process.
 
USER-SET QUoTAS: A ‘NUDGE’ STRATEGy
Problem drug-taking can be thought of as a problem of impaired 
volition, in which the easy and natural thing for the user to do 
is not the most beneficial thing to do – even as the consumer 
would understand it if approaching the question thoughtfully. 
(Someone once said that if the pain of the hangover came 
before the pleasure of the intoxication, heavy drinking would 
be a virtue rather than a vice.) If that is the case, then one 
way to deal with addiction would be to change the ‘choice 
architecture’ – the decision problem presented to the consumer 
– in ways more conducive to choices consistent with the 
consumer’s goals and values and less dominated by impulse.8 
In one of his ‘self-command’ essays, Thomas Schelling tells 
the story of a firm alarmed by spreading waistlines among its 
executives, who seemed to have a hard time restraining their 
caloric intake in the company dining room.9 The elegant – and, 
apparently, effective – solution was to have everyone order lunch 
at 9:30 in the morning, when the executives were not hungry 
and when the decision to order the brownie sundae did not 
result in having a brownie sundae immediately. Once it got to 
be lunchtime, when the temptation to overeat was stronger and 
more immediate, the option was no longer available: everyone 
was stuck with whatever he or she ordered at 9:30. Now of course 
no one was being fooled; the executives knew perfectly well that 
at 1 pm they would desire more, and different, food than they 
ordered at 9:30. But, at 9:30, that forgone future – rather than 
current satisfaction – seemed like a perfectly reasonable sacrifice 
for a smaller shirt or dress size.
That suggests a policy intervention for cannabis (or alcohol or 
gambling): a system of user-set personal quotas. Under such 
an approach, any adult might purchase cannabis from a set of 
competing outlets offering a variety of products at a variety 
of prices, just as in any normal market, and do so without any 
externally-imposed limit on quantity. But every user would be 
required to register, with the registration information treated as 
personal health information and thus strongly privacy-protected. 
(Given the somewhat complex and risky nature of cannabis-
taking as an activity, it might be reasonable to require every new 
user to go over some educational material and pass a simple test, 
like a driver’s license exam, but that is a different issue.) 
At registration – which could take place in any retail 
establishment or at a state office – the new user would be 
asked to establish a personal monthly or weekly purchase quota, 
perhaps denominated in multiples of some standard dosing 
unit: for example, 40 mg of THC, roughly the content of the 
average joint. A request for a very large quota might call for 
some counselling (or even lead to suspicion that the consumer 
intended to purchase for resale to minors or other unlicensed 
buyers), but the consumer’s final decision would stand, whatever 
it turned out to be.
But that choice, once made, would then be binding; every 
purchase would have to be centrally tracked against the 
consumer’s personal limit, just as every credit card transaction 
is tracked against the cardholder’s credit limit. Once the weekly 
or monthly quota had been reached, no retail outlet would be 
allowed to sell any more cannabis to that consumer in that time 
period. The consumer would have the right to modify his or her 
quota, but while a request for a decrease would take immediate 
effect, a request for an increase would not become effective until 
after some delay, perhaps two weeks.
That system would not interfere with anyone who really wanted 
to be chronically intoxicated. But it would allow someone who 
really wanted to be an occasional user from slipping insensibly 
into a bad habit, and someone who really wanted to cut back 
to protect that desire from his or her own transient impulses. At 
minimum, it would make every cannabis user aware of his or her 
consumption pattern.
Of course, the limit would not really bind any sufficiently 
determined user, even in the short term: it would always be 
possible, with some amount of effort, to find a friend, or even a 
stranger, willing to share supplies or to make a ‘straw’ purchase. 
But just having that barrier in place might prevent some fraction 
of the substance abuse disorder that would otherwise result from 
free access to cannabis.
It seems likely that most users would set moderate quotas for 
themselves and never run into those limits, and that a smaller 
number would either start with a very high quota or start with 
a moderate quota, hit the limit a few times, increase the limit, 
start hitting the limit again, increase the limit again, and find 
themselves with bad cannabis habits. But – and this is the 
empirically open claim – it is also possible that a substantial 
number would set a limit, hit it repeatedly, and never increase 
it, and that a non-trivial number would voluntarily cut back 
their personal quotas or take themselves off the rolls entirely. 
That surely would not eliminate cannabis abuse and 
dependency, but it would give the potential problem user 
a fighting chance to overcome the joint forces of his or her 
own weakness of will and the cleverness of the cannabis 
7 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Susan S. Everingham, C. Peter Rydell, James Chiesa and Shawn Bushway, An Ounce of Prevention, a Pound of 
Uncertainty. The Cost of School-Based Drug Prevention Programs, RAND, 1999.
8 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions and Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press: 2008).
9 Thomas Schelling, ‘Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice,’ The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, 
May 1984, 1-11. 
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industry marketing experts who would be doing their utmost 
to turn him into a ‘good’ – that is, addicted – customer. 
Imperfect self-command is not a disease; it is part of the human 
condition. Virtually all of us need, at some times and with respect 
to some behaviours, what Herbert Kleber has called ‘prosthetic 
support for weak will’. ‘Nudging’ in the form of self-set but 
externally enforced quotas is one possible way to help deal with 
the self-command problem when the problem is quantitative 
and involves a well-defined salable product. It would not solve 
the problem, which is after all not soluble. But it might diminish 
its extent without the well-known side-effects of dealing with 
cannabis (and perhaps other habit-forming drugs) by making sale 
and use illegal.
CoNCLUSIoN
The debate over how to legalise cannabis tends to assume 
that for-profit commercial enterprise is the default option. 
Legalising cannabis on the alcohol model may, however, be 
the second-worst option (behind only continued prohibition); 
commercialisation creates an industry with a strong incentive 
to promote heavy use and appeal to minors through 
aggressive marketing.No system of legal availability is likely 
to entirely prevent an increase in problem use. But pioneering 
jurisdictions should consider alternative approaches including 
non-profit regimes and state monopoly. Both sides of the 
legalisation debate should acknowledge that the question is 
complex and the range of uncertainties wide. Such modesty, 
alas, is in short supply. ■
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